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Synopsis 
 
This dissertation investigates market integrity issues across a range of financial markets. The 
topics were identified in consultation with the exchanges as of importance to the trading and 
dealing of securities in financial markets.  The essays investigate the leakage of information, 
information asymmetry, market manipulation, and off-market trading across the carbon, 
equity, and option markets.  The study spans across the European Union Emissions 
Allowances (EUA) futures market, the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) equity market, 
and the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) option market (AOM).  This dissertation 
extends the research by examining unique datasets not previously available to researchers and 
investigating emerging market integrity concerns not previously covered in literature. The 
findings are relevant to the interests of exchanges, investors, regulators, and academics. 
 
The first issue examined in this dissertation is the impact of European Union emissions 
trading scheme (EU ETS) national allocation plan (NAP) announcements on carbon markets.  
The study directs its attention to carbon returns and volatility movements around official EU 
ETS PHASE II announcements.  Because the supply and demand in carbon markets operates 
within constraints set by the ruling government, it creates a level of political risk not present 
in other markets. Consequently, there is likely to be a higher degree of information 
asymmetry in carbon markets.  A select group of government employees and firm level 
auditors are apt to information regarding caps and yearly net positions in advance of the 
market.  This creates a concerning information disclosure issue for a market in its infancy.  
The findings show that Phase II announcements have an influence on both Phase I & II front 
futures and sole Phase II futures carbon returns. In addition, the results indicate that the 
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announcements have no significant impact on volatility. Together, the findings suggest a 
systematic leakage of information across all types of announcements. 
 
The second essay examines trade cancellations on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX).  
Trade cancellations are trades that are determined to have been made in error by both parties, 
and are subsequently cancelled.  There is evidence of a growing trend of trade cancellations 
on the ASX and concerns regarding manipulative activity. Results indicate return reversal 
patterns consistent with manipulative activity following the initial trades. The results also 
show that prior to the trades, the stocks exhibit higher volume, return, and volatility than a 
benchmark portfolio. During the trades, the stocks also experience significantly higher 
abnormal volume, return, and volatility.  Further, following the trades, higher abnormal 
volume and volatility patterns continue. Together, these results are consistent with the 
empirical findings on market manipulation in the literature. 
 
The final essay examines the impact of large off-market option trades on the Australian 
Options Market (AOM). The analysis involves an investigation of trade prices, quoted 
liquidity, cumulative abnormal returns, and price effects surrounding the trades on both the 
options and underlying equity market.  The results reveal that large off-market option trades 
receive price improvement when compared to the quoted prices at the time of the trade.  In 
addition, examination of bid ask spreads and quotes in 5-minute and 1-hour intervals prior to 
and following the trades show no significant impact on liquidity.  Further, price effect 
analysis reveals that large off-market option trades experience no significant leakage or 
permanent price effects.  However, there is some evidence of temporary price effects 
following large off-market option trades.  Finally, cumulative abnormal returns in the days 
surrounding the trades reveal no significant price patterns prior to and following the trades.  
14 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Market integrity is essential to the success of an exchange (see O’Hara, 2001).  Market 
integrity refers to the ability of investors to transact in a fair and informed market where 
prices reflect information. With lacklustre investor confidence and falling trading volumes, 
regulators around the world are under more pressure than ever to reassure the public that 
securities markets are fair and efficient.  In addition, technological advancement and 
economic reform has facilitated capital mobility and exchanges must compete for order flow 
based on their ability to meet these interrelated objectives.  
 
A wide variety of academic research examines market integrity. Much of this literature 
examines regulatory environments and market integrity from a legal perspective (Fischel and 
Ross, 1991; Black, 1996; Andrews, 2003). Other theoretical literature attempts to model the 
possibility of profitable market integrity concerns such as market manipulation (Allen and 
Gorton, 1992; Kose and Narayana, 1997). In recent years, some empirical focus has shifted 
towards examining market manipulation and insider trading (Aggarwal and Wu, 2006; Fishe 
and Robe, 2004). 
 
With the creation of new financial instruments and markets, and the proliferation of 
technology leading to automated trading, markets are adapting and changing at a phenomenal 
rate.  This has led to many aspects of market integrity in financial markets that have remained 
unexamined.  Thus, the main objective of this dissertation is to investigate emerging market 
integrity issues in financial markets. 
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Market integrity is essential in promoting confident and informed participation by firms and 
investors, thus contributing to an efficient and prosperous economy. A lack of market 
integrity can deprive honest investors of their capital, reduce investor confidence, increase the 
cost of capital, and deter order flow.  Further, the integrity of financial markets is crucial to 
support the liquidity and depth necessary to attract investors.  This is particularly so in the 
case of emerging markets in their infancy such as the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) market for European Union Allowances (EUAs).  Therefore, a system of 
appropriate procedures that maintain market integrity in a market is vital to the orderly 
functioning of that market. 
 
The study of market integrity is beneficial to both market operators and regulators alike.  
Market operators play an important role in maintaining confidence in market integrity, while 
the regulator plays an important enforcement role in investigating behaviour that threatens 
market integrity and taking action against those who have broken the law. Regulation is 
primarily directed towards:  
 
(i)   using disclosure as the way to keep markets informed; and  
(ii) prohibiting certain types of misconduct (notably insider trading and market 
manipulation).  
 
The proper handling of confidential information promotes market integrity and efficiency by 
reducing the risk of leaks or insider trading. It empowers entities to manage the timely release 
(in accordance with the law) of its information in accordance with its continuous disclosure 
rules.  Information disclosure and the handling of confidential information have emerged as 
key flaws in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) market for European 
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Union Allowances (EUA) following the request made by the European Federation of Energy 
Traders (EFET, 2006) to the European Commission for carbon price sensitive information 
that is accurate, final and published in such a way as to be available to all market 
participants at the same time. Therefore the first issue examined in this dissertation is the 
impact of European Union emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) national allocation plan 
(NAP) announcements on carbon markets. 
 
Market manipulation is also a major market integrity concern for market operators and 
regulators.  By distorting prices, manipulators create an artificial market in which prices do 
not reflect information and leads to an unfair market.  Manipulation can discourage market 
participation and lead investors to trade in alternative markets, thereby decreasing liquidity 
and increasing trading costs. Consequently, manipulation can also lead to an increase in the 
cost of capital and discourage firms from listing on markets where manipulation is prevalent.  
Manipulation impairs price discovery through reduced order flow and distorts prices from 
their equilibrium. This reduces informational efficiency and causes deadweight economic 
losses due to distorted resource allocation and wealth redistribution (Pirrong, 1995).  With the 
proliferation of new technologies such as broker execution engines and high frequency 
algorithmic trading, the growing trend of cancelling trades after they have executed and been 
reported have emerged as a developing concern. These trades can lead to distorted prices 
among other market wide statistics. Further, there is evidence to suggest that some of these 
trades are in violation of exchange trading rules and possibly manipulative in nature.  Thus, 
this dissertation initiates the first comprehensive investigation of trade cancellations to 
understand their magnitude and impact on market integrity. 
 
Market integrity also concerns market quality in the provision of adequate liquidity and fair 
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and informed prices when transacting large trades.  Market quality depends on the liquidity of 
the market and the price impact of trades.  One of the key research questions in market 
microstructure is how market structure can influence the economics of liquidity provision. 
Market structure defines a set of rules that affect how market participants formulate their 
trading strategies (O’Hara, 1995).  To date, a large amount of theoretical and empirical 
literature examines block trading or upstairs trading in equity markets (Grossman, 1992; 
Easley and O’Hara , 1987; Seppi, 1990; Keim and Madhavan, 1996; Madhavan and Cheng, 
1997; Smith et al., 2001; Booth et al., 2002; Bessembinder and Venkataraman, 2004; Kraus 
and Stoll, 1972; Kraus and Stoll, 1972; Holthausen et al., 1987; and Gemmill, 1996).  The 
literature examines the impact of market structure on market quality.  However, there exists a 
lack of empirical evidence for large off-market trades in derivatives markets.  Therefore this 
dissertation contributes to the literature by examining the impact of large off-market trading 
in the options market. 
 
1.1 Summary 
 
The three essays of this dissertation investigate emerging market integrity issues from three 
different financial markets. This chapter motivates each issue by illustrating its contribution 
to the existing literature. Chapter 2 contributes to the literature on information asymmetry and 
uncertainty in the carbon markets. Chapter 3 contributes to the literature on trade 
cancellations and market manipulation.  Chapter 4 contributes to the literature concerned with 
the relationship between market structure and liquidity. 
 
The remainder of this dissertation is organised as follows. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 investigate the 
three issues discussed in this chapter. Each chapter includes the literature review, data and 
18 
 
sample, research design, empirical results, and conclusions reached. Overall conclusions are 
presented in Chapter 5. 
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Chapter 2: The Impact of European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) National Allocation Plans (NAP) on Carbon 
Markets. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The first essay examines the impact of information disclosure practices and the handling of 
confidential information in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) market 
for European Union Allowances (EUA). Information asymmetry and uncertainty is a 
dominant feature of the cap and trade EU ETS.  The two major sources of information 
asymmetry and uncertainty are derived from the process of setting future emissions caps 
based on projected figures and past emissions (the supply constraint), and the yearly 
verification of emission through audits.  Inconsistencies in emissions data from different 
agencies create a level of information asymmetry and uncertainty among market analysts, and 
diminishes their ability to make accurate assessments of the market (Kanen, 2006). 
 
The EU ETS provides an opportunity to examine the effect of numerous unscheduled and 
sporadic releases of official information on a single price series.  The market for European 
Union Allowances (EU ETS carbon credits) is also unique in several other ways.  First, the 
asset itself is a product of legislation, where individual governments under the supervision of 
the European Commission are responsible for setting emissions caps and allocating EUAs to 
firms.
1
 Therefore the National Allocation Plans that are examined essentially set the supply of 
EUAs, and the Verifications report the demand during the preceding period and the 
                                                 
1
 A European Union Allowance (EUA) gives the holder the right to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide.  Each 
futures contract represents 1,000 EUAs. 
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remaining supply. Further, because supply and demand in carbon markets operates within 
constraints set by the ruling government, it creates a level of political risk not present in other 
markets.  Second, there is likely to be a higher degree of information asymmetry in carbon 
markets. A select group of government employees and firm level auditors are apt to 
information regarding caps and yearly net positions in advance of the market. Third, futures 
contracts in Phase II 2008 EUAs traded without a spot market for approximately two years 
(Frino, Kruk and Lepone, 2010). 
 
Despite these interesting characteristics, the majority of literature focuses on the 
environmental and political aspect of emissions trading.  The common themes out of the 
handful of studies that do investigate emissions trading from a financial markets perspective 
are carbon pricing, price discovery, market efficiency, and information asymmetry.
2
  
Surprisingly, the majority of research focuses on the spot EUA market, even though it 
accounts for only two percent of the EU ETS trading volume.  In this work, we attempt to 
correct the imbalance in emissions trading literature by examining the European carbon 
futures market. Futures markets are essential to the development of the EU ETS as they 
facilitate risk transfer and price discovery, as well as providing a forecast for the marginal 
cost of abatement. Specifically, this study analyzes the impact of Phase II National Allocation 
Plans announcements on carbon returns during the period February 2006 through December 
2008, during which time more than 170 announcements were released. 
 
                                                 
2
 Studies of carbon pricing include Mansanet-Bataller, Tornero, and Mico (2006), Sijm, Neuhoff, and Chen 
(2006), Alberola, Chevallier, and Cheze (2007), Convery and Redmond (2007), Daskalakis, Psychoyios, and 
Markellos (2007), and Daskalakis and Markellos (2007a).  Studies of information asymmetry and uncertainty in 
the European carbon market include Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo, 2007; Chevallier, Ielpo, and Mercier, 2008.  
Studies of carbon market efficiency and price discovery include Daskalakis and Markellos (2007b) and 
Milunovich and Joyeux (2007). 
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This study follows the event study approach of Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007).  
However, this study differs to that of Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007) in focusing mainly 
on EU ETS Phase II announcements (National Allocation Plans) and Phase I verifications on 
both the front futures (which include both Phase I & II prices) and the sole Phase II futures 
prices (December 2008 expiry). The study of Phase II prices and announcements is of greater 
importance because under the EU ETS, it is the first Kyoto Protocol compliant phase of 
emissions trading. The EU Phase I emissions trading scheme was initiated as a trial phase to 
prepare for Phase II in which real abatement was to occur.  Subsequently, Phase I EUAs were 
found to be over allocated.  Phase II allocations are more restrictive and are likely to lead to a 
real reduction and abatement in emissions. As reported on April 1, 2009 by the European 
Commission after the release of 2008 verified emissions data, the second phase ETS was 
short in 2008 despite the economic downturn (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2009). 
 
Further, since mid-2006, the majority of EU ETS trading occurs in the Phase II December 
2008 expiry carbon contract (Frino et al., 2010). Therefore the study of Phase II 
announcements and its impact on both the front futures and Phase II futures returns is likely 
to yield more robust conclusions regarding the impact of carbon announcements on carbon 
returns and volatility.  This will provide further insights into the operation of the EU ETS into 
the future, and may highlight regulatory factors that can be improved upon. 
 
An advancement of this study is that we source the earliest date on which an official 
announcement becomes public by searching through both official and carbon specific news 
databases. This is an attempt to address a limitation in the Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo 
(2007) study that does not account for information that becomes public before the official 
announcement date. Information leakage occurred most notably in Phase I when several 
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member states released their 2005 emissions data ahead of the European Commission’s 
official release date (Frino et al., 2008). 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 describes the literature and 
develops several testable hypotheses. Section 2.3 outlines the current process of releasing 
official information on the EU ETS. Section 2.4 describes the data and sample. Section 2.5 
sets out the research design, and presents the empirical results. Section 2.6 summarises the 
chapter. 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
This section reviews the literature related to the issues examined in this study. In turn, based 
on the literature reviewed, a number of testable hypotheses are developed. This section is 
structured as follows. Section 2.2.1 provides a review of the literature concerned with carbon 
market liquidity and volatility.  Section 2.2.2 offers a review of the literature that examines 
the merits of the EU ETS allocation plan methodology.  Section 2.2.3 reviews the literature 
on information asymmetry and uncertainty in carbon markets.  Section 2.2.4 uses the 
literature reviewed to develop testable hypotheses that are tested subsequently in this study. 
 
2.2.1 Carbon Market Liquidity & Volatility 
 
Theory stipulates that the price of permits under the EU ETS should establish the marginal 
cost of emissions reductions that is sufficient to meet the allocation cap set in within the 
scheme (Betz, 2006). However in practice the scheme has experienced impediments in the 
form of substantial price volatility and liquidity costs. 
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Frino, Kruk, and Lepone (2010) investigate the market microstructure of EU ETS futures 
markets during the period April 2005 to June 2008. The study investigates liquidity by 
examining volume, volatility, bid-ask spreads, depth, and market impact costs for ECX CFI 
contracts. Frino, Kruk, and Lepone (2010) note a monotonic increase in liquidity represented 
by increased volume and decreased quoted and effective spreads.  They also report that the 
tick size was reduced in 2007 as trading volume increased, however, they do not identify the 
changing tick size as a factor that influences liquidity directly, in contrast to Bessembinder 
(2003).   Furthermore, Frino, Kruk, and Lepone (2010) note increasing market impact and 
total price effects with increasing trade sizes. They conclude that larger trades incur greater 
market impact costs, while small trade sizes actually experience price reversals, consistent 
with a developing market.  
 
Based on their findings Frino, Kruk, and Lepone (2010) suggest that trades are increasingly 
being executed by informed traders. Benz and Hengelbrock (2008) similarly find evidence of 
increased liquidity for both the ECX and Nord pool futures markets, and signal considerably 
larger increases in liquidity for the more liquid ECX market, consistent with Chowdhry and 
Nanda (1991) and Admati and Pfleiderer’s (1988) arguments that liquidity encourages further 
liquidity. 
 
Kruger (2008) found the main contributors to carbon price volatility under the EU ETS were 
fuel prices, weather, and policy developments.  Betz (2006) examined EU ETS carbon price 
volatility and concluded that the underlying reason for the volatility is the fact that the EU 
ETS is a relatively new market and new markets generally require time to realise real price 
discovery. Furthermore, it becomes difficult for a market structured like the EU ETS, with a 
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small number of dominant large players to achieve informational efficiency. There are three 
recent studies which shed some light on this issue with Seifert et al (2008) suggesting some 
evidence of efficiency based upon a test of autocorrelations, but only using a very small 
sample. In sharp contrast to this Daskalakis and Markellos (2008) found significant 
autocorrelations in the data and dismissed the random walk notion as applying to carbon 
prices. Montagnoli and de Vries (2010) used a series of variance ratio tests to find that the EU 
ETS was inefficient during Phase I but efficient during the first period of Phase II. This 
suggests that the carbon market shows the first signs of maturation after the learning and trial 
period of Phase I. 
 
Lepone, Sacco, and Yang (2013) investigate long-horizon weak form market efficiency in the 
Phase II EU ETS Carbon Futures Market. Using data that spans trades in both Phase I and 
Phase II futures they find evidence of a significant structural change to the EU ETS from 
Phase I to Phase II and support for the efficient market hypothesis during Phase II (2008–
2010), similar to Montagnoli and de Vries (2010). Furthermore, their results suggest that 
documented improvements in market quality, increasing trading activity, and removal of 
Phase I market frictions have fostered improvements in market efficiency into and during 
Phase II. 
 
Though the carbon market is clearly still at a pilot stage of development, there is evidence to 
suggest that the carbon allowance market is starting to show some signs of efficiency as a 
centre of price discovery and dissemination and that in the near future it is likely to grow in 
size and scope of complexity (Bettelheim and Janetos 2010). 
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2.2.2 EU ETS Allocation Plans 
 
There are three particular issues of importance with the allocation of caps in the EU ETS.   
The first is the fact that allocation was essentially free, with minor exceptions, for the first 
two phases that essentially triggered a “free allocation” (or grandfathering—i.e., giving 
companies permits based on historical output or emissions) versus auctioning.  Second, the 
trading scheme only applied to a portion of the emissions, thereby creating potential 
inefficiencies between the traded and non-traded sectors. Third, the highly decentralized 
nature of the process in phase 1 of the EU ETS, which was mainly the responsibility of 
member states had perverse incentive effects. 
 
National Allocation Plans (NAPs) were the instruments each member state used to decide 
how many allowances would be allocated and who would get them.  The most 
comprehensive review of these issues, but especially the realties and the implications of 
allocation in the first phase are to be found in Ellerman, Buchner, and Carraro (2007) and 
Buchner, Carraro, and Ellerman (2006).  
 
The second-phase (2008–2012) allocations are carefully dissected in Neuhoff et al. (2006). 
Burtraw (2001) provides an overview of the issues regarding the grandfathering versus 
auctioning debate and their impact on economic efficiency.  Cramton and Kerr (2002) also 
examine the merits of grandfathering versus auctioning and find that an auction of carbon 
permits is the best way to achieve domestic carbon caps designed to limit global climate 
change. 
 
Bohringer, Hoffmann, and Manrique-de-Lara-Penate (2006) examine the inefficiencies 
inherent in splitting the market between the trading and the non-trading sectors. Essentially 
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the paper concludes that the main efficiency problem of the EU ETS is the separated carbon 
markets that do not allow for equalized abatement costs between ETS and non-ETS sectors.  
Bohringer and Lange (2005) address the optimal design of grandfathering schemes by 
investigating how different allocation schemes can affect the outcome of an emissions trading 
scheme like the EU ETS. They find that an emission trading scheme with updated 
grandfathering based on emissions can in fact be cost-effective. 
 
The issue of auctioning, and its implications, has continued to be a subject of considerable 
analysis, with the analytical community’s broad consensus in favour of auctioning running 
into the realpolitik of securing initial agreement from key stakeholders, for whom free 
allocation was a prerequisite. 
 
2.2.3 Information Asymmetry and Uncertainty in Carbon Markets 
 
Information asymmetry and uncertainty is a dominant feature of the cap and trade EU ETS.  
The two major sources of information asymmetry and uncertainty are derived from the 
process of setting future emissions caps based on projected figures and past emissions (the 
supply constraint), and the yearly verification of emission through audits.  Inconsistencies in 
emissions data from the different agencies create a level of information asymmetry and 
uncertainty among market analysts and diminish their ability to make accurate assessments of 
the market (Kanen, 2006).  Emissions data published by the European Environment Agency 
and the EU transaction log differs substantially. They are collected according to different 
procedures and sector definitions and sometimes by different government bodies. In addition, 
the allocation and reporting process for the national allocation plans in Phase I and Phase II 
lacked transparency and hence led to further uncertainty. 
27 
 
 
Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007) study the effect of Phase I and Phase II information 
releases on Phase I prices during the period October 2004 through May 2007.  They 
document that returns are significantly higher on days when the European Commission 
released additional information and approved Phase I National Allocation Plans. Their results 
also reveal significantly higher returns after the 2005 verifications and significantly lower 
returns following 2006 emissions announcements.  The study suggests that differences in the 
EU ETS being short or long during the trading period affected the opposite returns to the 
verifications data. These results provide evidence that information regarding Phase I NAPs 
and verifications have a material effect on Phase I carbon prices. 
 
Further, they also examine returns and volatility surrounding the announcement days.  The 
study documents significant returns preceding Phase I National Allocation Plan notification, 
Phase I NAP additional information, Phase II National Allocation Plan notification, and 2005 
verifications announcements. In concert with their finding that volatility is not significantly 
different following announcements, their study reveals a systematic leakage of information 
preceding EU ETS announcements. 
 
Following Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007), Miclăuş, Lupu, Dumitrescu, and Bobircă 
(2008) also examine the effect of EU ETS Phase I & II National Allocation Plans and 
Verifications announcements on both spot and futures prices by testing the AR(1)-
GARCH(1,1) model. The AR-GARCH model in their case presents the markets’ 
expectations, and is used to provide forecast returns in the period around the event. Their 
methodology analyses both the daily differences in the realised and expected returns as well 
as the cumulated differences for the period around the event. Consistent with Mansanet-
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Bataller and Pardo (2007), trends in the cumulated abnormal returns in their study preceding 
the event suggest that the information about the event is known by some part of the market in 
advance. They also find that verifications announcements have a greater effect on market 
dynamics than NAP announcements. 
 
Similarly, Chevailler, Ieplo, and Mercier (2008) examine the impact of the 2006 emissions 
verification announcement on changes in investors’ risk aversion on the European Carbon 
Market using options and futures market data. They test the hypothesis that strong reversals 
in investors’ anticipations occur during the 2006 compliance event, and in addition, that the 
level of volatility decreases after the diffusion of information by the EC which tends to 
dissipate previously misleading trading information on this new market. The study 
empirically recovers risk aversion adjustments on the period 2006-2007 by first estimating 
the risk-neutral distribution from option prices, and then the actual distribution from futures 
on the European Climate Exchange. Their study uncovers a shift in the level of risk aversion 
on the EU ETS following the publication of the 2006 verified emissions data by the EC on 
April 30, 2007.  Further, they observe lower levels of volatility for contracts of maturity 
December 2008 and December 2009 during the time period after the 2006 compliance event. 
This latter result suggests that Phase I verification information has a strong market effect. 
 
Frino, Kruk, and Lepone (2010) suggest that regulators need to ensure the timely 
dissemination of all price-sensitive information in line with the findings of Mansanet-Bataller 
and Pardo (2007) and Miclăuş et al (2008) that suggest a systematic leakage of information 
prior to official announcements. The Frino, Kruk, and Lepone (2010) study finds a positive 
and statistically significant permanent price effect indicative of informed trading. They 
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conclude that the potential for insider trading in the market may potentially harm investor 
confidence and lower uninformed trading and liquidity (Madhavan et al., 1999). 
 
Kalaitzoglou and Ibrahim (2013) analyze trading behaviour through non-price order flow 
variations as a source of information revelation in the European Carbon Futures Market.  
They define three regime specifications motivated by three behavioural trading patterns: 
informed trading characterized by high volume and short duration, uninformed or non-
discretionary trades that arrive randomly, and fundamental or discretionary trades that have 
lagged behaviour.   The empirical results reveal that private information is indeed revealed in 
the rate of order flow, as measured by trading intensity. Informed traders seem to act first 
and, at least to a sizable proportion, before price changes, in support of the proposition of 
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) of the intense activity of the informed. 
 
Kalaitzoglou and Ibrahim (2013) also find evidence that informed trading behaviour is 
followed by similar, but slightly delayed and less intense, activity of discretionary liquidity 
traders. Their delayed order flow prolongs the effect, or revelation, of the information that the 
order flow of the informed has started. They follow a learning process and act as ‘informed’ 
to a third much larger group of uninformed or non-discretionary liquidity traders that are 
present in the market. The order flow of this third group is characterized by longer duration 
and lower trading intensity. The behaviour of the informed and fundamental groups gives 
credence to Kyle’s (1985) strategic activity of traders. 
 
In contrast, Ibikunle et al. (2013) use the Huang and Stoll (1997) spread decomposition 
model to discover that higher levels of information asymmetry are present during the after 
30 
 
market close period/hour than at any other interval/hour during the normal trading day.  They 
also find evidence that contribution to price discovery is a function of liquidity. Their 
findings reveal that less liquid contracts are the highest contributors to price discovery, even 
though they are informationally inefficient.  
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2.2.4 Hypothesis Development 
 
The European Union Emissions Trading Schemes provides a unique opportunity to examine 
the effect of numerous unscheduled and sporadic releases of official information on a single 
price series.  Furthermore, the EU ETS cap and trade system, a product of legislation, 
provides a market that is exposed to a higher level of political risk than other markets.  This 
introduces a higher degree of information asymmetry and uncertainty within the market.  This 
study sets out to examine the impact of these information releases on the price, in a market 
operating with inherently higher informational asymmetry and uncertainty.  This study also 
aims to investigate whether the political and bureaucratic framework that essentially creates 
the market supply constraint introduces any market integrity concerns regarding the way in 
which information regarding the National Allocation Plans and Verifications is handled. 
 
Empirically, the prior literature has examined the impact of National Allocation Plan and 
Verifications announcements on the Phase I carbon price series.  The literature (Mansanet-
Bataller and Pardo, 2007; and Miclăuş et al., 2008) finds that returns are significantly higher 
on days when the European Commission released additional information and approved Phase 
I National Allocation Plans. Their results also reveal significantly higher returns after the 
2005 verifications and significantly lower returns following 2006 emissions announcements.  
The findings suggest that differences in the EU ETS being short or long during the trading 
period affected the opposite returns to the verifications data.  Furthermore, they uncover that 
trends in abnormal returns preceding the announcements suggest that the information about 
the event is known by some part of the market in advance. 
 
Together, the studies provide findings that suggest that higher returns are to be expected on 
the day of the announcements of National Allocation Plan and Verifications official 
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information releases.  Furthermore, they present evidence of a systematic leakage of 
information during Phase I announcements that lead to abnormal returns prior to the 
announcements. 
 
However, these findings are all based on Phase I of the EU ETS, which was initiated as a trial 
phase to prepare for Phase II in which real abatement was to occur.  In this study we focus 
mainly on EU ETS Phase II announcements (National Allocation Plans) and Phase I 
verifications on both the front futures (which include both Phase I & II prices) and the sole 
Phase II futures prices (December 2008 expiry). Phase II prices and announcements are likely 
to yield differing results as it is the first Kyoto Protocol compliant phase of emissions trading. 
Furthermore, Phase I EUAs were found to be over allocated.  Phase II allocations are more 
restrictive and are likely to lead to a real reduction and abatement in emissions.  These 
differences suggest that it is difficult to predict the impact of Phase II announcements on 
carbon prices.  Hence, the following hypotheses are tested in this study. 
 
Hypothesis2,1: Phase II National Allocation Plan announcements lead to significantly higher 
returns on announcement days. 
 
Hypothesis2,2: Phase II National Allocation Plan announcements lead to significantly higher 
returns on the days preceding the announcement day. 
 
Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007) find that volatility is not significantly different following 
NAP and Verifications announcements.  Presenting further evidence for their suggestion of 
systematic leakage of information.  In contrast, Chevailler et al. (2008) find that the level of 
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volatility decreases after the diffusion of the 2006 Verifications information by the EC that 
led to dissipating previously misleading trading information on the market. 
 
As the above discussion indicates, it is difficult to predict the impact of the NAP and 
Verifications announcements on volatility.  Hence, the following hypothesis is tested in this 
study. 
 
Hypothesis2,3: NAP and Verifications announcements have no impact on volatility. 
 
2.3 Release of Information in the EU ETS 
 
The NAP is the document in which Member States determine both the total quantity of CO2 
allowances available in the Member State and the allocation made to each installation 
covered by the Scheme, which must subsequently be approved by the European Commission.  
The Draft of this document must be published for public consultation before the Member 
State final version is delivered to the European Commission. Once the NAP is notified, the 
European Commission has 3 months for its assessment, and subsequent publication of the 
corresponding Commission Decision. It is compulsory that the European Commission 
approves the NAP of each country. If it is not the case, the NAP will be modified until the 
European Commission approves it. All NAPs must be submitted to the European 
Commission by the end of June two years before the start of the corresponding Phase, so that 
the final NAP can be approved at the end of that year. The procedure makes it difficult to 
know in advance the exact date of publication of new information (Mansanet-Bataller and 
Pardo, 2007). Figure 2-1 depicts this process graphically. 
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Figure 2-1 National Allocation Plans and Verifications 
This Figure shows how the deadlines are organised in the EU ETS. Two years before the compliance period, NAPs have to be submitted before 30 June to the European 
Commission.  They have to be approved before 31 December of the same year.  When the real emissions take place two years later, the verified report has to be presented by 
each of the companies before 31 March to their respective governments.  Then before 30 April, the companies must surrender the allowances that correspond to their real 
emissions.  On 15 May, the compliance report of the Member States is published. 
 
 
Source: Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007) 
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Participating companies are required to indicate the amount of emitted CO2 of the previous 
calendar year by March 31, and surrender the allowances by April 30 each year.  The number 
of allowances must be equal to the total verified emissions from that installation during the 
preceding calendar year. Additionally, around 15 May, the Members States must submit a 
report of the verified emission to the European Commission including all the companies in 
the country covered by the European Directive. When this information is published, the 
agents in the market know whether the companies are long or short in respect of the 
allowances that they have received from their governments. 
 
The various types of announcements are divided into two categories: news strictly related to 
National Allocation Plans (NAPs) and news related to the Verification of Emissions (VER). 
In the first group we have 11 sub-categories of events: the First Draft of the NAP, Second 
Draft of the NAP, Initial Notification of the NAP to the European Commission, Second 
Notification of the NAP to the European Commission, Notification of Additional NAP 
Information related to the NAP to the European Commission, NAP Approval by the 
European Commission, NAP Conditional Approval, NAP Amendment, NAP Amendment 
Additional Information, NAP Amendment Approval, and Other announcements that relate to 
the EU ETS such as administrative changes. In the second group, the Verification of 
Emissions, there are 3 subcategories: verified emissions for the year 2005, verified emissions 
for the year 2006, and verified emissions for the year 2007.  All dates on which more than 
one different type of announcement occurred are eliminated from the sample for robustness.
3
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 An analysis that includes all the announcements does not produce results that are qualitatively different. These 
are available upon request from the authors. 
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2.4 Data and Sample 
 
Trading of emission allowance futures contracts is primarily performed through the European 
Climate Exchange (ECX) in the Netherlands. Since the ECX does not allow spot EUA 
trading, it uses Powernext spot prices as a reference for the futures contracts. The ECX 
accounts for approximately 87% of the total exchange-based futures contract transactions in 
Europe (Frino et al., 2010). To analyse the influence of NAP related announcements on 
carbon prices, we are interested in the most representative series of EUA prices.  Therefore 
from 1 February, 2006 to the end of the sample (31 December, 2008), we use the ECX 
nearest Carbon Futures Instrument (CFI) contract for the front futures analysis and the ECX 
CFI with December 2008 expiry for sole Phase II price analysis. Table 2-1 reports the 
contract specifications for ECX CFI futures.  Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007) report that 
the ECX has the greatest volume among all carbon markets. 
 
Table 2-1 ECX CFI Contract Specifications 
The Table below reports the contract specifications for ECX CFI futures. 
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ECX futures contracts data is sourced from the Reuters DataScope Tick History (RDTH) 
Database provided by SIRCA, which includes every bid and ask price submitted each day 
(together with accurate time stamps). The underlying asset of the futures contract is 1,000 
spot EUAs, with the most liquid contracts being those with annual (December) maturities. All 
futures contracts that expire in December of each year between 2006 and 2008 are used. The 
data correspond to the daily average mid-point of intraday quotes calculated from every quote 
update within a day. 
 
Finally, carbon prices are tested for stationarity, using the Augmented Dickey – Fuller (ADF) 
test.  A well-documented stylized fact of financial time series data is their non-stationarity.
4
  
Panel A of Table 2-2 presents results of the ADF Unit Root tests for both the front futures 
and sole Phase II price series. Additionally, various statistics of carbon returns are calculated.  
Panel A of Table 2-2 shows that carbon prices contain a unit root (i.e. they are non-
stationary).  In order to render the series stationary, log-returns are taken.  That is, 
continuously compounded returns are constructed as rc,t = ln(Pc,t /Pc,t-1), where Pc,t is the 
carbon price at time t.  Panel A of Table 2-2 shows the unit root results for log-returns of the 
carbon price series to be stationary.  Furthermore, results in Panel B of Table 2-2 indicate the 
normality hypothesis for the carbon returns series is rejected. The Shapiro-Wilk test statistics 
indicate that carbon returns series are non-normally distributed. The series present much 
fatter tails than a normal distribution.  In total, 179 NAPs and 20 Verifications 
announcements are analysed.  The announcements data includes 24 First Draft NAP 
announcments, 8 Second Draft NAP announcements, 27 Initial NAP notifications, 7 Second 
NAP notifications, 54 Additional NAP information announcements, 7 NAP Approvals, 21 
                                                 
4 This non-stationarity property is related to the fact that most of financial time series data exhibit 
“random walk” behaviour. 
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NAP Conditional Approvals, 8 NAP Ammendments, 12 NAP Ammendment Additional 
information announcements, 7 Ammendment Approvals, and 4 Other announcements.  Table 
A-1 in the appendix presents all the separate announcments and their corresponding release 
dates. 
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Table 2-2 Augmented Dickey - Fuller Test and Statistics of Carbon Returns 
Panel A of this table shows the results of the Augmented Dickey - Fuller test for the carbon prices 
and returns.  The critical values for the rejection of the null hypothesis of the existence of a unit 
root are -3.4336, -2.8621 and -2.5671 for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels respectively 
(MacKinnon, 1991).  In Panel B the descriptive statistics for carbon returns are shown. 
 
 
  
ADF Statistic (Tau)  Pr < Tau
-2.63 0.0871
-22.71 <.0001
ADF Statistic (Tau)  Pr < Tau
-3 0.036
-17.13 <.0001
Kurtosis 8.864452
Shapiro-Wilk 0.917092
Augmented Dickey - Fuller Test Statistics for Carbon Prices and Returns
Median -0.000819
Standard Deviation
rc
Phase II (Dec, 2008) Futures
rc
Skewness
Kurtosis
0.027997
Skewness -1.050538
Mean -0.000823
Descriptive Statistics of Carbon Returns
Shapiro-Wilk
Phase I & II Front Futures
Carbon Prices
Carbon Returns
Carbon Prices
Carbon Returns
0.293817
-0.000775
-0.002370
6.450795
161.5743
0.227434
Mean
Median
Standard Deviation
Phase I & II Front Futures
Phase II (Dec, 2008) Futures
Panel B:
Panel A:
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2.5 Research Design and Empirical Results 
 
2.5.1 Influence of Announcements on Carbon Returns 
 
If security prices reflect all currently available information, then price changes must reflect 
new information. Therefore, it is possible to measure the importance of an event of interest 
by examining price changes during the period in which the event occurs. We apply event 
study methodology to the return series constructed to examine carbon return behaviour 
around NAP and Verification related events. Following Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007), 
we use two approaches; a regression method, and the Constant Mean Adjusted Return model. 
 
2.5.1.1 Regression Method 
 
The regression approach involves modelling daily abnormal returns as coefficients of dummy 
variables for the event period and the returns before and after. The dummy variables are used 
to parameterize the effects of each particular event. An advantage of this approach is that it 
takes into account distributional aspects such as volatility clustering, leptokurtosis or the 
presence of ARCH effects. 
 
Following the methodology of Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007), the following is 
estimated: 
rC,t=θ'xt + βEt+εt 
(2-1) 
where rC,t is the carbon return, xt includes a constant term and non-event related explanatory 
variables and Et includes the dummy variables representing each of the events considered. 
Each event variable is equal to one on the announcement day, zero otherwise. 
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The non-event related variables include the energy commodities variables that are used as 
explanatory variables of carbon prices.
5
 Following Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007), the 
most representative prices of oil and natural gas in Europe are selected. To account for the 
series of energy variables that better fits the front futures contract of carbon, the front contract 
for the energy variables is also constructed. That is, the contract for the energy variables with 
the closest maturity to the maturity of the carbon contract considered is selected. All series 
data are obtained from the Reuters Database. The futures contract on WTI Crude Oil is 
quoted in USD per barrel; the futures contract on Natural Gas is quoted in GBP per therm. 
Both values are converted into Euros using the daily exchange rate data available from the 
European Central Bank.
6
 As with carbon prices, energy prices also present a unit root, and are 
thus converted into stationary returns by taking first logarithm differences. 
 
The information announcment dummy variables are analysed in two ways. In the first model, 
the effect of one dummy variable for each type of event described (NAPs and Verifications) 
is considered grouped together.  That is, the NAP dummy variable includes all NAP related 
events, while the Verifications dummy includes all verifications related events. In the second 
model, the NAP and Verifications grouped dummy variables are separated into 14 dummy 
regressors (explained in the section 2.3 Release of information in the EU ETS) and the 
regressions re-estimated. For each type of event, the dummy variables are constructed with 
ones on the days of announcements of its type, and zero otherwise. The regressions are 
estimated for both the front futures prices and the sole Phase II prices (December 2008 
expiry). All regressions are estimated by applying the Newey-West covariance matrix 
estimator that is consistent with the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The 
results of the regressions are presented in Tables 2-3 and 2-4. 
                                                 
5
 Robustness tests reveal that that the current models are specified correctly and no other determinant variables 
are identified. 
6
 See http://www.ecb.int 
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The estimated regressions for the Phase I & II front futures are presented in Table 2-3.  Only 
in the regression with the dummy variables considered separately are any event coefficients 
statistically different from zero (see Model 2 in Panel A). The significant variables include 
WTI Crude Oil returns, Notification of Additional NAP Information, NAP Conditional 
Approval, and NAP Amendment Approval. These findings suggest that news related to Phase 
II of the EU ETS affects the front futures contracts that mainly consist of prices from Phase I 
of the scheme. In addition, all the significant announcements have negative coefficients.  This 
may imply that the EUA market deduced that Phase I EUAs were over allocated by observing 
the restrictive nature of the NAPs for Phase II. These results are in contrast with that of 
Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007) who find that Phase II announcements had no significant 
impact on front futures prices during the period October 2004 through May 2007.  A possible 
explanation is that NAP announcements related to the conditional approval of NAPs and 
amendments are significant, and these announcements usually arise later in the NAP setting 
process and are not captured in the sample period examined by Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo 
(2007). 
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Table 2-3 Regression Model Results - Front Futures 
Panel A presents the estimates of Model (1) and Model (2).  In Model (1) the regression of CO2 returns has been 
calculated on energy variables and dummy variables considered grouped.  In Model (2) the regression of CO2 
returns has been calculated on energy variables and dummy variables considered separately.  Panel B reports the 
R
2
, the Adjusted R
2
, the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and the Schwarz Criteria (SC). 
 
 
 
Additionally, the coefficients associated with verifications of emissions for 2006 are 
marginally significant at the 10% level, and are negative. This is explained by the fact that 
verified emissions were long in 2006.  However, the results differ from that of Mansanet-
Bataller and Pardo (2007) who find that 2005 verifications also have a significant negative 
impact on the front futures. On further inspection, it is revealed that the initial primary 2005 
verifications announcements were eliminated from the sample because of other confounding 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
-0.0108 -1.4001 0.0034 0.3627
-0.2559 -1.0226 -0.2593 -0.9969
0.7062 2.4669 0.8024 2.4806
0.0629 1.2747
0.0083 0.2235
-0.0027 -0.1990
0.0054 0.5369
-0.0015 -0.1237
0.0548 1.2014
-0.0300 -2.1984
-0.0018 -0.0270
-0.0510 -2.4132
0.0076 0.5672
-0.0484 -1.0303
-0.2091 -2.2038
0.0050 0.0611
-0.1054 -1.9440
-0.0034 -0.2407
-0.1356 -1.8906
0.011658
0.006337
0.330704
0.008686
-0.013012
0.365793
Schwarz criterion
NAP Amendment
Initial Notification of the NAP
NAP Amendment Additional Information
NAP Amendment Approval
Verification 2005
Verification 2006
Verification 2007
Other
R
2 
squared
Akaike criterion
Panel B: Goodness of Fit Measures
Second Notification of the NAP
Notification of Additional NAP Information 
NAP Approval
NAP Conditional Approval
R
2
 - Adjusted
Model 1 Model 2
rc,t (WTI Crude returns)
ALL NAPs
ALL Verifications
First Draft of the NAP
Second Draft of the NAP
0.361569 0.470734
Model 1 Model 2
α
Variable
rg,t (Natural Gas returns)
Panel A: Estimates of Model 1 and Model 2 for the Phase I & II Front Futures
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announcements on the same days. Those that remain were late verifications data from 
individual smaller countries. 
 
Assessment of the Phase I & II regression results in Table 2-3 reveal that the coefficients of 
determination (R
2
) are extremely low, and fail to explain more than 1.2% of the variation in 
carbon returns. Regressions estimated on Phase II (December 2008) returns in Table 2-4, 
however, yield superior coefficients of determination at 9.7% and 10.3%, respectively.  Panel 
A of Table 2-4 reveals that both Natural Gas returns and WTI Crude Oil returns are highly 
significant at the 1% level, with both having a positive effect on carbon returns. Panel B 
reveals similar results for the energy variables. A possible reason that Gas and Oil returns are 
not significant in explaining carbon returns in Phase I & II front futures, but significant in 
explaining carbon returns variation in Phase II prices, is that the trial phase EUAs were over-
allocated. For a fuel switching price to arise, which would make energy commodities viable 
explanatory variables of carbon returns, there would have to be a lower supply than demand 
for EUAs. This provides further support for our motivation in examining Phase II prices. 
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Table 2-4 Regression Model Results - Phase II Futures 
Panel A presents the estimates of Model (1) and Model (2).  In Model (1) the regression of CO2 returns has been 
calculated on energy variables and dummy variables considered grouped.  In Model (2) the regression of CO2 
returns has been calculated on energy variables and dummy variables considered separately.  Panel B reports the 
R
2
, the Adjusted R
2
, the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and the Schwarz Criteria (SC). 
 
 
 
Similar to Table 2-3, only in the regression with the dummy variables considered separately 
are any of the announcement dummy variable coefficients statistically different from zero 
(see Model 2 in Panel A).  Both NAP Conditional Approval and NAP Amendment have a 
significant positive effect on carbon returns, while NAP Amendment Approval has a highly 
significant (at the 1% level) negative effect on carbon returns. This may suggest that on 
conditional approval by the European Commission or the request for amendments to the 
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
-0.0009 -0.9114 -0.0006 -0.6422
0.0629 2.6924 0.0627 2.8153
0.3581 7.5568 0.3571 7.7499
0.0006 0.2464
-0.0018 -0.0765
0.0001 0.0216
-0.0008 -0.5330
-0.0045 -1.1531
-0.0014 -0.2688
-0.0023 -0.5008
0.0115 0.5126
0.0125 2.5178
0.0091 3.6979
-0.0005 -0.0425
-0.0136 -11.4151
-0.0093 -0.1837
-0.0138 -1.0521
0.0056 1.0235
0.0000 0.0010
0.0838
Akaike criterion -4.4812 -4.4558
Model 1 Model 2
R
2 
squared 0.0973 0.1037
Schwarz criterion -4.4500 -4.3498
R
2
 - Adjusted 0.0923
Verification 2005
Verification 2006
Verification 2007
Other
Panel B: Goodness of Fit Measures
Notification of Additional NAP Information 
NAP Approval
NAP Conditional Approval
NAP Amendment
NAP Amendment Additional Information
NAP Amendment Approval
ALL Verifications
First Draft of the NAP
Second Draft of the NAP
Initial Notification of the NAP
Second Notification of the NAP
rg,t (Natural Gas returns)
rc,t (WTI Crude returns)
ALL NAPs
Panel A: Estimates of Model 1 and Model 2 for the Phase II (December, 2008) Futures
Model 1 Model 2
Variable
α
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submitted NAP, the market overreacts on average. The subsequent price reduction on news of 
the amendment approval corresponds to a correction of the market. The results from Table 2-
4, together with the results from Table 2-3, suggest that news concerning NAPs following 
their NAP conditional approval or requests for amendments to the NAP by the European 
Commission are the most significant announcements concerning NAPs in Phase II. 
Examining the sample announcements data, it is quickly apparent that a very small minority 
of NAPs are approved initially, with most progressing to conditional approvals and requests 
for amendments. This may explain the findings, and also suggest that in Phase II, the 
European Commission took a more hard-line approach to the approval of NAPs. 
 
Concerning verifications announcements, all the verifications dummy variables are 
insignificant in explaining any of the variation in Phase II carbon returns. This result is 
expected as the verifications announcements all relate to Phase I of the EU ETS.  In addition, 
because there is no inter-phase banking of EUAs between Phase I and Phase II, these 
announcements have no bearing on the Phase II EUA supply or prices. 
 
Overall, the results suggest that carbon returns do react to Phase II announcements, although 
their impact is greater in Phase II futures. However, because of the uncertain and volatile 
nature of the market, and inefficiencies in its administration, we require an assessment of the 
days surrounding an announcement to adequately interpret the results.  Furthermore, 
following McKenzie et al. (2004), the use of all available data could lead to spurious 
inferences when carbon returns do not present a normal return constant over time (Mansanet-
Bataller and Pardo, 2007). Additionally, when examining regulatory events on the carbon 
market, the formal date or the day the information becomes public may not coincide with the 
date when the new information reaches the market. This is due to the high level of 
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information asymmetry present in the infant stage EU ETS and the extensive consultation 
that takes place with stakeholders prior to announcement, as discussed earlier.  In this case, 
the use of the regression approach may have little power to reject the null hypothesis of no 
effect on the carbon price as the price response to the formal announcement will only reflect 
the announcment relative to expectations (conditioned by the consultation process). Based on 
this, we extend the analysis to include the Truncated Mean model analysis that allows a 
broader range of days to be analyzed. 
 
3.5.1.2 Truncated Mean Model 
 
Following Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007), the truncated mean model approach is 
adopted, which is a truncated version of the Constant Mean Return Model (Brown and 
Warner, 1985).  The abnormal returns are measured as the difference of the returns in t minus 
a mean return from some benchmark of the estimation period. However, the benchmark 
return is a truncated average of the estimation period. That is, to calculate the truncated mean 
return, the largest and smallest 10% of returns during the estimation period are excluded. As 
a sole commodity (carbon prices) is examined, which is affected by a large quantity of closed 
and sporadic announcements, the objective is to minimize the effect of large surprises in the 
estimation period. 
 
 ̅ a,τ is defined as the truncated mean for the announcement day “a” and the 2*l days 
surrounding (l is the number of days in the prediction period before the announcement, which 
coincides with the number of days after it). To calculate this truncated mean, this study 
proceeds as follows: 
1. This study considers the announcement day as the reference day (t = 0). 
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2. The estimation period is defined as the days included in the interval from t1=- (τ+l) 1 to 
t2= -(l+1).  τ = 10, 20 and 30 are considered. Therefore, following Milonas (1987) the 
estimation periods have effectively τ days and finish l+1 days before the announcement. 
3. The τ returns of the estimation period are re-ordered from the smallest to the largest, such 
that r1 is the smallest return in the estimation period and rτ the largest, with τ = 10, 20 and 30, 
respectively. 
4. k is defined as the number representing 10% of the estimation period and consequently it is 
the number of returns that will be excluded from each of the extremes: k = τ * p where τ is the 
number of days in the estimation period and p = 10%.
7
 
Given that k is an integer, following Wilcox (2001), the truncated mean is calculated as: 
 ̅a,τ = 
 
    
 ∑   
   
      
(2-2) 
where ri is the i
th
 return of the estimation period after ordering. Additionally, for any 
announcement “a”, a standardized excess return ZRa,t is calculated for each day of the 
prediction period.
8
 The standardized excess returns are the excess returns standardized by the 
truncated standard deviation in the estimation period, calculated using the same procedure as 
in the mean case. The expression for the standardized excess returns is: 
  a,τ,t = 
      ̅   
  
 
(2-3) 
For each of the (2*l+1) days of the prediction period, the portfolio standardized excess 
returns is calculated, which is an equally weighted portfolio of the standardized excess 
returns: 
  ̅̅ ̅̅  a,τ,t = 
 
 
 ∑        
 
    
                                                 
7
 Note that k is 1, 2, and 3 in the case of an estimation period of 10, 20, and 30 days, respectively. 
8
 The prediction period has (2*l + 1) days. 
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(2-4) 
where N is the number of announcements of a specific type of event. The null hypothesis is 
whether the portfolio excess returns are equal to zero on the day of the announcement (t = 0). 
 
Following Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007), three different scenarios are considered.  
Panel A of Tables 2-5 and 2-6 present results when considering all the announcements 
released in the sample period. The results are grouped in NAPs and Verifications and Table 
2-5 illustrates the results when examining the Phase I & II front futures, while Table 2-6 
examines Phase II (December 2008) futures. The second scenario considers only the 
announcements that do not have another announcement in the three previous days. These 
results are presented in Panel B of Tables 2-5 and 2-6. The third scenario is limited to the 
announcements where no other announcements are released in the six days surrounding it.  
All three scenarios are considered, each more restrictive than the previous, in order to assess 
whether the results are robust given that surrounding announcements could be leading to 
confounding findings.  These results are presented in Panel C of Tables 2-5 and 2-6. 
Additionally, the same analysis is undertaken by substituting the returns series by the residual 
series of the regression of carbon returns, taking as independent variables the energy 
variables from the previous section.
9
 The results are presented in Panels A, B and C of Table 
2-5 and 2-6.
10
  
 
Tables 2-5 and 2-6 document that there are many events with statistically significant 
differences before the announcement date. This occurs when the complete sample (Panel A), 
and the other two scenarios (Panels B and C) are considered.  This suggests that the market 
                                                 
9
 The specification of the regression is                            . 
10
 We only present the results with the returns (residuals) standardized with the truncated mean and variance of 
the estimation period of 10 days.  The results of the standardized returns with the truncated mean and variance 
of the estimation period of 20 and 30 days are qualitatively similar. 
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anticipates the impact of the news prior to the announcment and may possibly hint at a level 
of information leakage during the consultation period. Additionally, most of the 
announcement days present statistical significance, suggesting that the new information has 
an effect on the price series when it becomes public. 
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Table 2-5 Truncated Mean Model Results – Front Futures 
In this Table we present the results of the test with the null hypothesis that the portfolio excess returns are equal to zero. 
In our case we perform this test for the day of the announcement, the 3 previous days and the 3 next days. In Panel A we 
present the results with the complete sample. In Panel B we consider the announcements days where there has not been 
an announcement within the 3 previous days. Finally, in Panel C we consider the announcement days where there has not 
been an announcement within the 6 days around the announcement. The first column in the Table presents the days (“0” 
is the announcement day). The next four columns refer to the standardized returns and the last 4 columns to the 
standardized residuals of Model 1 in the previous Table regression. The ZRt mean column shows the mean of the 
portfolio of the standardized returns (residuals) for each of the event groups (NAPs and Verification), and the p-value 
column shows the p-value of the test.  Number refers to the number of times an announcement of each kind of event has 
been produced. 
 
  
Days ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value
-3 -0.4491 0.0000 -2.3484 0.0000 0.0275 0.7595 -1.2435 0.0000
-2 0.4393 0.0000 -1.4315 0.0000 0.8326 0.0000 -1.5929 0.0000
-1 -0.5132 0.0000 -1.9966 0.0000 -0.5135 0.0000 -2.4266 0.0000
0 1.0002 0.0000 -2.5557 0.0000 0.8751 0.0000 -3.8448 0.0000
1 -2.6907 0.0000 -4.8835 0.0000 -2.4941 0.0000 -6.9974 0.0000
2 0.4405 0.0000 -6.2177 0.0000 0.6439 0.0000 -8.1976 0.0000
3 -0.3941 0.0000 -7.6080 0.0000 -1.3347 0.0000 -9.5946 0.0000
Number
Days ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value
-3 0.2660 0.0967 -0.8824 0.0776 2.0553 0.0000 0.0829 0.8683
-2 -0.0403 0.8011 -2.1632 0.0000 1.7087 0.0000 -3.0198 0.0000
-1 0.1327 0.4071 -2.6841 0.0000 0.0047 0.9766 -2.3527 0.0000
0 1.4412 0.0000 1.8645 0.0002 2.2176 0.0000 0.9269 0.0638
1 -2.3473 0.0000 -17.1697 0.0000 -1.8431 0.0000 -19.5371 0.0000
2 -3.9144 0.0000 -5.5336 0.0000 -4.9059 0.0000 -6.3544 0.0000
3 0.3975 0.0130 0.4278 0.3922 1.0239 0.0000 1.8585 0.0002
Number
Days ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value
-3 0.7089 0.0060 -0.6654 0.3467 4.8996 0.0000 0.1418 0.8410
-2 0.3144 0.2234 -2.2495 0.0015 3.7597 0.0000 -1.4847 0.0358
-1 -0.4632 0.0728 -3.4980 0.0000 -1.1300 0.0000 -4.1473 0.0000
0 -1.0108 0.0001 0.3189 0.6520 -1.0699 0.0000 0.4499 0.5246
1 -1.4787 0.0000 -2.3920 0.0007 -1.0767 0.0000 -2.2469 0.0015
2 0.0609 0.8135 0.3247 0.6461 -1.0043 0.0001 2.0581 0.0036
3 2.9829 0.0000 -1.3717 0.0524 4.0501 0.0000 0.6343 0.3697
Number
124 11
Panel A: All announcements considered.
Returns Residuals
ALL NAPs ALL Verifications ALL NAPs ALL Verifications
Residuals
ALL NAPs ALL Verifications ALL NAPs ALL Verifications
Panel C: Announcements without any other announcement 3 days on either side.
15 2 15
Returns Residuals
ALL NAPs ALL Verifications ALL NAPs ALL Verifications
2
39 4 39 4
124 11
Panel B: Announcements without any other announcement 3 days before.
Returns
 52 
 
Table 2-6 Truncated Mean Model Results – Phase II Futures 
In this Table we present the results of the test with null hypothesis that the portfolio excess return are equal to zero. In our 
case we perform this test for the day of the announcement, the 3 previous days and the 3 next days. In Panel A we present 
the results with the complete sample. In Panel B we consider the announcements days where there has not been an 
announcement within the 3 previous days. Finally in Panel C we consider the announcements days where there has not been 
an announcement within the 6 days around the announcement. The first column in the Table presents the days (“0” is the 
announcement day). The next four columns refer to the standardized returns and the last 4 columns to the standardized 
residuals of Model 1 in the previous Table regression. The ZRt mean column shows the mean of the portfolio of the 
standardized returns (residuals) for each of the event groups (NAPs and Verification), and the p-value column shows the p-
value of the test.  Number refers to the number of times an announcement of each kind of event has been produced. 
 
 
Days ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value
-3 -0.1838 0.0407 -1.1863 0.0001 0.0683 0.4467 -1.4209 0.0000
-2 -0.5076 0.0000 -1.5164 0.0000 -0.3617 0.0001 -1.4948 0.0000
-1 -0.0308 0.7320 -1.7113 0.0000 0.1778 0.0478 -2.1793 0.0000
0 -0.5196 0.0000 -1.8274 0.0000 -0.3923 0.0000 -1.1827 0.0001
1 0.0162 0.8571 -3.3307 0.0000 -0.1842 0.0403 -2.5033 0.0000
2 0.3954 0.0000 -3.4139 0.0000 0.4183 0.0000 -2.1346 0.0000
3 -0.2579 0.0041 -4.0402 0.0000 -0.3260 0.0003 -2.6905 0.0000
Number
Days ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value
-3 0.6277 0.0001 -0.2550 0.6101 0.7736 0.0000 0.3380 0.4991
-2 -1.2986 0.0000 -2.6091 0.0000 -1.3230 0.0000 -2.9444 0.0000
-1 0.7475 0.0000 -1.6009 0.0014 0.8514 0.0000 -1.8199 0.0003
0 -0.6489 0.0001 1.0215 0.0411 -0.5685 0.0004 0.7575 0.1297
1 1.1793 0.0000 -6.7492 0.0000 0.1853 0.2472 -7.0955 0.0000
2 1.4828 0.0000 -0.0168 0.9732 1.2651 0.0000 0.5334 0.2860
3 0.1567 0.3279 0.5628 0.2603 0.1103 0.4908 1.2869 0.0101
Number
Days ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value
-3 0.3820 0.1390 -0.6654 0.3467 0.2439 0.3449 0.1657 0.8148
-2 -2.9883 0.0000 -2.2495 0.0015 -2.8924 0.0000 -2.3902 0.0007
-1 0.5349 0.0383 -3.4980 0.0000 0.5376 0.0373 -4.5007 0.0000
0 -2.0054 0.0000 0.3189 0.6520 -1.4588 0.0000 0.8007 0.2575
1 3.7518 0.0000 -2.3920 0.0007 1.5065 0.0000 -2.5011 0.0004
2 2.4106 0.0000 0.3247 0.6461 1.7142 0.0000 1.8891 0.0075
3 1.5976 0.0000 -1.3717 0.0524 0.6414 0.0130 -0.2258 0.7495
Number 15 2 15 2
Panel C: Announcements without any other announcement 3 days on either side.
Returns Residuals
ALL NAPs ALL Verifications ALL NAPs ALL Verifications
ALL NAPs ALL Verifications ALL NAPs ALL Verifications
39 4 39 4
11 124 11
Panel B: Announcements without any other announcement 3 days before.
Returns Residuals
124
Panel A: All announcements considered.
Returns Residuals
ALL NAPs ALL Verifications ALL NAPs ALL Verifications
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For a more in-depth examination of which type of announcement is relevant to the 
market, the events considered separately are analysed. The results for the most 
restrictive scenario, the one considering only the announcements without any other 
announcement in the six days surrounding it, are presented in Tables 2-7 and 2-8. 
Examining Panel A of both tables, it is apparent that within the NAP announcements 
category, only on the days of the Initial NAP Notification are there significant 
positive returns across both the Phase I & II front futures and the sole Phase II futures. 
In contrast, the remaining types of announcements in the NAP category, such as 
Additional NAP info, NAP Approval, NAP Conditional Approval, NAP Amendment 
Additional Info, and Amendment Approval all exhibit a significant negative reaction. 
For Phase II futures, it may reflect that the market tends to price in a restrictive cap 
when member states initially notify the EC of their NAP.  Therefore, on subsequent 
amendments and conditional approvals, the market reduces its perceived expectation 
of a very restrictive cap and hence the negative reactions. In addition, although the 
Phase II NAPs are more restrictive and will result in an average cut of nearly 7% 
below the 2005 emission levels, the inclusion of offsets undermines this claim. This 
may be another reason for the negative reactions to the majority of Phase II NAP 
announcements. 
 
Reviewing the reactions on the days surrounding Verifications announcements (2005 
and 2007), the results suggest that they fail to cause a significant reaction on the day 
of the announcement.
11
 However, there are significant price movements leading up to 
the announcement day. This confounding discovery may suggest that there is 
considerable leakage of verifications data before the information becomes public, and 
                                                 
11
 Verifications for 2006 are not in the analysis because they were eliminated from the sample as they 
had other announcements in the 6 days surrounding it. 
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that the information is already impounded into prices. These findings lend further 
credence to the allegations of a high degree of information asymmetry and possible 
insider trading concerning EU ETS official announcements. The leakage of 
information is further pronounced when considering the most restrictive scenario in 
which there are no other announcements in the 6 days surrounding the announcement 
of interest. In many cases, the significant price reaction leading up to an 
announcement is also in the same direction. This again suggests the existence of 
information leakage. 
 
Panel B of Tables 2-7 and 2-8 present the results when the residual series are 
considered, and confirm the finding that the market reacts before (or on) the day of 
the official announcement. Several other announcements such as Initial NAP 
Notification, Additional NAP Info and NAP Amendment Additional Info also lead to 
significant reactions beyond t=0 in Phase I & II front futures, while Additional NAP 
Info, NAP Amendment Additional Info, and NAP Amendment Approval all cause 
significant reactions beyond t=0 in the sole Phase II futures. This may suggest that 
there is uncertainty following information releases in the EUA market, and that it 
requires several days to resolve the uncertainty and accurately price in the 
information. 
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Table 2-7 Truncated Mean Model Results: Events Separated – Front Futures 
 
In this Table we present the results of the test in which the null hypothesis is that the portfolio excess return is equal to zero, for the scenario most restrictive (considering the announcement day 
without any other announcement on the six days surrounding it). In our case we perform this test for the day of the announcement, the 3 previous days and the next 3 days. Panel A (B) present 
the results for the returns (residuals of the regression of Model 1 in Table II & III) taking into account exclusively the announcements without any other announcement 3 days before and after it. 
In all cases the ZR mean column shows the mean of the portfolio of the standardized returns for each of the events considered, and the p-value column shows the p-value of the test. Number 
refers to the number of times an announcement of each type has been produced. * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
  
Days ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value
-3 -1.3099 0.0233 -4.6476 0.0000 5.4844 0.0000 -0.4178 0.5546 -9.9273 0.0000 0.1494 0.8813 0.2911 0.7709 -3.9905 0.0001 2.6598 0.0078
-2 -5.5094 0.0000 -7.6383 0.0000 6.3348 0.0000 0.3130 0.6580 2.6993 0.0069 -5.2550 0.0000 -1.5920 0.1114 -1.8214 0.0685 -2.6776 0.0074
-1 -1.2728 0.0275 -1.1904 0.2339 -0.9661 0.0308 1.0438 0.1399 3.1270 0.0018 -6.3464 0.0000 3.7069 0.0002 -3.2650 0.0011 -3.7310 0.0002
0 1.9077 0.0010 6.3023 0.0000 -1.5619 0.0005 -2.6032 0.0002 -0.4401 0.6599 -12.7321 0.0000 -2.9905 0.0028 0.4065 0.6844 0.2313 0.8171
1 -0.5729 0.3211 -2.8623 0.0042 -3.7676 0.0000 0.3130 0.6580 0.1525 0.8788 -0.3973 0.6911 -2.3583 0.0184 -5.0077 0.0000 0.2237 0.8230
2 0.7078 0.2202 -0.1149 0.9085 0.7910 0.0770 0.3130 0.6580 0.2460 0.8057 -10.3449 0.0000 4.8386 0.0000 -3.0929 0.0020 3.7422 0.0002
3 0.0617 0.9149 0.4521 0.6512 3.4524 0.0000 0.3130 0.6580 -0.6645 0.5064 20.0081 0.0000 4.2553 0.0000 -2.6136 0.0090 -0.1297 0.8968
Number
Days ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value
-3 -0.3488 0.5457 -2.7948 0.0052 17.5665 0.0000 -0.9478 0.1801 -9.5762 0.0000 0.1740 0.8619 0.4715 0.6373 -5.2720 0.0000 5.5264 0.0000
-2 -2.9767 0.0000 -7.6125 0.0000 15.7594 0.0000 -0.1832 0.7955 2.5393 0.0111 -4.8808 0.0000 -1.1499 0.2502 1.5998 0.1097 -4.5300 0.0000
-1 1.3331 0.0209 -4.8699 0.0000 -3.3573 0.0000 0.7965 0.2600 2.7696 0.0056 -5.4164 0.0000 3.5615 0.0004 -3.8622 0.0001 -4.2888 0.0000
0 -0.3092 0.5923 7.9124 0.0000 -1.4139 0.0016 -2.1112 0.0028 -0.3934 0.6940 -10.7361 0.0000 -2.3792 0.0174 0.3535 0.7237 0.5107 0.6096
1 0.4587 0.4269 -3.6964 0.0002 -3.4158 0.0000 0.1968 0.7808 0.2187 0.8269 -0.4596 0.6458 -1.7721 0.0764 -2.4007 0.0164 -2.0493 0.0404
2 -1.2732 0.0274 4.7718 0.0000 -2.3690 0.0000 0.2289 0.7461 0.0409 0.9674 -8.1647 0.0000 4.3436 0.0000 -1.0331 0.3016 5.0109 0.0000
3 -0.1923 0.7391 3.6554 0.0003 5.0136 0.0000 -0.2914 0.6803 -0.6152 0.5384 16.0083 0.0000 3.6736 0.0002 1.5194 0.1286 -0.3919 0.6952
Number 1 1 1 1
Verification 2005 Verification 2007
3 1
1
5 2 1
1
Panel B: Results with the Residuals series
NAP Ammendment 
Additional Info
Ammendment 
Approval
First Draft NAP Initial NAP 
Notification
Additional NAP Info NAP Approval NAP Conditional 
Approval
Verification 2005 Verification 2007
3 1 5 2 1 1 1
First Draft NAP Initial NAP 
Notification
Additional NAP Info NAP Approval NAP Conditional 
Approval
Panel A: Results with the Returns series
NAP Ammendment 
Additional Info
Ammendment 
Approval
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Table 2-8 Truncated Mean Model Results: Events Seperated – Phase II Futures 
In this Table we present the results of the test in which the null hypothesis is that the portfolio excess return is equal to zero, for the scenario most restrictive (considering the announcement day without 
any other announcement on the six days surrounding it). In our case we perform this test for the day of the announcement, the 3 previous days and the next 3 days. Panel A (B) present the results for the 
returns (residuals of the regression of Model 1 in Table II & III) taking into account exclusively the announcements without any other announcement 3 days before and after it. In all cases the ZR mean 
column shows the mean of the portfolio of the standardized returns for each of the events considered, and the p-value column shows the p-value of the test. Number refers to the number of times an 
announcement of each type has been produced. * denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
  
Days ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value
-3 -3.5919 0.0000 -5.5658 0.0000 1.4548 0.0011 7.3746 0.0000 -5.0173 0.0000 2.4492 0.0143 4.5832 0.0000 -3.9905 0.0001 2.6598 0.0078
-2 -19.9123 0.0000 -10.1226 0.0000 1.6944 0.0002 6.7554 0.0000 0.8945 0.3710 2.9014 0.0037 -0.9804 0.3269 -1.8214 0.0685 -2.6776 0.0074
-1 -0.7119 0.2176 5.1078 0.0000 0.2491 0.5776 -0.2819 0.6902 6.2884 0.0000 -3.0389 0.0024 -2.8124 0.0049 -3.2650 0.0011 -3.7310 0.0002
0 -0.9286 0.1078 5.6758 0.0000 -2.3993 0.0000 -6.6001 0.0000 -2.7645 0.0057 -4.3156 0.0000 -1.2485 0.2119 0.4065 0.6844 0.2313 0.8171
1 17.7824 0.0000 1.7209 0.0853 0.5567 0.2132 0.7229 0.3066 2.8590 0.0043 -3.7886 0.0002 -1.4100 0.1585 -5.0077 0.0000 0.2237 0.8230
2 2.9102 0.0000 -2.0113 0.0443 3.2430 0.0000 8.6674 0.0000 2.4379 0.0148 1.7191 0.0856 0.7976 0.4251 -3.0929 0.0020 3.7422 0.0002
3 -0.2835 0.6234 3.5712 0.0004 2.7995 0.0000 5.2110 0.0000 1.9657 0.0493 2.1178 0.0342 0.8921 0.3723 -2.6136 0.0090 -0.1297 0.8968
Number
Days ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value ZRt mean p-value
-3 -1.5074 0.0090 -4.9478 0.0000 0.3022 0.4992 5.1663 0.0000 -3.4037 0.0007 2.5697 0.0102 4.6536 0.0000 -5.5056 0.0000 5.8545 0.0000
-2 -16.1461 0.0000 -11.9966 0.0000 1.0389 0.0202 4.2234 0.0000 0.7478 0.4546 2.2538 0.0242 -2.4726 0.0134 -0.3796 0.7042 -4.4088 0.0000
-1 1.2073 0.0365 2.7830 0.0054 0.3840 0.3905 -1.0830 0.1256 3.9867 0.0001 -2.8040 0.0050 -2.2393 0.0251 -4.0018 0.0001 -4.9986 0.0000
0 -1.8183 0.0016 7.4953 0.0000 -1.2541 0.0050 -2.6079 0.0002 -1.5615 0.1184 -4.1012 0.0000 -3.3857 0.0007 0.7385 0.4602 0.8625 0.3884
1 5.5842 0.0000 1.4477 0.1477 1.5212 0.0007 0.4698 0.5064 2.9453 0.0032 -3.2445 0.0012 -2.6265 0.0086 -4.3270 0.0000 -0.6706 0.5025
2 1.3295 0.0213 1.5843 0.1131 2.5341 0.0000 8.1444 0.0000 1.5285 0.1264 1.9800 0.0477 0.0100 0.9920 -2.6081 0.0091 6.3922 0.0000
3 -0.6653 0.2492 7.1540 0.0000 3.3550 0.0000 2.9351 0.0000 2.0052 0.0449 2.0199 0.0434 -2.2687 0.0233 -0.6396 0.5224 0.1701 0.8650
Number
NAP Conditional 
Approval
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Panel A: Results with the Returns series
1
First Draft NAP Initial NAP 
Notification
Additional NAP Info NAP Approval
NAP Approval NAP Conditional 
Approval
1
Panel B: Results with the Residuals series
NAP Ammendment 
Additional Info
Ammendment 
Approval
Verification 2005 Verification 2007
3 1
Ammendment 
Approval
Verification 2005 Verification 2007
3 1
1
First Draft NAP Initial NAP 
Notification
Additional NAP Info
1
5 2 1 1 1 1 1
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2.5.2 Influence of Announcements on Carbon Volatility 
 
This section reviews the impact of Phase II NAPs and Phase I Verifications 
announcements on carbon return volatility. This allows an examination of whether 
there is a systematic leakage of information. As the announcements are mainly 
unscheduled and sporadic, it is expected that upon becoming public, there will be a 
higher degree of volatility as the news is priced in. However, if there is no change in 
volatility, it may suggest a systematic leakage of information before it becomes 
public. 
 
To test the difference in volatility before and after the event, two tests are undertaken 
– the Brown-Forsythe test and the sign test. Consistent with the previous section, both 
the return series and the residual series of the regression are used. 
 
2.5.2.1 Brown and Forsythe Test 
 
The Brown-Forsythe test allows testing for seasonality in the unconditional variance. 
The Brown-Forsythe test statistic is calculated as: 
F = 
∑     ̅    ̅   
  
   
∑ ∑          
 
  
   
 
   
 
   
   
 
(2-5) 
where      |      ̂   | ;     is the return for the day t and the interval j; ̂    is the 
sample median return for the interval j over the relevant    days;  ̅    = ∑ (
   
  
)
  
    is 
the mean absolute deviation from the median  ̂    for the time interval j; and     = 
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∑ ∑ (
   
 
)
  
   
 
    is the grand mean where    ∑   
 
   . The test statistic is distributed 
        under the null hypothesis of equality of variances across the J time intervals. 
 
Following Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007), applying this test to the peculiarities 
of the sample is coherent with the idea of minimising the effects of large surprises in 
the estimation period. Specifically, a prediction period of 10 days separated into two 
sub-periods, both of 5 days is considered. The first sub-period consists of the 5 days 
preceding the announcement and the second sub-period includes the announcement 
day and the following 4 days. Therefore, the division of the prediction period is the 
announcement day. 
 
The results of the Brown-Forsythe test applied to the announcement days without any 
other announcement on the 6 days around it are presented in Panels A and B of Tables 
2-9 and 2-10. This sample is chosen for two reasons. First, following these criteria the 
analysis is consistent with the more restrictive analysis of the impact of the 
announcements on carbon returns presented in the previous section. Second, if the test 
is only applied to announcement days without any other announcement during the 10-
day prediction period, the sample will be drastically reduced. Additionally, the 
Brown-Forsythe test uses the mean absolute deviation from the median, and thus the 
possible extreme values provoked by an announcement in the prediction period will 
not distort the results. 
 
Focusing on Panel A of Tables 2-9 and 2-10, the results for the Brown-Forsythe test 
for both the return series and the residual series are similar. If we consider the 
variables grouped in NAPs and Verifications (Panel A), in both cases the null 
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hypothesis is never rejected. Furthermore, NAP announcements lead to a higher 
variance after the announcement only in 7% of the cases when examining Phase II 
returns. 
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Table 2-9 Equality Test Results – Front Futures 
This table presents the results of two equality tests. Panel A (B) shows the results of the Brown- Forsythe test for the carbon returns and the residuals series considered grouped (separated). 
Panel C (D) shows the p-value for the standardized returns and residual series sign test for the variables considered grouped (separated). In all cases, the null hypothesis is that the variance 
during the 5 days preceding the announcement day is equal to the variance in the period made up of the announcement day and the next 4 days. In Panel A and B, the times the null hypothesis 
is rejected is expressed in percentage. The different rows present the results for the possible alternative hypotheses. The last row shows the total number of announcements of each type of 
event. In order to be consistent with the previous analysis, the announcement days considered are those without any announcements on the 6 days around it. For both Panel C and D, the series 
are standardized with the truncated mean and variance of a period of 10 days. 
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Null HypothesisAlternative Hypothesis NAPs VER NAPs VER
σ0=σ1 σ0>σ1 0.3036 0.2500 0.6964 0.2500
σ0=σ1 σ0<σ1 0.8491 1.0000 0.5000 1.0000
15 2 15 2
σ0=σ1 σ0>σ1 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.7500 0.5000 1.0000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000
σ0=σ1 σ0<σ1 0.8750 1.0000 0.8125 0.7500 1.0000 0.5000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
3 1 5 2 1 1 1 1 1
σ0=σ1 σ0>σ1 0.5000 1.0000 0.8125 0.7500 0.5000 1.0000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000
σ0=σ1 σ0<σ1 0.8750 0.5000 0.5000 0.7500 1.0000 0.5000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
3 1 5 2 1 1 1 1 1
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Table 2-10 Equality Test Results – Phase II Futures 
 
This Table presents the results of two equality tests. Panel A (B) shows the results of the Brown- Forsythe test for the carbon returns and the residuals series considered grouped (separated). 
Panel C (D) shows the p-value for the standardized returns and residual series sign test for the variables considered grouped (separated). In all cases, the null hypothesis is that the variance 
during the 5 days preceding the announcement day is equal to the variance in the period made up of the announcement day and the next 4 days. In Panel A and B, the times the null hypothesis 
is rejected is expressed in percentage. The different rows present the results for the possible alternative hypothesis. The last row shows the total number of announcements of each type of 
event. In order to be consistent with the previous analysis, the announcement days considered are those without any announcements on the 6 days around it. For both Panel C and D, the series 
are standardized with the truncated mean and variance of a period of 10 days. 
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Panel B of Tables 2-9 and 2-10 present results where the events are considered separately for 
both Phase I & II front futures. None of the announcements provoke any change in carbon 
variance, when examining both returns and residuals. For Phase II futures, only Additional 
NAP information announcements cause an increase in carbon variance following the 
announcement in 20% of the cases, both for returns and residuals. Finally, in no case is the null 
hypothesis rejected when considering the announcements related to the verification of 
emissions. 
 
Overwhelmingly, the results illustrate that the majority of announcements cause no statistical 
difference in variance following the announcement.  In the isolated case where the variance 
before and after the announcement is statistically different, an increase of the variance is 
detected after the announcement.  These results are consistent with the notion that NAP related 
announcements do not have a significant effect on carbon volatility. 
 
2.5.2.2 Sign Test of Carbon Variance 
 
Following Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007) and Milonas (1987), the equality test of the 
variance of the standardized excess returns is undertaken to completely assess the equality of 
the variance before and after announcements. Consistent with the previous analysis, this test is 
also applied to the residual series. Specifically, the period that comprises of the 5 previous days 
to the announcement is separated from the period comprised of the day of the announcement 
and the next 4 consecutive days. Then the equality of the variances of the standardized returns 
explained in the Truncated Mean Model section is tested with l = 5 between the two sub-
periods. As in the case of the Brown-Forsythe test, and for the same reasons, the sample period 
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of the announcements without any other announcements during the 6 days surrounding it is 
considered. 
 
The null hypothesis of the sign test is that the variance of the standardized returns (residuals) 
during the five days preceding the announcement of a particular event is equal to the variance 
of the standardized returns (residuals) in the period starting from the announcement day and 
finishing 4 days after. This is represented as follows: 
      
     
   or               
   =       
   = 0.5 
That is, if the sample data for each type of event is consistent with the hypothesized variance 
value for this particular event, half of the sample observations related to the event will lie 
above   
  and half below. Thus, the number of observations larger than K can be used to test 
the validity of the null hypothesis.  The two possible alternative hypotheses are: 
      
    
   and         
     
  
As the distribution of the random variable K is the binomial probability with parameters N and 
θ, with θ = 0.5, the rejection region for the       
     
  for an α-level test is: 
K ϵ  R   for K ≤    
where    ‘ is chosen to be the largest integer which satisfies: 
        
  |     ∑ (
 
 
)       
 
    
     
where N is the number of announcements of a particular event. For       
     
  , the 
rejection region for an α-level test is: 
K ϵ  R   for K ≥    
where    is chosen to be the smaller integer which satisfies: 
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The results of the one-side tests for the events considered grouped are shown in Panel C of 
Tables 2-9 and 2-10, and the results of the test for the events considered separately are in Panel 
D.
12
 In both cases, the p-value is presented for the two possible alternative hypotheses. As 
shown in Panels C and D of Table 2-9, for all of the events, the carbon returns present the same 
variances before and after the event unanimously (all p-values are larger than α = 0.05).  In the 
case of the residuals series, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis and consequently we 
cannot reject the equality of variances of the residual series before and after the announcement. 
The results of the tests are the same for all types of events, independent of whether the 
variables are considered grouped together or separately. These results are consistent with the 
results obtained with the previous test, and indicate a statistically insignificant effect of Phase 
II EU ETS NAP announcements on carbon volatility. 
  
                                                 
12
 In this case, the returns and residuals are standardized with the truncated mean and variance of a period of 10 
days. 
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2.6 Summary 
 
This essay examines the extent to which participants in the carbon market perceive EU ETS 
NAP and Verifications announcements to possess informational value.  The study directs its 
attention to carbon returns and volatility movements around official EU ETS Phase II 
announcements. 
 
Results demonstrate that Phase II NAP announcements have a significant effect on Phase II 
futures contracts. In contrast, Phase I verifications announcements have no effect on the Phase 
II futures returns. This is consistent with the information inherent in Phase I verifications and 
the no banking of allowances between phases restriction. The findings also detect significant 
returns on days leading up to both NAP and Verifications information becoming public. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence of significant differences in the volatility of carbon returns 
before and after NAP and Verifications announcements. Together, the findings suggest a 
systematic leakage of information across all types of announcements. 
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Chapter 3: An Investigation of Trade Cancellations on the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Trade cancellations are executed market trades that were originally made in error or 
unintentionally violated market rules and regulations and are subsequently cancelled.  Trades 
are cancelled ‘when brokers reach mutual agreement that a particular trade should not have 
happened and they both agree to cancel the trade on behalf of their clients.’  An ASX Review 
on Algorithmic Trading and Market Access Arrangements reports that ‘there has been a 
significant increase in trade cancellations, as a result of an increase in the number of wash 
trades, and this is consistent with the increased use of algorithms.’13  Furthermore, an article in 
the Sydney Morning Herald reports that ‘an ASX review identified a four-fold increase in 
potentially illegal ''wash trades'' in 2009.’14 
 
The proportion of ASX executed trades that are subsequently cancelled is increasing. In 
January 2009, 11,000 (0.16%) trades were cancelled. This increased to 43,000 (0.39%) trades 
in August 2009. The vast majority of trades that are cancelled are crossings, and an increasing 
number of these are being cancelled after the close of trading (up from 33% in January 2009, to 
60% in August 2009).  Crossings are trades in respect of which a single Trading Participant 
acts (on its own account or on behalf of a client) on both sides of the trade.  The prevalence of 
                                                 
13 ASX Review – Algorithmic Trading and Market Access Arrangements, 8 February 2010. 
14
 ASX: you still need us to protect against computer trades, February 9, 2010, Sydney Morning Herald. 
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cancelled crossings has raised concerns about an increase in ‘wash trades’, which may 
technically be in breach of ASX rules and the law. Wash trades occur where a trader places a 
buy order against a sell order for the same beneficial owner.  The ASX Market Rule Guidance 
Note 1 currently anticipates wash trades as a result of algorithmic trading and provides the 
following guidance: 
 
“ASX recognises that program trading and AOP trading sourced from different trading 
engines or origins may result in the “accidental” Crossing of principal orders with no change 
in beneficial ownership. ASX takes the view that principal trading of this type which results in 
a transaction with no change in beneficial ownership is less likely to be considered creating of 
a false or misleading appearance of active trading in any Product or with respect to the market 
for, or the price of, any Product if: 
 
• the Trading Participant has not pre-arranged the entry of the Bids or Offers; 
• the same Authorised Person does not enter both sides of the Crossing; and 
• it can be demonstrated that the Orders originated from a defined program or algorithm-
driven trading strategy application.” 
 
Trade cancellations provide ‘wash trade’ manipulators with the ability to conduct their market 
misleading trading without incurring the transactional costs as the trades are subsequently 
cancelled.  
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Wash trades are problematic because both the wash trade itself and the subsequent cancellation 
(if any) may detrimentally impact the market by creating a false appearance of activity. Wash 
trades can also directly alter the price of shares if they are executed above or below market 
rates.  Where trade cancellations occur after the close of trading or on T+1, for example it 
could also affect intra-day Time Weighted Average Price (TWAP) strategies and the 
calculation of daily Volume Weighted Average Prices (VWAPs), impacting other market users. 
 
Recently there has been some concern generated by high frequency algorithmic trading.  The 
proportion of complaints relating to algorithmic trading has risen from about 10% of 
complaints directed to ASX Surveillance in early 2009 to about 30% by the third quarter. 
Similarly, an ASX review also identified a four-fold increase in potentially illegal ''wash 
trades'' in 2009.  The relationship between increased wash trades and increased algorithmic 
trading is that as brokers and clients employ an increasing range of different trading strategies 
(connecting many different algorithms to a trading platform at a given time), the likelihood that 
bids and offers entered from those algorithms will inadvertently execute against each other in 
the market increases. 
 
Thus, this essay initiates the first comprehensive investigation of trade cancellations to 
understand their magnitude and the impact on market integrity. Specifically, this essay (i) 
reports the growth of trade cancellations between 2006 and 2009, (ii) measures the impact of 
trade cancellations on Daily Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP), and (iii) examines 
trade cancellations for return reversal, return, volume, and volatility patterns consistent with 
market manipulation. Essentially this essay draws from theoretical and empirical research on 
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market manipulation and applies it to the case of trade cancellations.  Therefore, this study also 
contributes to the literature on emerging forms of market manipulation. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 describes the literature and 
develops several testable hypotheses. Section 3.3 explains trade cancellations in detail. Section 
3.4 describes the growth of trade cancellations on the ASX between 2006 and 2009. Section 
3.5 examines the impact of trade cancellations on the daily volume weighted average price. 
Section 3.6 looks at trade cancellations and return reversals. Section 3.7 examines the impact of 
trade cancellations on return, volume, and volatility. Section 3.8 summarises the chapter. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
This section reviews the literature related to the issues examined in this study. This section is 
organised in a manner so as to highlight the areas of the existing literature upon which this 
study builds. In turn, based on the literature reviewed, a number of testable hypotheses are 
developed. This section is structured as follows. Section 3.2.1 focuses on the literature that 
examines the different forms of market manipulation. Section 3.2.2 sheds light specifically on 
the literature that examines trade-based market manipulation.  Section 3.2.3 takes a closer look 
at ‘pump-and-dump’ trade-based manipulation. Section 3.2.4 reviews the evidence in literature 
of return reversals and market manipulation.  Section 3.2.5 uses the literature reviewed to 
develop testable hypotheses that are tested subsequently in this study. 
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3.2.1 Forms of Market Manipulation 
 
‘Market manipulation’ as a generic term encompasses many distinct and widely varied 
strategies.  Putnins (2012) presents a simple taxonomy of the most common types of market 
manipulation in Figure 3-1. At the broadest level, manipulation is divided into runs, contract-
based manipulations, and market power techniques. Within these groups, manipulation is 
further broken down into trade-based, information-based, and action-based forms following 
Allen and Gale (1992). The following overview explains two levels on which manipulation can 
be grouped and then provides a definition of the individual techniques. 
 
Figure 3-1 Taxonomy of Market Manipulation 
This figure presents a taxonomy of the most common types of market manipulation, developed by Putnins (2012).  
Market manipulation is categorized based on methods and techniques. 
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The first broad category of manipulation is titled ‘Runs’ by Putnins 2012.  He goes onto 
explain that a run is a form of manipulation designed to profit by first taking either a long or a 
short position in a stock, inflating or depressing the stock’s price, while at the same time 
attracting liquidity to the stock, and finally reversing the position at the profitable inflated or 
deflated price.  He refers to runs that inflate a stock’s price as ‘pump-and-dump’ manipulation, 
the type of manipulation we focus on in our study.  The stock ‘pumping’ can take anywhere 
from a matter of hours to several years and make use of techniques such as rumour mongering, 
wash sales, and pooling by several manipulators.  ‘Bear raids’, conversely, are a form of run in 
which the manipulator takes a short position in the stock, manipulates its price downwards by 
inducing others to sell, and covers his position at a depressed price.  A distinguishable common 
feature of runs is that the manipulator profits directly from the manipulated market by inducing 
investors to trade at inflated or depressed prices. 
 
Putnins 2012 defines ‘contract-based manipulation’ as those instances where the manipulator 
profits from a contract or market that is external to the manipulated market.  An example is  
where a manipulator takes a position in a derivatives contract and profits by manipulating the 
underlying market price.  A distinguishing factor from ‘runs’ type manipulation is that 
‘contracts-based’ manipulation does not require the manipulator to induce others to trade at 
manipulated prices and therefore tends to be more mechanical by nature. 
 
The third category of manipulation in Putnins 2012 considers manipulators that utilize an 
aspect of market power.  This can be in the form of a controlling position in the supply of a 
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security.  They are similar to ‘contract-based’ manipulation in that they are mechanical in 
nature and similar to ‘runs’ in that they exploit participants of the manipulated market in order 
to profit. 
 
Previous to Putnins 2012, Allen and Gale (1992) defined three main forms of market 
manipulation based on how they are conducted.  These included trade-based, information-
based, and action-based manipulation.  Trade-based manipulation relies on the manipulator to 
trade in the security in order to directly influence the price.  Information-based manipulation is 
based on the manipulator releasing false information or rumours about a security in order to 
indirectly influence the price.  Action-based manipulation relies on the manipulator taking a 
course of action that may either directly or indirectly influence the value or perceived value of 
a security.  An example of action-based manipulation would be a scenario in which a 
management team of a company runs the firm sub-optimally in order to depress the price 
before a management buy out (MBO).  Therefore, the three broad categories of manipulation 
defined by Putnins (2012) can be further classified into trade-, information-, and action-based 
manipulation. 
 
Additionally, each form of market manipulation can also involve a wide variety of techniques, 
particularly trade based manipulation
15
.  Several of the most prevalent techniques include: 
‘wash trades’ which involve sales in which there is no change in the beneficial owner i.e. the 
same beneficial owner is behind the buy and sale order, or similarly ‘matched orders’ which 
involve the same method but involve different but colluding parties placing matching buy and 
sell orders at the same time for the same price and volume.  ‘Pools’ are also based on the same 
                                                 
15 See Cumming and Johan (2008) for a list of the techniques targeted by market surveillance authorities. 
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premise of creating a false appearance of trading volume and activity but involve a group of 
manipulators trading shares back and forth among themselves.  ‘Painting the tape’ utilizes the 
power of a public display reporting facility in order to create the impression of trading activity 
through a series of transactions.  ‘Hype-and-dump’ schemes are an increasingly popular 
method of manipulation with the popularity of Internet forums and social media.  It involves 
the dissemination of false information or rumours via the media, Internet, or other means with 
the intent to inflate a stock price.  They are also referred to as ‘slur-and-dump’ when the intent 
is to depress the stock price. 
 
‘Marking the close’ (also known as closing price manipulation and ‘high closing’) involves 
buying or selling securities at or shortly before the close in an effort to alter the closing price.  
‘Marking the open’ is similar, but involves influencing the opening price rather than closing 
price.  Closing and opening price manipulation are common techniques for contractual 
manipulation as the payoffs from contracts are often based on either the open or close price of a 
security on a particular date.  ‘Pegging’ and ‘capping’ refer to placing orders that effectively 
prevent a price from moving up or down.  This is often done to ensure a derivatives contract 
expires in or out of the money.  ‘Corners’ and ‘squeezes’ involve the manipulator securing a 
controlling position in the supply of an asset and/or a derivative contract and then using their 
position to manipulate the price by exploiting investors that need the underlying asset to close 
out short positions. 
 
In summary the definition of market manipulation refers to the interference with the free and 
fair operation of a market, conducted with the intent to create a misleading price or misleading 
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trading activity.  Previous literature has divided market manipulation into runs, contract based 
manipulation, and manipulation using market power.  Furthermore, each form of manipulation 
has been categorized into how each is conducted, including action-, information- and trade-
based techniques.  We have also reviewed the numerous techniques within each category. 
 
3.2.2 Trade-based Manipulation 
 
Among Allen and Gale’s (1992) three classifications of manipulation, trade based manipulation 
is arguably the more difficult to detect and rule out.  The detection of trade-based manipulation 
becomes difficult as a result of the trader manipulating a stock simply by buying and selling, 
without taking any publicly observable actions to alter the value of the firm or releasing false 
information to change the price.  Trade based market manipulation is the focus of our study.  
Allen and Gorton (1992) argue that a natural asymmetry between liquidity purchases and 
liquidity sales exists that gives rise to profitable trade-based manipulation.  They posit that if 
liquidity motivated sales are more likely than liquidity motivated purchases, then buy orders 
are more likely to be informed and therefore have a larger effect on prices.  Allen and Gale 
(1992) use a Glosten and Milgrom (1985) framework and a manipulator that mimics an 
informed trader with positive information about the stock in order to demonstrate how trade 
based manipulation can be profitable in the presence of information asymmetry. 
 
In the seminal Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model, this asymmetry between liquidity purchases 
and sales allows an uninformed manipulator to generate a profit by executing a series of buys 
to bid the price up and then sell the stock causing a relatively smaller decrease in price.  
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Information asymmetry is of critical importance to the success of both models of trade-based 
manipulation. 
 
Aggarwal and Wu (2006) extend on the above models and demonstrate that in addition, the 
presence of information seekers (or arbitrageurs) in a market where information asymmetry 
exists can further exasperate the effects of trade-based manipulation by creating a greater 
competition for shares.  This ultimately has the effect of making trade based manipulation 
easier for the manipulator and deteriorating informational efficiency. 
 
Building on the previous models, Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2004a, 2004b) demonstrate that in 
the Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) models, informed traders can also benefit 
from manipulating the market.  They illustrate that in a market where the existence of an 
informed trader is uncertain and there is a large lag before private information is fully revealed 
to the market, informed traders can profit by initially trading in the opposing direction to their 
information.  They achieve this by creating increased uncertainty and distorting the market 
thereby allowing them to retain their informational advantage for a longer period and extract 
higher profits over a longer period.  This effect is even more pronounced when there are many 
competitive rational traders who hold more noisy information than the insider but more 
accurate information than the market maker, as the competitive rational traders follow the 
insiders trades in equilibrium (Chakraborty and Yilmaz, 2008). 
 
In addition to the simple act of trading in order to distort prices and induce profits a number of 
studies model how other properties such as derivatives securities, events, or specific market 
 78 
 
design features can also give rise to other profitable trade based manipulation techniques.  
Jarrow (1994) demonstrated that in an economy with a stock market, money market account, 
and a derivative security, the introduction of the derivative security generates market 
manipulation trading strategies that would otherwise not exist.  Gerard and Nanda (1993) find 
that strategic informed traders can profit off seasoned equity offerings by short selling a stock 
just prior to the offering to place downward pressure on the price and then more then cover 
their position by purchasing stocks in the offering at a discount price.  They would finally 
liquidate their remaining position at a profit when the stock price is eventually restored to its 
fair value.  In Fishman and Hagerty (1995) a manipulator takes advantage of the Securities 
Exchange Act (1934) mandatory disclosure rule for large trades. The manipulator first declares 
large buy trades, thereby forcing prices up, and then sells the position anonymously in a series 
of small trades.  Similarly, John and Narayanan (1997) and Huddart et al. (2001) also examine 
the effect of mandatory disclosure laws on the incentives of insiders to manipulate.  Kyle 
(1984), Vila (1987) and Allen et al. (2006) model corners and squeezes in which manipulators 
can essentially set prices by obtaining a controlling fraction of the supply of stock on the 
market.  In Vila (1989) and Bagnoli and Lipman (1996) the manipulator trades in order to 
create the impression of a takeover bid to induces a price run-up and ultimately profit by 
selling at an inflated price. 
 
Studies also illustrate that trade based manipulation can exploit the feedback effect from 
financial markets to the real value of a firm in order to distort resource allocation and profit.   
This occurs as result of directors using their company’s stock price as a signal in making 
decisions about the company’s investments.   Goldstein and Geumbel’s (2008) model 
manipulators that aggressively short sell shares to depress prices and negatively influence 
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company investment decisions.  The manipulators eventually profit by covering their positions 
at depressed prices as a result of the negative investment decisions. Khanna and Sonti (2004) 
demonstrate the feedback effect in the opposing direction where long-term shareholders 
manipulate prices upwards to encourage value creating investment.  In both cases manipulators 
take advantage of market mechanisms to distort the efficient allocation of resources within a 
company. 
 
In this section we conclude that trade-based manipulation is not only restricted to the impact of 
the manipulative transactions themselves, but also relies on the subsequent actions of other 
traders, features of certain securities, events, and market mechanisms. 
 
3.2.3 Evidence on “pump-and-dump” trade-based manipulation 
 
Allen and Gale (1992) and Aggarwal and Wu (2006) both present theoretical and empirical 
evidence of “pump-and-dump” manipulation.  Aggarwal and Wu also empirically analyze 51 
of 142 ‘pump- and-dump’ manipulation cases during 1990-2001 from the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) litigation releases. They find that the minimum length of a 
manipulation period is two days, the median is 202 days and the maximum is 1,373 days, 
highlighting the variation in the nature of pump-and-dump manipulation. Their analysis reveals 
that manipulated stocks generally experience a price increase during the manipulation period, a 
subsequent decrease during the post-manipulation period, and increased volatility. Their 
sample of cases is more concentrated in illiquid stocks where informed insiders such as 
management, substantial shareholders, market makers, or brokers conduct most of the 
manipulation.  However, Aggarwal and Wu (2006), like most empirical studies of prosecution 
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cases, suffer from sample selection bias as a result of only examining prosecuted manipulation 
cases. 
 
Mei et al. (2004) propose a model in which manipulators can strategically take advantage of 
investors' behavioural biases and manipulate the price process to profit. They consider three 
types of traders, behaviour-driven investors who are loss averse (dispositional effect), 
arbitrageurs, and a manipulator who can influence asset prices. They show that, due to the 
investors' behavioural biases and the limit of arbitrage, the manipulator can profit from a 
"pump-and-dump" trading strategy by accumulating the speculative asset while pushing the 
asset price up, and then selling the asset at high prices. Since nobody has private information, 
manipulation here is completely trade-based. In an empirical test of the model developed by 
Mei et al. (2004), they find that "pump-and-dump" operations have led to higher return, 
increased volatility, larger trading volume, short-term price continuation and also long-term 
price reversal during the manipulation period. Moreover, small stocks are found to be more 
subject to the effects of manipulation. This possibility poses a new challenge for regulators. As 
the manipulator relies on neither inside information nor visible actions his manipulation is 
difficult to be detected and ruled out. 
 
In the first laboratory experiment on price manipulation Hanson et al. (2006) study 12 
participants trading stock and cash in an electronic limit order book market.  In this market 
manipulation setting, half of the participants are given monetary incentives to manipulate the 
stock price. Their main finding is that manipulators are unable to distort price accuracy because 
other traders counteract the actions of the manipulators. 
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In another experiment that can be considered similar to trade cancellations, Camerer (1998) 
attempts to manipulate horse racing odds by making bets and then cancelling them shortly 
before the race. Although making and then cancelling a bet is costless. In the experiment 
Camerer finds that cancelled bets placed by the experimenter do not distort prices. 
 
In a completely different approach Khwaja and Mian (2005) examine trading records of likely 
manipulators rather than market prices and find evidence of ‘pump-and-dump’ market 
manipulation by brokers in Pakistan’s main stock exchange. Their findings reveal brokers earn 
at least 8% higher returns on their own trades and neither market timing nor liquidity provision 
offer sufficient explanations for this result.  
 
Gallagher et al. (2009) find evidence of fund managers manipulating closing prices to influence 
their fund’s reported performance. Gallagher et al. find that on the last day of the quarter, fund 
managers tend to purchase illiquid stocks in which they already hold overweight positions in a 
bid to ‘pump’ up the prices and increase the value of the fund. 
 
3.2.4 Market manipulation and Return Reversals 
 
Comerton- orde and Putnin s (2011) examine 184 cases of closing price manipulation by 
prosecuted fund managers, top company management, brokers, and substantial shareholders.  
The cases are all a result of prosecution by the SEC between 1997 and 2009. Their findings 
reveal that episodes of closing price manipulation are associated with large increases in day-
end returns, subsequent return reversals, increased trading volume, and wider spreads.   
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Blocher et al. (2009) examine whether fund managers holding short positions manipulate prices 
down with short selling on the last trading day of the year. They find increased levels of short 
selling in the last hour of the last trading day of the year for stocks that have large short 
interest. The short selling is accompanied by poor returns and subsequent reversals at the 
beginning of the year.  
 
Stoll and Whaley (1987), and Chamberlain, Chueng and Kuan (1989) find empirical evidence 
of significantly higher price mean reversals on the expiration day of index futures/option 
contracts in comparison to month-ends or quarter-ends without index futures/options expiration 
in the US markets.  All of these results are consistent with return reversals following episodes 
of market manipulation. 
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3.2.5 Hypothesis Development 
 
Following the arising market integrity concerns regarding the growing number of trade 
cancellations on the ASX, this study aims to investigate whether trade cancellations can be a 
source of market manipulation.  As it is a novel area of study there is no prior literature on 
trade cancellations specifically.  However, this study can draw from the wide literature 
available on market manipulation.  Market manipulation can be broken down into several 
categories based on the characteristics and methods involved.  Only the forms of market 
manipulation in the literature that present similarities to the characteristics of trade 
cancellations are considered. 
 
Firstly, if trade cancellations are to be used as a means of manipulation than it will certainly be 
classified as ‘trade-based’ manipulation.   urthermore, the introduction to trade cancellations 
highlights the fact that the majority of trade cancellations can also be classified as potential 
‘wash trades’, which in the manipulation literature will fall under ‘pump-and-dump’ 
manipulation. 
 
Allen and Gale (1992) and Aggarwal and Wu (2006) both present theoretical and empirical 
evidence of “pump-and-dump” manipulation.  Their analysis reveals that manipulated stocks 
generally experience a price increase during the manipulation period, a subsequent decrease 
during the post-manipulation period, and increased volatility.  Khwaja and Mian (2005) 
examine trading records of likely manipulators in ‘pump-and-dump’ market manipulation 
schemes and find return results consistent with Allen and Gale (1992) and Aggarwal and Wu 
(2006).  Furthermore, in an empirical tests Mei et al. (2004) find that "pump-and-dump" 
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operations lead to higher return, increased volatility, larger trading volume, short-term price 
continuation and also long-term price reversal during the manipulation period. Moreover, small 
stocks are found to be more subject to the effects of manipulation. 
 
Taken together, the following hypotheses examine whether the effects of trade cancellations 
share similarities with the effect of ‘pump-and-dump’ manipulation. 
 
Hypothesis3,1: Returns increase between the initial trade and its subsequent cancellation. 
 
Hypothesis3,2: Volatility increases from the initial trade and continues after the trade 
cancellation. 
 
Hypothesis3,3: Trading volume increases between the initial trade and its subsequent 
cancellation. 
 
The literature also presents evidence of return reversals following episodes of market 
manipulation.  Comerton- orde and Putnin s (2011) reveal that episodes of closing price 
manipulation are associated with large increases in day-end returns and subsequent return 
reversals.  Blocher et al. (2009) examine manipulative short selling and find that it is 
accompanied by poor returns and subsequent reversals.  Stoll and Whaley (1987), and 
Chamberlain et al. (1989) find empirical evidence of significantly higher price mean reversals 
on the expiration day of index futures/option contracts in comparison to month-ends or quarter-
ends without index futures/options expiration in the US markets.  All of these results are 
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consistent with return reversals following episodes of market manipulation.  Therefore the 
following hypothesis is also tested. 
 
Hypothesis3,4: Significant return reversals follow trades that are subsequently cancelled. 
 
3.3 What are Trade Cancellations? 
 
Trade cancellations are executed market trades that were originally made in error or 
unintentionally violated market rules and regulations and are subsequently cancelled.  Trades 
are cancelled ‘when brokers reach mutual agreement that a particular trade should not have 
happened and they both agree to cancel the trade on behalf of their clients.’  
 
ASX’s equity market trade cancellation process during the sample of our study (2006 to 2009) 
had been in place under the ASX Operating Rules since 2004. Under these rules, participants 
are required to report error trades to the ASX within 15 minutes of the error trade being 
executed. Upon receipt of the request, ASX would as soon as possible send a message to the 
market notifying that a cancellation had been requested.  ASX would then evaluate a potential 
error trade, or in the case of a dispute may ask the Dispute Governors Committee (DGC) to 
review or guide ASX’s decision on cancellation. The Dispute Governors Committee was 
formed to gain a degree of impartiality on the determination of cases deserving trade 
cancellation. The approach to resolution on ASX Markets was to either reject a request to 
cancel a deal, facilitate an agreement between counterparties to cancel a deal, or unilaterally 
cancel a deal. Cancellation was required to be effected by end T+1 at the latest.  As a result of 
these rules and procedures it was common for a large number of trade cancellations on the 
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ASX to occur up until the close of trading on T+1. Where a decision regarding cancellation of 
a trade had been effected, ASX would notify the affected Participants of the decision and send 
a message to the market. 
 
Two key error types covered by the trade cancellation powers are trading system errors and 
disorderly market errors. Trading system errors involve an incorrect Trading Message 
submitted by a stockbroker or by the ASX, or other error by a Market Participant of the ASX 
that relates to the Market Transaction.  Examples include incorrect market information errors 
such as the ASX system error disseminating trades with an incorrect settlement date or the 
purging of orders entered before a security's suspension to be removed from the trading system 
that prevents investors trading into securities that may experience a dramatically falling price. 
Disorderly market error involves securities being traded at levels that are far removed from 
their market value. Examples include the incorrect entry of stocks and/or prices by brokers into 
the trading system at the terminal. 
 
During the sample period (July 2006 to October 2009), brokers were required to provide a 
reason for the trade cancellation in the form of a ‘trade reversal code’ which are outlined 
below: 
• B -  Incorrect Broker                                   
• D -  Data Entry Error                                   
• O - Other                                              
• P -  Incorrect Price                                    
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• S -  Incorrect Stock                                    
• V -  Incorrect Volume         
 
Only D, O, P, and V are present in the sample.  Once a decision was made, ASX Trading 
Operations & Markets would then notify the Australian Securities Exchange Markets 
Supervision (ASXMS) office (mandated to supervise futures, equities, clearing and settlement 
at the ASX) of the trade cancellation and the reason provided. 
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Table 3-1 Trade Reversal Code Frequency 
This table reports the Trade Reversal Codes and their frequency in 
the sample.  The Trade Reversal Code is submitted by brokers as a 
reason for a trade cancellation request.  The Trade Reversal Codes 
are as specified:  D (Data Entry Error), O (Other), P (Incorrect 
Price), and V (Incorrect Volume). 
 
Trade Reversal Code Number Percent (%) 
D 622,862 95 
O 30,346 5 
P 4 0 
V 1 0 
 
653,213 100 
 
As can be seen in Table 3-1, the majority of trade cancellations (95%) in the sample occur as a 
result of ‘D’ or ‘data entry error’ also known as the case of ‘fat-finger trading’ in the 2010 
‘ lash Crash’.  Most of the remaining trade cancellations (4.6%) are classified under ‘O’ or 
‘Other’.  Unfortunately, there is no exact definition for the ‘Other’ category provided by the 
ASX, apart from the fact that it does not suitably fit into any of the other categories.  In the 
sample there are 4 trade cancellations as a result of ‘P’ – ‘incorrect price’ and only 1 trade 
cancellation as a result of ‘V’ – ‘incorrect volume’. 
 
The fundamental intention of ASX’s trade cancellation policy (TCP) is to provide a mechanism 
for cancelling and removing from the trade data any trades that are clearly erroneously priced.  
Such trades detract from the integrity of the price formation process, as the trade may not be a 
reflection of genuine supply and demand. 
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3.4 The Growth of Trade Cancellations on the ASX from 2006 to 2009 
 
This section reports the magnitude of trade cancellations on the ASX from 2006 to 2009 and 
outlines growth trends.  Figure 3-2 demonstrates that the prevalence of trade cancellations both 
in terms of total traded volume and value has increased in 2007 before stabilizing in 2009. 
Although trade cancellations as a proportion of traded volume remained very much the same in 
October 2009 as in July 2006 at around 0.50%, trade cancellations as proportion of total traded 
value almost doubled from 0.69% to 1.16%. 
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Figure 3-2 All ASX Listed Stocks 
This figure reports the traded volume and value of all cancelled trades as a percentage of all ASX trades during the sample period.  The graph is for the 
period July 2006 to October 2009. 
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Figure 3-3 ASX Top 50 Stocks 
This figure reports the traded volume and value of all cancelled trades as a percentage of all ASX trades in the top 50 capitalisation stocks during the 
sample period.  The graph is for the period July 2006 to October 2009. 
 
 
 
 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
C
a
n
ce
ll
a
ti
o
n
s 
A
s 
A
 P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 O
f 
A
ll
 T
ra
d
e
s 
Month/Year 
Trade Volume
Trade Value
 92 
 
Trade cancellations as proportion of all trades within the 50 largest stocks listed on the ASX 
exhibit a steady increase both in terms of total traded volume and value (Figure 3-3).  Trades 
cancellations as a proportion of all traded volume on the ASX increased from 0.8% in July 
2006 to 1.18% in October 2009. Similarly, trade cancellations as a proportion of all traded 
value on the ASX increased from 0.65% in July 2006 to 1.32% in October 2009. 
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Figure 3-4 ASX Smallest 501+ Stocks 
This figure reports the traded volume and value of all cancelled trades as a percentage of all ASX trades in the lowest capitalisation stocks (those that 
are below the top 500 stocks, approximately 1,500 stocks) during the sample period.  The graph is for the period July 2006 to October 2009. 
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The greatest increase in trade cancellation activity is revealed to be among the smallest listed 
stocks on the ASX (Figure 3-4), which include approximately 1,500 stocks that fall below the 
top 500 listed stocks.
16
 Although trade cancellations as a proportion of total traded value in the 
smallest stocks remained roughly the same from 0.13% in July 2006 to 0.11% in October 2009, 
trade cancellations as a proportion of traded value ballooned from 0.15% to 2.3% over the 
same period.  The figures above make it clear that by 2009, a significant proportion of all 
executed trades are subsequently cancelled and a growing cause for concern. 
  
                                                 
16
 Results of trade cancellations for all remaining ASX listed stocks exhibit figures similar to the figures for all 
ASX listed stocks. 
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3.5 The Impact of Trade Cancellations on Daily Volume Weighted Average 
Price (VWAP) 
 
The first metric to be examined to investigate the impact of the growing proportion of trade 
cancellations is the Daily Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP).  VWAP is the ratio of the 
total value (the total number of shares traded multiplied by the prices they were traded at) 
traded to total volume (the number of shares traded) traded over a particular time horizon 
(usually one day). It is a measure of the average price a stock traded at over the trading 
horizon.  Traders who aim to be as passive as possible in their execution often use VWAP as a 
trading benchmark.  Brokers also use VWAP in algorithmic order execution engines.  With the 
proliferation of algorithm based trading and VWAP being such a widely relied on metric it is 
the first metric that may be impacted by an increase in trade cancellations and therefore 
erroneous trades. 
 
3.5.1 Data and Sample 
 
All trade cancellations data from 1 July 2006 to 23 October 2009 are sourced internally from 
the ASX.  For each trade cancellation there is information on the ASX Code, Sales Slip 
Number, Buyer and Seller Broker ID, Trade Reversal Code, Trade Volume, Trade Price, Trade 
Value, Trade Condition Codes, the initial Trade Date and Time, and the Reversal Date and 
Time.  In addition, internal ASX trade data on all equities trades on the ASX during the period 
1 July 2006 to 23 October 2009 are also sourced.  The equities trade data includes the Trade 
Price, Buyer and Seller Broker ID, Sales Slip Number, Trade Volume, Trade Price, Trade 
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Value, Trade Condition Codes and the Trade Date and Time.  There are a total of 653,213 trade 
cancellations during this period. 
 
3.5.2 Research Design 
 
Daily VWAP is calculated for all executed trades on the ASX including trades that are 
subsequently cancelled and for all executed trades excluding those trades which are 
subsequently cancelled arriving at two Daily VWAP figures for each stock on a trading day.  
Daily VWAP for each is stock is calculated as follows: 
 
             
∑     
 
   
∑   
 
   
 
(3-1) 
Where             is the Daily Volume Weighted Average Price, J is the current trade within 
the trading day, n is the total number of trades within the trading day,    is the price at which 
the j’th trade executed at, and    is the quantity of stocks executed at the j’th trade. The change 
in the Daily VWAP metric as a result of trade cancellations is also examined by calculating the 
percentage change between the two figures for the Daily VWAP. 
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3.5.3 Results 
 
Table 3-2 All ASX Listed Stocks 
This table reports the average change in VWAP as a result of trade cancellations for each half-year period in 
each year in the entire sample.  The figures are reported as a summary of all trade cancellations in the sample.  
The ‘Half’ column specifies the period of the year, with 1 signifying the first half (1 January to 30 June), and 
2 signifying the second half (1 July to 31 December).  Average Absolute VWAP Change (%) reports the 
average absolute value of VWAP changes, while Average VWAP Change (%) reports the figure without 
taking the absolute value. 
 
Year Half 
Average Absolute VWAP 
Change (%) 
Average VWAP 
Change (%) 
Maximum VWAP 
Change (%) 
Minimum VWAP 
Change (%) 
2006 2 0.0249 -0.0122 2.5253 -65.6229 
2007 1 0.0197 -0.0123 7.7236 -6.4086 
2007 2 0.0241 -0.0055 5.2273 -17.1321 
2008 1 0.0259 -0.0043 16.4840 -41.4039 
2008 2 0.0232 -0.0031 5.7207 -13.2556 
2009 1 0.0215 -0.0032 7.8663 -8.0559 
2009 2 0.0124 -0.0031 16.1257 -8.7030 
 
Table 3-2 illustrates that the average magnitude of change in Daily VWAP as a result of trade 
cancellations (Average Absolute VWAP Change) varies from 0.012% to 0.025% for all ASX 
listed stocks.  However, the maximum and minimum figures highlight the potential impact that 
trade cancellations can have on a Daily VWAP figure, altering it by up to 65% within one 
single day in a stock. 
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Table 3-3 Top 50 ASX Listed Stocks 
This table reports the average change in VWAP as a result of trade cancellations for each half-year period in 
each year in the sample.  The figures are reported as a summary of all trade cancellations in the top 50 
capitalisation stocks during the sample period.  The ‘Half’ column specifies the period of the year, with 1 
signifying the first half (1 January to 30 June), and 2 signifying the second half (1 July to 31 December).  
Average Absolute VWAP Change (%) reports the average absolute value of VWAP changes, while Average 
VWAP Change (%) reports the figure without taking the absolute value. 
 
Year Half 
Average Absolute 
VWAP Change (%) 
Average VWAP 
Change (%) 
Maximum VWAP 
Change (%) 
Minimum VWAP 
Change (%) 
2006 2 0.0246 -0.0206 1.0111 -65.6229 
2007 1 0.0049 -0.0209 0.3049 -0.6267 
2007 2 0.0071 -0.0004 0.3629 -4.6039 
2008 1 0.0064 -0.0004 0.9786 -0.7239 
2008 2 0.0087 -0.0004 1.7933 -3.1300 
2009 1 0.0072 -0.0007 0.2055 -1.4290 
2009 2 0.0040 -0.0007 0.5394 -0.4938 
 
The average magnitude of change in Daily VWAP as a result of trade cancellations (Average 
Absolute VWAP Change) among the top 50 stocks peaked in the second half of 2006 at 
0.025% before stabilizing between 0.004% and 0.008% from 2007 to 2009.  The maximum and 
minimum VWAP change figures also reveal less variance since 2007 with the largest change of 
4.6% in the second half of 2007. 
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Table 3-4 ASX Smallest Listed Stocks 
This table reports the average change in VWAP as a result of trade cancellations for each half-year period in 
each year in the sample.  The figures are reported as a summary of all trade cancellations in the smallest 
capitalisation stocks (those that are below the top 500 stocks, approximately 1,500 stocks) during the sample 
period.  The ‘Half’ column specifies the period of the year, with 1 signifying the first half (1 January to 30 
June), and 2 signifying the second half (1 July to 31 December).  Average Absolute VWAP Change (%) 
reports the average absolute value of VWAP changes, while Average VWAP Change (%) reports the figure 
without taking the absolute value. 
 
Year Half 
Average Absolute 
VWAP Change (%) 
Average VWAP 
Change (%) 
Maximum VWAP 
Change (%) 
Minimum VWAP 
Change (%) 
2006 2 0.2032 -0.1053 2.5253 -11.2110 
2007 1 0.1758 -0.0990 7.7236 -6.4086 
2007 2 0.2218 -0.1143 2.8032 -17.1321 
2008 1 0.2213 -0.0646 16.4840 -41.4039 
2008 2 0.2105 -0.0405 5.7207 -13.2556 
2009 1 0.3259 -0.0347 7.8663 -8.0559 
2009 2 0.2760 -0.0290 16.1257 -4.9190 
 
Average Daily VWAP change as a result of trade cancellations is most pronounced in the 
smallest stocks listed on the ASX (approximately the smallest 1,500 stocks). Among the 
smallest stocks, the average magnitude of change in Daily VWAP as a result of trade 
cancellations (Average Absolute VWAP Change) varies from 0.18% to 0.33%, approximately 
ten times the average across all stocks listed on the ASX.  Maximum and minimum VWAP 
changes are also similar to those of all listed ASX stocks varying between 2.5% and 41% from 
2006 to 2009. 
 
The results reveal a proliferation in the number of trades that are subsequently cancelled on the 
ASX year on year and a resulting significant impact on the daily reported VWAP figures 
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within stocks on certain days.  These findings are more pronounced in the smallest listed stocks 
on the ASX, and are of a greater concern.  Irregularly large changes in VWAP as a result of 
cancelled trades in most cases is likely to be a result of trades made in error where trades were 
executed at prices very differet to the current market prices.  Nonetheless, the results highlight 
the potential impact that cancelled trade may have on market price statistics. 
 
3.6 Trade Cancellations and return reversals 
 
This section examines the returns patterns of a subset of trade cancellations on the ASX.  
Specifically, this section investigates whether a subset of ‘crossed’ trades that are subsequently 
cancelled are manipulating the market.  The ‘crossed’ trades in the sample act as a proxy for 
possible ‘wash trades’17 that have been a cause for concern following the increase in trade 
cancellations on the ASX.  This section examines whether there is evidence of return reversals 
following the cancellation of these possible wash trades that is consistent with manipulated 
market prices. 
 
3.6.1 Data and Sample 
 
The data are obtained from an internal database from the ASX.  The sample consists of trade-
by-trade data for all stocks listed on the exchange and the subsequent trade cancellations.  The 
data on trade cancellations contain a record describing each transaction, including the ASX 
Code, Sales Slip Number, Buyer and Seller Broker ID, Trade Reversal Code, Trade Volume, 
                                                 
17
 Wash trades occur where a trader places a buy order against a sell order for the same beneficial owner.  
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Trade Price, Trade Value, Trade Condition Codes, the initial Trade Date and Time, and the 
Reversal Date and Time.  In addition, this data has been merged with order book data from the 
ASX that provides information on whether the trade was Buyer or Seller initiated.  The sample 
period extends from October 30, 2006 to October 23, 2009.  The sample is restricted to normal 
trading hours for equities markets (10:00 a.m. - 4:12 p.m.).  The internal data are combined 
with order book data sourced from Reuters Data Scope Tick History provided by Securities 
Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). The data provide the prices of the best bid 
and ask quotes time stamped to the nearest millisecond. To calculate stock betas and expected 
returns the ASX All Ordinaries Index values, daily stock prices and monthly market value for 
each stock are sourced from Datastream.  Daily and monthly Treasury Notes yields are sourced 
from the Reserve Bank of Australia website. 
 
This analysis is limited to only ‘crossings’ which means all cancelled trades where the Buyer 
and Seller Broker ID do not match up are eliminated.  Initially there are 516,467 unique trade 
cancellations in the sample period, of which 510,807 are crossings.  Since only minimums of 5-
minute intervals are examined, all trades that are reversed within a 5-minute interval are 
eliminated. This leaves 321,841 observations. Further, the study is limited to those instances 
where only one ‘crossed’ trade is cancelled in a particular stock on a certain day.  This is 
required to eliminate the confounding effect of other crossed trades that are subsequently 
cancelled on the same day.  Any observation in which the direction of the trade cannot be 
determined is eliminated. This results in an analysis sample of 14,617 observations; 10,708 of 
these cancellations occur after market close, while 3,909 are reversed before market close.  
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Table 3-5 Frequency of Trade Cancellations Before and After Market 
This table reports the frequency of trade cancellations before 
and after market close, and the relevant percentage.  The 
normal trading hours for ASX equities is 10:00 a.m. to 4:12 
p.m. 
 
Time of Cancellation Number Percent (%) 
After Market Close 10,708 73 
Before Market Close 3,909 27 
 
14,617 100 
 
 
3.6.2 Research Design 
 
The approach adopted to investigating whether possible ‘wash trades’ that are subsequently 
cancelled are consistent with manipulative trade reversal patterns is similar to Comerton-Forde 
and Putnins (2009). It involves (i) establishing the difference in abnormal return paths for 
informed trading and manipulative trading; and (ii) identifying likely episodes of manipulation 
based on abnormal return paths. 
 
Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2009) construct a simple theoretical model of manipulation 
based on Allen and Gale (1992) to provide predictions about the price paths under informed 
and manipulative trading.  Allen and Gale (1992) only consider trade-based manipulation in 
which the manipulator simply buys and sells the stock without taking a position in any other 
market. In addition, they do not allow the possibility of a purchaser of the firm taking actions 
that alter the value of the firm or releasing rumours.  
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There is a large amount of theoretical support and some empirical evidence that manipulation 
leads to reversals in prices. Examples of theoretical models in which the manipulator causes 
price reversals include Vila (1989), Allen and Gale (1992), Allen and Gorton (1992), Jarrow 
(1992), Benabou and Laroque (1992), Gerard and Nanda (1993), Bagnoli and Lipman (1996), 
Van Bommel (2003), Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2004a, 2004b), Aggarwal and Wu (2006) and 
Allen et al. (2006). In an empirical study of 51 cases of manipulation prosecuted by the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during 1990-2001, Aggarwal and Wu (2006) find 
that manipulation is associated with price reversals.  
 
Two theoretical studies, Khanna and Sonti (2004) and Goldstein and Geumbel (2008), differ 
from the general consensus in the literature in that the price changes brought about by the 
manipulator do not subsequently reverse to their full extent. This occurs because the initial 
price changes affect firms’ investment decisions, which influence fundamental values. The 
feedback of prices to fundamental values is likely to take months or years. The focus of this 
study is on shorter-term manipulation strategies (lasting up to a few hours) and therefore the 
evidence supporting price reversals is more relevant in our case.  
 
Returns are measured at 5-minute intervals from the time of the trade to the end of the trading 
day, when a closing price auction takes place.  It is proposed that to a high degree a closing 
price auction will correct any inconsistent prices that result from market manipulation.  
Abnormal return for a trade in stock i in the 5 minute interval t is the difference between the 
mid-quote return (thereby minimising microstructure effects such as bid-ask bounce) on stock i 
in interval t,    , and the expected return from the CAPM model: 
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(3-2) 
In the equation above,    , and     are returns on one-month Treasury notes, and the return on 
the ASX All Ordinaries Price Index, respectively, over interval t.  Both Treasury notes returns 
and ASX All Ordinaries Price Index returns are calculated at 5-minute intervals.     are the 
estimates for beta for each stock.  The betas are estimated using monthly data from 2004 to 
2009. 
 
The cumulative abnormal returns to each trade are calculated by summing the abnormal returns 
from the interval immediately following a trade: 
 
      ∑     
 
   
 
(3-3) 
Informed trading moves prices gradually towards fundamental value, whereas manipulation 
moves prices away from fundamental value. Then once the manipulator exits the market, 
prices spring back to fundamental value creating a reversal in returns.  The previous subsection 
establishes that reversals in cumulative abnormal returns are indicative of manipulation, 
whereas abnormal return continuations are associated with informed trading.  The measure of 
reversal is defined as: 
 
           {
      [      
                 
            ]             
      [(     
         ) (     
           )]              
 
(3-4) 
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This measure recognizes that for a positive reversal, CAR must increase and subsequently 
decrease such that      
    is above both the CAR at the time of the trade (       ) and the 
CAR at the end of the measurement window (       , measured at the end of the trading 
day). If CAR increases and remains high, we have a continuation of abnormal returns rather 
than a reversal and our reversal measure gives a value of zero.  
 
Further, to capture any return reversals that happen as a result of trade cancellation 
notifications after market close an ‘overnight return reversal’ metric is also calculated, similar 
to Putnins (2009). Overnight return reversal is the return from the closing price auction 
between 4:10pm and 4:12pm to the opening price auction the following morning between 
10am and 10:09am.
18
  The price auctions at open and close allow for all information to be 
incorporated into the prices and attempt to reduce transient volatility. 
 
                        
      
     
  
(3-5) 
Where        is the closing price on the day of the original trade cancellation and        is the 
opening price the following day. 
  
                                                 
18 Opening on the ASX takes place at 10:00 am Sydney time and lasts for about 10 minutes. ASX Trade calculates 
opening prices during this phase. Securities open in five groups, according to the starting letter of their ASX code.  
Similarly, the Closing Single Price Auction takes place between 4:10pm and 4:12 pm, Sydney time. 
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3.6.3 Results 
 
Table 3-6 Frequency of Zero and Non-Zero Reversals 
This table reports the frequency of zero or non-zero reversals 
during normal market trading hours for cancelled trades, and the 
relevant percentages.  The normal trading hours for ASX 
equities is 10:00 a.m. to 4:12 p.m. 
 
Reversal Number Percent (%) 
Zero 3,654 25 
Non-Zero 10,963 75 
 
14,617 100 
 
 
 
Table 3-7 Frequency of Zero and Non-Zero Overnight Reversals 
This table reports the frequency of zero or non-zero reversals during the 
overnight hours for cancelled trades, and the relevant percentages.  The non-
normal trading/overnight hours for ASX equities are from 4:13 p.m. the previous 
day to 10:00 a.m. the following day. 
 
Overnight Reversal Number Percent (%) 
Zero 1,937 13 
Non-Zero 12,680 87 
 
14,617 100 
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Table 3-8 Reversal Statistics – Full Sample 
This table reports the statistics for Reversal and Overnight Reversal for the entire sample of trade cancellations.  ‘Number of 5-minute intervals’ 
specifies the number of 5 minutes intervals from the time of the initial trade to either market close or trade cancellation.  ‘Absolute Reversal’ and 
‘Absolute Overnight Reversal’ present the statistics for the absolute value of Reversal and Overnight Reversal, respectively. 
 
Statistic 
Number of 5-minute 
Intervals Reversal Absolute Reversal 
Overnight 
Reversal 
Absolute Overnight 
Reversal 
n = 14,617           
MEAN 41 0.0002 0.0049 -0.0002 0.0157 
p-value 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.58 0.00 
MIN 3 -0.2231 0.0000 -3.7007 0.0000 
MAX 75 0.2069 0.2231 0.7588 3.7007 
STD 26 0.0102 0.0089 0.0412 0.0381 
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Considering the ‘reversal’ metric takes into account the direction of the initial trade, a 
non-zero reversal figure for a trade is evidence that is consistent with a trade reversal 
no matter the direction. Table 3-6 shows that in our sample 75% or 10,963 trades 
exhibit non-zero return reversals following the initial trade.  Further, Table 3-7 also 
highlights that 87% of all cancelled trades in our sample also experience an overnight 
return reversal following the trade cancelation. This may provide evidence that the 
closing price auction is not sufficient in correcting a distorted market price, and that 
the trade cancellation notice (after-market close) is required to reveal the extent of the 
distortion to the market.   
 
Table 3-8 summarises the reversal findings for our entire sample.  It identifies that the 
average wash trade takes place three hours and twenty-eight minutes before market 
close.  This is an indicator of the potential length of time that prices may remain 
distorted after the initial wash trade.  The average reversal across all cancelled wash 
trades is 0.02% (significant at the 10% level). However, a standard deviation of 
1.02%, and minimum and maximum reversal figures of 22.31% and 20.69%, 
respectively, highlights the large variance of reversals among the cancelled trades and 
the significant extremities of the price distortions in the market following these trades.  
The Absolute Reversal metric measures the magnitude of the reversal disregarding 
direction and illustrates a similar finding. 
 
The Overnight Reversal metric does not take into account the direction of the initial 
wash trade; therefore we focus on the results of the Absolute Overnight Reversal 
metric.  The average magnitude of overnight reversal (Absolute Overnight Reversal) 
is 1.57% with a large standard deviation of 3.81%. The minimum and maximum 
 109 
 
extremes of overnight reversal in the sample are 370% and 75.88%, respectively.  The 
results reveal that overnight reversals exhibit larger extreme returns than trading hour 
reversals.  However, this may be the result of the larger time frame overnight and the 
arrival of market relevant news during the closing hours. Nonetheless, the results 
provide evidence of return reversals following wash trades to the closing price auction 
and even after market close to the following trading day open. 
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Table 3-9 Reversal Statistics – By Before/After Market Cancellation 
This table reports the statistics for Reversal and Overnight Reversal for the sample of trade cancellations categorized into those cancellations that take place before and after 
market close.  ‘Number of 5-minute intervals’ specifies the number of 5 minutes intervals from the time of the initial trade to either market close or trade cancellation.  
‘Absolute Reversal’ and ‘Absolute Overnight Reversal’ present the statistics for the absolute value of Reversal and Overnight Reversal, respectively. 
 
Time of Trade 
Cancellation Statistic 
Number of 5-minute 
Intervals Reversal Absolute Reversal Overnight Reversal Absolute Overnight Reversal 
BEFORE 
Market Close 
MEAN 41 -0.0001 0.0049 -0.0007 0.0144 
p-value 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MIN 3 -0.1705 0.0000 -0.2414 0.0000 
MAX 75 0.2069 0.2069 0.7588 0.7588 
n=10,708 STD 27 0.0096 0.0082 0.0244 0.0198 
       
AFTER Market 
Close 
MEAN 40 0.0009 0.0048 0.0012 0.0195 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 
MIN 3 -0.2231 0.0000 -3.7007 0.0000 
MAX 75 0.1257 0.2231 0.5390 3.7007 
n=3,909 STD 23 0.0116 0.0106 0.0691 0.0663 
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Table 3-10 Reversal Statistics – By Year 
This table reports the statistics for Reversal and Overnight Reversal for the trade cancellations split into the different years in our sample  ‘Number of 5-minute intervals’ 
specifies the number of 5 minutes intervals from the time of the initial trade to either market close or trade cancellation.  ‘Absolute Reversal’ and ‘Absolute Overnight 
Reversal’ present the statistics for the absolute value of Reversal and Overnight Reversal, respectively. 
 
Year Statistic Number of 5-minute Intervals Reversal Absolute Reversal Overnight Reversal Absolute Overnight Reversal 
2006 
MEAN 40 0.0000 0.0022 -0.0020 0.0063 
p-value 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MIN 4 -0.0253 0.0000 -0.1178 0.0000 
MAX 75 0.0451 0.0451 0.0458 0.1178 
n = 497 STD 26 0.0046 0.0040 0.0118 0.0102 
2007 
MEAN 41 0.0001 0.0032 -0.0018 0.0106 
p-value 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.04 0.00 
MIN 3 -0.1333 0.0000 -3.7007 0.0000 
MAX 75 0.1097 0.1333 0.5337 3.7007 
n=4,565 STD 26 0.0068 0.0060 0.0583 0.0573 
2008 
MEAN 44 0.0001 0.0066 0.0031 0.0210 
p-value 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 
MIN 4 -0.2231 0.0000 -0.2600 0.0000 
MAX 75 0.2069 0.2231 0.5390 0.5390 
n=5,487 STD 26 0.0130 0.0112 0.0335 0.0262 
2009 
MEAN 36 0.0003 0.0048 -0.0026 0.0155 
p-value 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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MIN 3 -0.1705 0.0000 -0.1892 0.0000 
MAX 75 0.0757 0.1705 0.7588 0.7588 
n=4,068 STD 26 0.0095 0.0082 0.0274 0.0227 
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The analysis is also broken down into wash trades that are cancelled before market 
close and after market close.  The results are presented in Table 3-9.  Apart from the 
observation that after market cancellations outnumber before market cancellations, 
the results presented in the table are very much similar for both before and after 
market cancelations and are in line with the results of the entire sample presented in 
Table 3-8. 
 
The sample is also further broken down by the year of the trade in Table 3-10.  Again, 
the results are consistent for reversals and overnight reversals across the 4 years and 
in line with the results of the entire sample. 
 
Finally, the results are broken down into ten size deciles based on the market value of 
the stock during the trading year.  The results are presented in Table 3-11.  Although 
most of the results are quite consistent across the size deciles, there is evidence of an 
increasing magnitude of return reversals following wash trades as the market value of 
a stock decreases. Absolute Reversal increases from 0.07% and statistically 
insignificant in size decile 1 to 0.45% and significant in size decile 3 and a high of 
0.87% in size decile 7.  This finding is not replicated in overnight return reversals.  
The increasing magnitude of return reversals in smaller size stocks is in line with the 
findings of Mei et al. (2004) and Gallagher et al. (2009). 
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Table 3-11 Reversal Statistics – By Size Decile 
This table reports the statistics for Reversal and Overnight Reversal for the sample of trade cancellations categorized into size deciles.  The ten size deciles are based on 
market value of the stock during the trading year.  ‘Number of 5-minute intervals’ specifies the number of 5 minutes intervals from the time of the initial trade to either 
market close or trade cancellation.  ‘Absolute Reversal’ and ‘Absolute Overnight Reversal’ present the statistics for the absolute value of Reversal and Overnight Reversal, 
respectively. 
 
Company 
Size Decile Statistic Number of 5-minute Intervals Reversal Absolute Reversal Overnight Reversal Absolute Overnight Reversal 
1 
MEAN 40.5862 -0.0007 0.0007 0.0227 0.0593 
p-value 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.01 
MIN 4.0000 -0.0196 0.0000 -0.1398 0.0000 
MAX 74.0000 0.0000 0.0196 0.3655 0.3655 
n=29 STD 21.9342 0.0036 0.0036 0.1033 0.0868 
2 
MEAN 43.0000 0.0013 0.0070 -0.1617 0.2082 
p-value 0.00 0.75 0.07 0.35 0.23 
MIN 4.0000 -0.0499 0.0000 -3.7007 0.0000 
MAX 75.0000 0.0741 0.0741 0.2513 3.7007 
n=24 STD 23.3387 0.0196 0.0182 0.7938 0.7823 
3 
MEAN 45.1591 -0.0036 0.0045 -0.0064 0.0364 
p-value 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.45 0.00 
MIN 5.0000 -0.0568 0.0000 -0.1252 0.0000 
MAX 75.0000 0.0135 0.0568 0.1625 0.1625 
n=44 STD 25.7871 0.0133 0.0130 0.0525 0.0379 
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4 
MEAN 45.4038 -0.0010 0.0043 0.0113 0.0545 
p-value 0.00 0.61 0.02 0.47 0.00 
MIN 4.0000 -0.0670 0.0000 -0.1967 0.0000 
MAX 75.0000 0.0502 0.0670 0.5390 0.5390 
n=52 STD 23.8782 0.0135 0.0128 0.1045 0.0895 
5 
MEAN 41.7200 0.0012 0.0084 -0.0059 0.0341 
p-value 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.49 0.00 
MIN 5.0000 -0.0741 0.0000 -0.1823 0.0000 
MAX 74.0000 0.0743 0.0743 0.1398 0.1823 
n=50 STD 22.5389 0.0218 0.0201 0.0565 0.0451 
6 
MEAN 46.6842 0.0034 0.0057 0.0037 0.0284 
p-value 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.46 0.00 
MIN 4.0000 -0.0339 0.0000 -0.1823 0.0000 
MAX 75.0000 0.2069 0.2069 0.1823 0.1823 
n=114 STD 21.0319 0.0225 0.0220 0.0499 0.0411 
7 
MEAN 41.9670 0.0004 0.0087 -0.0074 0.0282 
p-value 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.04 0.00 
MIN 4.0000 -0.1096 0.0000 -0.1892 0.0000 
MAX 75.0000 0.1257 0.1257 0.2559 0.2559 
n=182 STD 24.3762 0.0219 0.0201 0.0468 0.0380 
8 MEAN 42.9321 0.0000 0.0068 -0.0047 0.0225 
 116 
 
p-value 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.02 0.00 
MIN 4.0000 -0.1120 0.0000 -0.1892 0.0000 
MAX 75.0000 0.0665 0.1120 0.1878 0.1892 
n=368 STD 24.1877 0.0146 0.0129 0.0373 0.0301 
9 
MEAN 41.6136 -0.0002 0.0065 -0.0016 0.0162 
p-value 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.01 0.00 
MIN 4.0000 -0.2231 0.0000 -0.2013 0.0000 
MAX 75.0000 0.1097 0.2231 0.2025 0.2025 
n=1,752 STD 26.6713 0.0140 0.0124 0.0266 0.0211 
10 
MEAN 39.8440 0.0002 0.0045 0.0005 0.0144 
p-value 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.00 
MIN 3.0000 -0.1597 0.0000 -0.2600 0.0000 
MAX 75.0000 0.0815 0.1597 0.5337 0.5337 
n=9,638 STD 25.9705 0.0084 0.0070 0.0238 0.0189 
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Overall, the results document evidence of return reversals following potential wash trades 
that are subsequently cancelled.  It is well documented in literature that return reversals are 
characteristic of distorted or manipulated prices (Vila, 1989; Allen and Gale, 1992; Allen and 
Gorton, 1992; Jarrow, 1992; Benabou and Laroque, 1992; Gerard and Nanda, 1993; Bagnoli 
and Lipman, 1996; Van Bommel, 2003; Chakraborty and Yilmaz, 2004a, 2004b; Aggarwal 
and Wu, 2006; and Allen et al., 2006).  However, there are limitations to the study that 
restrict the scope of the conclusions regarding possible cancelled wash trades. 
 
Crossings, in which the same broker is on both sides of the trade, are used as a proxy for 
wash trades. This is an imperfect proxy as it is increasingly common for brokers to 
‘internalise’ trades and cross the trades of clients themselves.  Crossings do not necessarily 
imply that the same party is behind both sides of the trade.  The subsequent cancellation of 
the crossings may be an indicator that the trade was in fact a wash trade if it were specified in 
the cancel request.  However, the trade reversal codes do not reveal such information.  If an 
original trade was subsequently discovered to be a ‘wash trade’ and a cancel request was 
submitted, it would be recorded under the ‘Other’ category.  In addition, the return reversal 
metric is also influenced by any new information that may be revealed to the market from the 
time of the trade to the end of the trading day or the opening of the next trading day.  This 
study fails to account or correct for this shortcoming.  Further, considering only 
approximately 2.8% of the total cancelled crossings data during the sample period is utilised, 
the conclusions that can be drawn from this study are limited.  All that can be inferred from 
the data is that a very small minority of possible cancelled ‘wash trades’ exhibit manipulative 
return reversal patterns consistent with market manipulation. 
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3.7 Trade Cancellations and Return, Volume, and Volatility 
 
This section examines the impact of cancelled crossings on return, volume, and volatility 
prior to, following, and during the trades.  In response to the restricted nature of the sample of 
cancelled crossings in the previous section, this analysis utilizes a methodology that permits 
the retention of a majority of the observations.  Similar to the previous study crossings are 
used as a proxy for ‘wash trades’.   ollowing the methodology of Aggarwal and Wu (2006), 
the extent to which the alleged ‘wash trades’ are associated with return, volume, and 
volatility patterns indicative of trade based manipulation is empirically tested. 
 
3.7.1 Data and Sample 
 
The data are obtained from an internal database from the ASX.  The sample consists of trade-
by-trade data for all stocks listed on the exchange and the subsequent trade cancellations.  
The data on trade cancellations contain a record describing each transaction, including the 
ASX Code, Sales Slip Number, Buyer and Seller Broker ID, Trade Reversal Code, Trade 
Volume, Trade Price, Trade Value, Trade Condition Codes, the initial Trade Date and Time, 
and the Reversal Date and Time. The sample period extends from October 30, 2006 to 
October 23, 2009.  The sample is restricted to normal trading hours for equities markets 
(10:00 a.m. - 4:12 p.m.).  The internal data are combined with order book data sourced from 
Reuters Data Scope Tick History provided by Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-
Pacific (SIRCA). The data provide the prices of the best bid and ask quotes time stamped to 
the nearest millisecond. To calculate stock betas in the following section, the ASX All 
Ordinaries Index values, daily stock prices, and monthly market value for each stock are 
sourced from Datastream.  Daily and monthly Treasury Notes yields are sourced from the 
Reserve Bank of Australia website. 
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The analysis is limited to ‘crossings’ which means all cancelled trades where the Buyer and 
Seller Broker ID do not match up are eliminated.  In the data set there are 516,467 unique 
trade cancellations in the specified time period, of which 510,807 are crossings. The 
crossings are grouped into packages where they occur within 1 hour of the previous crossing 
within the same stock on the same trading day.  This leads to a sample of 67,206 crossing 
packages. 
 
Table 3-12 Crossing Package Characteristics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for the Trade Cancellation packages. 
 
Statistic Number of Trades 
in Package 
Average 
Package 
Price 
Package Total 
Manipulation Time 
Package 
Total Volume 
Package Total 
Traded Value 
N 67,206     
MEAN 4 $12 0:26:07 47,355 $262,987 
MIN 1 $0 0:00:00 1 $0 
MAX 305 $197 6:10:53 50,000,000 $455,671,844 
STD 10 $18 1:01:04 443,874 $2,623,600 
 
There are on average 4 consecutive crossings in a cancelled crossings package with the 
minimum being 1 crossing and the maximum being 305 consecutive crossings.  The average 
trade price for these cancelled crossing packages is $12, but ranges from $0.002 to $197.   
The average manipulation period per package is 26 minutes and 7 seconds, with the longest 
one-day manipulation period during our sample lasting for over 6 hours. The shortest 
manipulation period is that of just one trade and therefore is zero or momentary.  The total 
volume traded per package during the manipulation period is 47,355 shares.  However, the 
volume traded can range from 1 share to 50 million shares.  Similarly, the total value traded 
per package during the manipulation period is $262,987 and can vary from $0.05 to over 
$455 million.  The characteristics of the cancelled crossing packages illustrate that the whole 
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cross-section of different stocks, trading sizes, and manipulation periods in the sample are 
captured. 
 
3.7.2 Research Design 
 
This section empirically tests the extent to which the alleged ‘wash trades’ are associated 
with return, volume, and volatility patterns indicative of trade based manipulation.  
Specifically the impact of the crossings on Return, Volume, and Volatility are examined for 
the: 
 Manipulation period is the interval between the first trade and the last trade in the 
package. 
 Pre-manipulation period is the 1-hour interval prior to the first trade in the package. 
 Post-manipulation period is the 1-hour interval following the last trade in the 
package.  
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Table 3-13 Crossing Package Summary Statistics 
This table reports the Return, Volume, and Volatility summary statistics for the Trade Cancellation packages during the 
Manipulation, Pre-Manipulation, and Post-Manipulation periods.  Manipulation period is the interval between the first trade and the 
last trade in the package.  Pre-manipulation period is the 1-hour interval prior to the first trade in the package.  Post-manipulation 
period is the 1hour interval following the last trade in the package. 
 
    Mean     
Standard 
Deviation   Skewness   Kurtosis 
  
Manipulation Period, n=35480 
Return 
 
0.0001 
  
0.0127 
 
11.67 
 
641.21 
Volume 
 
1,330,590 
  
5,779,333 
 
52.20 
 
4607.64 
Volatility 
 
0.0157 
  
0.0423 
 
59.03 
 
5043.70 
  
Pre-Manipulation Period, n=67206 
Return 
 
0.0003 
  
0.0161 
 
7.71 
 
370.76 
Volume 
 
767,687 
  
5,692,119 
 
186.44 
 
42709.79 
Volatility 
 
0.0176 
  
0.0334 
 
84.49 
 
12994.84 
  
Post-Manipulation Period, n=67206 
Return 
 
-0.0002 
  
0.0123 
 
2.77 
 
207.10 
Volume 
 
830,860 
  
4,121,234 
 
142.89 
 
29333.38 
Volatility  0.0162   0.0295  72.24  9717.98 
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Table 3-13 summarises return, volume, and volatility for the cancelled crossing packages 
during the three periods. It is observed that average returns are highest during the pre-
manipulation period, followed by the manipulation period, and post-manipulation period.  
Average volume traded during the manipulation period is double that of pre- and post-
manipulation periods. Finally, volatility is lowest during the manipulation period and greatest 
in the pre-manipulation period.  The results regarding volume are consistent with wash trades 
and the creation of a false sense of activity in the stock. 
 
Aggarwal and Wu (2006) posit that illiquidity in a stock implies a higher likelihood of it 
being manipulated.  They argue that one key element to a successful manipulation is to move 
the price effectively and that it would be difficult for a manipulator to be able to move a 
large-capitalization and highly liquid stock through trade-based manipulation by any 
significant amount without incurring huge costs and taking on enormous risk.  Further, trade 
based manipulation is likely to result in higher liquidity during and following the 
manipulative trading in order to create a false sense of activity in the security and entice 
uninformed traders to trade. To examine this issue, trading volume is used as a measure of 
liquidity over the ‘manipulation’, ‘pre-manipulation’, and ‘post-manipulation’ periods. 
 
 or each ‘manipulated’ stock, the trading volume for a benchmark is also calculated.19 For 
the benchmark, the manipulated stock is matched to an equally weighted portfolio of 10 
stocks. These stocks must be in the same size decile of all ASX listed stocks as that of the 
manipulated stock, and they are the closest in estimated betas to that of the manipulated 
stock. The average trading volume for the portfolio is calculated as the benchmark.  Trading 
volume is then cross-sectionally regressed on a constant and a dummy variable for 
                                                 
19
 ‘Manipulated stock’ for the purpose of this study refers to the stock in which there were crossed trades that 
were subsequently cancelled. 
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‘manipulation’. The dummy variable equals one for the manipulated stock and equals zero for 
the benchmark. The sample period is 30 October 2006 to 23 October 2009. 
 
                         {           }     
(3-6) 
There are a total 67,206 manipulated stock packages for which trading data is available. With 
the matched sample from the benchmark, there are a total of 134,412 observations in the 
regressions. 
 
In addition, of interest is how the ‘manipulated’ stocks perform relative to other stocks during 
the manipulation period. Since most trade based manipulation involves enticing other 
uninformed traders to trade and thereby profiting off the change in price, it is expected to 
observe abnormal returns during and especially following instances of manipulation. This 
section also examines whether manipulators prefer stocks that have underperformed or 
outperformed their market benchmarks. 
 
Returns over the manipulation period, as well as over the pre- and post-manipulation periods 
are calculated. Similar to trading volume, returns for the corresponding period for a 
benchmark are also calculated.  The benchmark is an equally weighted portfolio of 10 stocks 
matched on size and beta.  The interval return is cross-sectionally regressed on a constant and 
a dummy for manipulation. The dummy variable equals one for the manipulated stocks and 
equals zero for the benchmark. 
 
                 {           }     
(3-7) 
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Next the volatility of manipulated stocks is examined. The analysis is similar to that on 
returns above, except now the logarithm of the interval high price divided by the interval low 
price
20
 is used as the dependent variable in the regression: 
 
                     {           }     
(3-8) 
In computing the benchmarks’ volatilities, the ‘Hi-Lo’ volatility measure is averaged for the 
10 benchmark stocks in the portfolio. 
 
3.7.3 Results 
 
Panel A of Table 3-14 reports the regression results for trading volume. For the pre-
manipulation period, manipulation period, and the post-manipulation period, the results show 
that the coefficient for ‘manipulation’ is positive and significant in all three intervals.  
Further, the results indicate that that there is positive abnormal volume prior to the 
manipulation, in the ‘pre-manipulation’ period and following the trades in the ‘post-
manipulation’ period. However, the most interesting result is the finding that abnormal 
volume during the ‘manipulation’ period is twice that of the abnormal volume during the 
‘pre-manipulation’ period.  This finding is consistent with manipulative ‘wash trades’ which 
create a false and misleading sense of activity in securities thereby enticing uninformed 
traders to trade.  This finding is further reinforced by the discovery that abnormal volume 
continues following the ‘manipulation’ period into the ‘post-manipulation’ period, indicating 
that uninformed traders may have been influenced to trade in the security following the 
crossed trades.   
                                                 
20 Volatility is measured as log(High/Low) price during the interval. 
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Panel B of Table 3-14 reports the regression results for returns. The results illustrate that 
there are significant abnormal returns for the manipulated stocks prior to the trading in the 
‘pre-manipulation’ period of 0.034% for the one-hour interval. Further, significant abnormal 
returns continue into the manipulation period of 0.016%.  As for the post-manipulation period 
we find no significant abnormal returns.  These results are somewhat consistent with trade-
based manipulation that is designed to lead to abnormal returns, but perplexing in the finding 
that there are higher abnormal returns prior to the manipulation. An explanation may be that 
we cannot account for whether the ‘manipulators’ were trying increase or decrease the price 
of the stocks through their wash trades. This would definitely have some bearing on the 
findings. 
 
Panel C of Table 3-14 presents the results for volatility.  For all three periods, volatility is 
higher for manipulated stocks, and the coefficients are statistically significant. This indicates 
that manipulation is more likely to happen in volatile stocks, and manipulated stocks often 
experience dramatic price movements during the manipulation period. 
 
Overall, these results suggest that prior to the manipulation, the manipulated stocks generate 
higher returns, higher volumes, and tend to be more volatile than their benchmarks. During 
the manipulation period, manipulated stocks exhibit higher returns, higher liquidity, and 
higher volatility, consistent with Mei et al. (2004). Volatility and volume remain higher for 
manipulated stocks in the post manipulation period. These results are consistent with most 
models of successful trade-based manipulation such as Allen and Gale (1992). 
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Table 3-14 Liquidity, Return, and Volatility of Manipulated Stocks 
This table reports the results of the regression analysis.   or each ‘manipulated’ stock, we also compute the return, volume, and volatility for a benchmark.  
For the benchmark, we match the manipulated stock to an equally weighted portfolio of 10 stocks.  These stocks must be in the same size decile of all ASX 
listed stocks as that of the manipulated stock, and they are the closest in estimated betas to that of the manipulated stock.  We compute the average return, 
volume, and volatility for the portfolio as the benchmark and then cross-sectionally regress the return, volume, and volatility on a constant and a dummy for 
‘manipulation’.  The dummy variable equals one for the manipulated stock and equals zero for the benchmark.  The sample period is 30 October 2006 to 23 
October 2009. 
 
    
Manipulation Period 
  
Pre-manipulation Period 
  
Post-Manipulation Period 
  
  
  
A. Volume 
Intercept 
 
503,836 
 
355,002 
 
391,158 
(t-statistic) 
 
21.62 
 
22.62 
 
34.1 
(P-value) 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
Manipulation 
 
826,755 
 
412,685 
 
439,702 
(t-statistic) 
 
25.08 
 
18.6 
 
27.11 
(P-value) 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
R squared 
 
0.88% 
 
0.26% 
 
0.54% 
  
B. Return 
Intercept 
 
-0.000014 
 
-0.000081 
 
-0.000102 
(t-statistic) 
 
-0.27 
 
-1.76 
 
-2.9 
(P-value) 
 
0.79 
 
0.08 
 
0.00 
Manipulation 
 
0.000155 
 
0.000339 
 
-0.000071 
(t-statistic) 
 
2.14 
 
5.23 
 
-1.43 
(P-value) 
 
0.03 
 
0.00 
 
0.15 
R squared 
 
0.01% 
 
0.02% 
 
0.00% 
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C. Volatility 
Intercept 
 
0.0131 
 
0.0133 
 
0.0129 
(t-statistic) 
 
78.55 
 
139.89 
 
149.27 
(P-value) 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
Manipulation 
 
0.0026 
 
0.0043 
 
0.0033 
(t-statistic) 
 
11.1 
 
31.54 
 
27.13 
(P-value) 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
R squared  0.17%  0.73%  0.54% 
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3.8 Summary 
 
This essay initiates the first comprehensive investigation of trade cancellations to understand 
their magnitude and impact on market integrity. The investigation finds that trade 
cancellations as a proportion of total traded value on the ASX almost doubled from 0.69% to 
1.16% between 2006 and 2009.  These trades can lead to distorted prices among other market 
wide statistics.  Further, there is evidence to suggest that some of these trades are in violation 
of exchange trading rules and possibly manipulative in nature.  This essay draws from 
theoretical and empirical research on market manipulation and applies it to the case of trade 
cancellations. 
 
The results reveal a proliferation in the number of trades that are subsequently cancelled on 
the ASX year on year and a resulting significant impact on the daily reported VWAP figures 
within stocks on certain days.  These results are also more pronounced in the smallest listed 
stocks on the ASX and are of a greater concern.  Findings also document evidence of return 
reversals following potential wash trades that are subsequently cancelled. Examination of the 
impact of trade cancellations also reveals that during the initial trades (prior to being 
cancelled), stocks exhibit higher returns, higher liquidity, and higher volatility, consistent 
with Mei et al. (2004). Volatility and volume also remain higher following the trades. These 
results are consistent with most models of successful trade-based manipulation such as Allen 
and Gale (1992). 
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Chapter 4: The Impact of Large Off-Market Option Trades: 
Evidence from the Australian Options Market 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Off-market trading allows traders to access unexpressed liquidity provided by off-market 
participants that is unavailable on the centralised limit order book.  It thereby provides large 
traders with a platform to search for liquidity and negotiate a trade with minimal market 
impact.  A great deal of academic literature focuses on the economics of off-market trading in 
equity markets.  However, the impact of off-market trading in derivatives markets is yet to be 
investigated. This is largely due to unavailability of the data required for this line of research.  
The objective of this essay is to bridge this gap in the literature by using a unique data set 
provided by the Australian Options Market (AOM). Specifically, this essay (i) reports the 
change in bid and ask quotes on the options and underlying equity market around the off-
market option trades, (ii) measures the price impact of off-market option trades on the 
underlying equities market, and (iii) examines cumulative abnormal returns on the underlying 
stocks in the days surrounding the large off-market option trades. 
 
Prior empirical studies examine the role of off-market trading in liquidity provision for larger 
traders in the equities market, also referred to as block trading.  The literature suggests that 
off-market trading lowers execution costs for large traders by reducing adverse selection 
costs as off-market broker-dealers can screen out informed traders and tap into unexpressed 
liquidity (Booth et al. 2002; and Bessembinder and Venkataraman, 2004). In addition, it is 
posited that off-market trading improves market quality by supplementing liquidity when on-
market liquidity is not sufficient. Although these findings are based on empirical studies 
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examining equities markets, this study aims to test these findings for the Australian Options 
Market (AOM) and the underlying equities market. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes the literature and 
develops several testable hypotheses. Section 4.3 provides institutional details. Section 4.4 
describes the data and sample. Section 4.5 sets out the research design. Section 4.6 presents 
the empirical results. Section 4.7 summarises the chapter. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
This section reviews the literature related to the issues examined in this study. This section is 
organised in a manner so as to highlight the areas of the existing literature upon which this 
study builds. In turn, based on the literature reviewed, a number of testable hypotheses are 
developed. This section is structured as follows.  Section 4.2.1 reviews the literature on 
upstairs trading (or off- market trading)
21
.  Section 4.2.2 examines the literature on the impact 
of informed options trading on the options and underlying equity market.  Section 4.2.3 
provides a review of the literature on large trades and price impact.  Section 4.2.4 uses the 
literature reviewed to develop testable hypotheses that are tested subsequently in this study. 
 
4.2.1 Upstairs Trading 
 
Theoretical literature on upstairs trading focuses on two pertinent issues to large traders: 
order exposure and the information content of trades.  The revelation of an imminent large 
order arriving on market may move prices adversely against the large trader if other market 
                                                 
21 Upstairs trading and off-market trading are used interchangeably in this dissertation. 
 131 
 
participants decide to front run or simply infer information about the future price movement 
of the security.  A large limit order, in particular, offers a free trading option to other market 
participants and is susceptible to adverse selection risk if market conditions change.  
Grossman (1992) posits that the trading preferences of many large investors are not expressed 
publicly and that the upstairs brokers act as a repository of information on the unexpressed 
trading interests of large investors.  Therefore, considering all trading interest are not 
reflected in the limit order book, a large market order submitted on the downstairs market 
will simply ‘walk’ the book, bypassing uncommitted liquidity, and thus increasing execution 
costs and price impact.  In contrast, Grossman (1992) devises a model in which upstairs 
broker-dealers have access to the information on unexpressed liquidity off-market.  This 
allows a large order negotiated on the upstairs market to tap the pool of unexpressed liquidity 
through an upstairs broker, while minimizing the degree to which the customer’s order is 
exposed.  
 
The second line of literature on upstairs trading focuses on the role of upstairs brokers in 
certifying trades’ information content.  Easley and O’Hara (1987) establish that liquidity 
providers will require greater compensation to execute larger orders in response to the finding 
that informed traders with private information prefer to trade larger quantities.  As a result 
large uninformed utilitarian traders are incentivized to identify themselves as uninformed to 
upstairs brokers.  Seppi (1990) provide descriptions of the mechanisms by which an upstairs 
broker attempts to distinguish between informed and uninformed traders.  The Seppi (1990) 
model allows upstairs broker-dealers to screen out informed traders in a repeated game 
setting.  This leads to a separating equilibrium where only uninformed (or liquidity-
motivated) investors trade upstairs, thereby reducing the adverse selection costs to large 
upstairs liquidity providers. 
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Both the Seppi (1990) and Grossman (1992) models predict that upstairs markets facilitate 
block transactions at lower costs compared to downstairs markets.  Another implication of the 
findings is that upstairs trading may not contribute to price discovery.  That is, upstairs 
broker-dealers attract the large uninformed order flow from the downstairs market.  
 
Prior empirical work has focused mainly on the Seppi (1990) prediction regarding the 
informational role of the block broker.  Keim and Madhavan (1996) study block transactions 
that are facilitated upstairs and examine the price changes around the transactions.  They find 
evidence that upstairs (both seller- and buyer-initiated) trades have permanent price impact.  
Their results also reveal that price changes occur prior to upstairs trades, which they interpret 
as suggesting the leakage of information about upstairs trades during the facilitation process.  
However, their findings cannot be generalised to all upstairs trading as their data are sourced 
from one particular investment firm.  
 
Madhavan and Cheng (1997) compare the execution costs of block trades executed in the 
upstairs market to those executed in the downstairs market for the stocks comprising the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) trading on the NYSE.  They find that the downstairs market 
plays a dominant role in facilitating block trades on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
and that execution costs for block trades in both markets are comparable.  Although their 
analysis of the price impact of large trades is in contrast to the Seppi (1990) proposition that 
upstairs broker-dealers are able to screen out informed traders, they note the similarities in 
the negotiation between floor traders and specialists on the NYSE and the negotiation process 
in the upstairs market. 
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Smith et al. (2001) and Booth et al. (2002), study upstairs trading in the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSE) and the Helsinki Stock Exchange (HSE), respectively.  In both markets the 
downstairs market is electronic.  The studies find that upstairs brokers are able to lower 
adverse selection costs by effectively discerning informed trading.  Their findings support the 
Seppi (1990) model in which upstairs brokers are able to certify trades’ information content. 
They also provide support for the Grossman (1992) model in that their findings show that 
upstairs trading is more likely to be preferred when the downstairs market is less liquid.  
Furthermore, Booth et al. (2002) show that upstairs trades have lower permanent price impact 
than the downstairs trades.  In contrast, the temporary price effects of block trades are larger 
in the upstairs market, implying that upstairs broker-dealers require a greater reward for 
liquidity provision.  Consistent with the Seppi (1990) prediction, their evidence reveals that 
upstairs order flow is less informative than the downstairs counterpart. 
 
Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004) analyze upstairs trading on the Paris Bourse, which 
more accurately resembles the market structure modelled in both Seppi (1990) and Grossman 
(1992).  The Paris Bourse is an electronic limit order book without designated market makers 
and has an upstairs market.  Similar to Smith et al. (2001) and Booth et al. (2002) and 
consistent with the Seppi (1990) model they find that block traders incur smaller adverse 
selection costs in the upstairs market.  Furthermore, they directly investigate the Grossman 
(1992) prediction by reconstructing the downstairs limit order book and estimating the 
execution costs that upstairs block traders would incur if they were to execute their trades in 
the downstairs market.  Their results indicate that execution costs are lower in the upstairs 
market for both buy and sell orders but not as a result of unexpressed liquidity in the 
downstairs but more as a result of the ability of upstairs brokers in certifying trades’ 
information content, consistent with Seppi (1990). 
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In conclusion, the empirical literature provides overwhelming support for the Seppi (1990) 
model that predicts that upstairs broker-dealers are able to screen out information-motivated 
orders.  To a weaker extent, the literature also supports the Grossman (1992) model that 
predicts that upstairs broker-dealers reduce execution costs by exploiting their access to 
unexpressed liquidity.  The exception to the literature is the Madhavan and Cheng (1997) 
study of upstairs block trades on the NYSE with results in contrast to Seppi (1990).  
However, their findings can be attributed to the fact that the upstairs negotiation mechanism 
modelled in Seppi (1990) is embedded in the NYSE downstairs market, offsetting the 
benefits of upstairs trading.  Chakravarty (2001) offers support, arguing that NYSE 
specialists and floor brokers can sometimes deduce the identity of trade initiators, thereby 
lowering the risk of adverse selection.  Furthermore, the NYSE specialist, being positioned at 
the centre of a trading crowd on the exchange floor, has information on the hidden liquidity 
on the floor and unexpressed liquidity upstairs thereby offering support for the Grossman 
(1992) model. 
 
4.2.2 The Impact of Informed Options Trading on Liquidity in Options and 
Underlying Equities Markets 
 
Demsetz (1968) explains that the bid-ask spread partly compensates market makers for the 
operating costs incurred in providing immediacy (also referred to as order processing costs) 
in securities markets.  In theoretical microstructure literature, information-based models are 
concerned with adverse selection costs faced by dealers in the presence of information 
asymmetry (e.g. Bagehot, 1971; Copeland and Galai, 1983; Kyle, 1985; Glosten and 
Milgrom, 1985; Easley and O‟ Hara, 1987; Madhavan, 1992; and Foster and Viswanathan, 
1994).  The key implication is that bid-ask spreads are wider for volatile securities. 
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Literature that investigates the extent of information-motivated trading in options markets 
include Manaster and Rendleman (1982), Anthony (1988), Stephan and Whaley (1990), 
Sheikh and Ronn (1994), Easley, O‟ Hara, and Srinivas (1998), Chan et al. (2002), and 
Charkravarty et al. (2004).  However, in this study we are not so much interested in the extent 
of informed trading but more in how informed trading impacts on both the options and 
underlying market. 
 
Early empirical studies generally suggest that adverse selection is not a considerable 
determinant of the bid-ask spread in options markets.  Vijh (1990) is one of the first to 
examine the relationship between information asymmetry and option bid-ask spreads.  
Similar to our study he examines both stock and option price changes around large option 
trades on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE).  He posits that the implicit leverage 
of options relative to equities attracts both informed and noise traders.  His results reveal 
insignificant price effects on options surrounding the large option trades and that the adverse 
selection component of the bid-ask spread is negligible.  Together, the results suggest that the 
large CBOE option trades are uninformed and utilitarian in nature.  Neal (1992) expands on 
the work of Vijh (1990) by examining 26 AMEX options and 15 CBOE options using the 
Glosten and Harris (1988) spread decomposition method to estimate the adverse selection 
component.  He finds the adverse selection component of the spreads around the trades to be 
statistically insignificant.  Extending the results of Vijh (1990) and Neal (1992), Lee and Yi 
(2001) investigate the extent of information-motivated trading on the CBOE by partitioning 
trades into different trade sizes.  Consistent with Vijh (1990), they find that the adverse 
selection component is lower in the options market than the stock market for large trades 
after controlling for leverage.  They obtain the opposite results for small trades. 
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In related literature looking at how option market makers may hedge away their adverse 
selection risk, Cho and Engle (1999) proposed a new theory called “derivative hedge theory”.  
The theory stipulates that bid-ask spreads in the option market are determined by both option 
activity and activity in the underlying stock.  If market makers in derivative markets are able 
to perfectly hedge away their position with an underlying security, then spreads in the option 
market will only be determined by spreads in the underlying market.  The implication is that 
the presence of informed trading in options will not affect bid-ask spreads in the options 
market.  Examining S&P 100 index options, the authors find that option market spreads are 
positively related to spreads in the underlying market, supporting their derivative hedge 
theory.  Furthermore, the authors propose that the market maker is only able to imperfectly 
hedge his position in the underlying securities market. 
 
Building on Cho and Engle (1999), Kaul, Nimalendran and Zhang (2004) contend that the 
derivative hedge theory of Cho and Engle (1999) only accounted for the initial hedging cost 
but neglected rebalancing costs.  By calculating and accounting for rebalancing costs, Kaul, 
Nimalendran and Zhang (2004) find that a large proportion of the bid-ask spread is 
attributable to inventory management costs; 50% attributable to setting up a delta neutral 
position and 6.93% associated with discrete rebalancing. 
 
Utilising the Cho and Engle (1999) model, Landsiedl (2005) consider additional factors such 
as underlying asset and cross option market characteristics on the Austrian option exchange.  
He finds that hedging costs on the Austrian option exchange represent only part of the 
variability of the bid and ask spread.  Furthermore, delta hedging and order processing costs 
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are significantly and positively related to bid-ask spreads.  Information asymmetry however 
is not a significant factor in the Austrian option market.  
 
Bartram et al. (2008) study the impact of adverse selection on option bid-ask spreads by 
comparing two markets with different levels of information asymmetry.  The study examines 
the EuRex, a traditional derivatives exchange, with EuWax, which specializes in bank-issued 
options.  It is proposed that the level of adverse selection is lower on the EuWax as a result of 
market makers knowing the identity of the investors with whom they trade.  By assessing 
similar option contracts across both markets they find that bid-ask spreads on the EuWax are 
tighter (4.2%) than on the EuRex (8.8%). 
 
4.2.3 Large Trades and Price Impact 
 
Kraus and Stoll (1972) were the first to examine the determinants of the price impact of large 
trades.  They explain that there are three possible factors that lead to price impact.  First, price 
concessions are often required to find block trade counterparties (i.e. find liquidity), and thus 
the impact of the search for liquidity could lead to price impact.  Second, inelastic supply and 
demand curves, in that stocks are not perfect substitutes for each other, lead to price 
concessions and thus price impact.  Thirdly, the possible information conveyed by large 
orders can result in a price adjustment and thus new equilibrium prices.  Finally, they regress 
the value of block trades on price impact, and find that the size of trades is positively related 
to the level of price impact. 
 
Typically, large block trades demand more liquidity than is available at the current best 
quotes.  As a result, if the block trade was to be fully executed against the expressed liquidity 
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available on the market, the block trade would ‘walk’ through the limit order book, and in 
doing so, force the stock price to move in the direction of the trade (Aitken et al., 1993).
22
  
Madhavan and Cheng (1997) show that when a block trade is shopped in the upstairs market, 
information can leak to other market participants prior to the execution of the block trade.  
This information leakage is known as the leakage effect in price impact literature. 
 
The temporary effect of price impact is a measure of the market frictional price reaction 
following the execution of a block trade.  The temporary effect measures the liquidity 
component of price impact, as it occurs as a result of large trades executing at prices away 
from the equilibrium price.  The frictional price reaction arises in large trades because usually 
there is no readily available counterparty that can assume the opposite side of a large block 
purchase (sale) at the best available ask (bid) quote (Kraus and Stoll, 1972).  The temporary 
effect can also be considered as compensation to liquidity providers (i.e. counterparties) 
given it is necessary for large block buyers (sellers) to offer a price premium (discount) in 
order to attract counterparties to participate. 
 
The temporary effects calculated in previous studies following large block trades on equity 
markets show considerable variation.  Several studies, including Holthausen, Leftwich and 
Mayers (1987) find a positive temporary effect is associated with both block purchases and 
block sales.  Gemmill (1996) finds that the temporary effect is negative following block 
purchases and positive following block sales. 
 
Post-trade benchmarks represent the equilibrium price after the temporary effects of the trade 
has dissipated (usually following a price reversal following the block trade).  The most 
                                                 
22 This ‘cutting’ through the limit order book occurs in limit order markets like the ASX. 
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common benchmark for the post trade impact is the closing price on the day of the trade, 
although benchmarks both closer to, and further from the trade, are also used. 
 
The permanent effect captures the overall impact of the block trade on the stock price.  It is 
argued that since most large block trades are executed by institutions, and institutions are 
more likely to be informed (Easley and O’Hara, 1987), the equilibrium stock price following 
a block purchase is expected to increase, and decrease following a block sale.  The pre- and 
post- trade benchmarks are often the opening and closing stock prices on the day of the block 
trade (Beebower and Priest, 1980).  Several studies also use benchmarks closer to, or further 
away from, the block trade.  Kraus and Stoll (1972), for example, calculate the permanent 
effect as the return from the closing price on the previous day to the closing price on the day 
of the block trade. 
  
 140 
 
4.2.4 Hypothesis Development 
 
A great deal of academic literature has focused on the economics of off-market trading in 
equity markets.  However, the impact of off-market trading in derivatives markets is yet to be 
investigated. This is largely due to unavailability of the data required for this line of research.  
This study investigates the impact of large off-market option trades on both the options and 
underlying equity market. 
 
Theoretical literature on upstairs trading focuses on two pertinent issues to large traders: 
order exposure and the information content of trades.  The Seppi (1990) model predicts that 
upstairs broker-dealers are able to screen out information-motivated orders.   While the 
Grossman (1992) model predicts that upstairs broker-dealers reduce execution costs by 
exploiting their access to unexpressed liquidity.  The empirical literature (Smith et al., 2001; 
Booth et al., 2002; and Bessembinder and Venkataraman, 2004) provides overwhelming 
support for the Seppi (1990) model and some support for the Grossman (1992) model.  The 
exception to the literature includes Madhavan and Cheng (1997).  However, their findings 
can be attributed to the fact that the upstairs negotiation mechanism modelled in Seppi (1990) 
is embedded in the NYSE downstairs market, offsetting the benefits of upstairs trading. 
 
Although there is no direct literature on the effects of large off-market options trades on the 
options market, this study draws on the literature on upstairs trading to form the hypotheses.  
The above literature leads to the following hypothesis to be tested in the study. 
 
Hypothesis4,1: Large off-market option trades transact at prices equal to or better than the 
standing quotes on the options market. 
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Cho and Engle (1999) proposed a new theory called “derivative hedge theory” that stipulates 
that bid-ask spreads in the option market are determined by both option activity and activity 
in the underlying stock.  It is posited that if market makers in derivative markets are able to 
perfectly hedge away their position with an underlying security, then spreads in the option 
market will only be determined by spreads in the underlying market.  The implication is that 
the presence of informed trading in options will not affect bid-ask spreads in the options 
market.  Therefore, this study tests the impact of large off-market option trades on the 
underlying equities market.  The following hypothesis is tested: 
 
Hypothesis4,2: Large off-market option trades have no impact on the liquidity of the 
underlying equity market. 
 
Kraus and Stoll (1972) identify three determinants of price impact for large trades.  These 
include the price concessions in order to find liquidity (leakage effect), price concessions to 
counterparties for taking on the opposing side to a large trade (temporary effect), and finally 
the possible information conveyed by large orders which can result in a price adjustment and 
thus new equilibrium prices (permanent effect). 
 
Madhavan and Cheng (1997) find evidence of a leakage effect when a block trade is shopped 
in the upstairs market.  Several studies, including Holthausen et al. (1987) find a positive 
temporary effect is associated with both block purchases and block sales.  Gemmill (1996) 
finds that the temporary effect is negative following block purchases and positive following 
block sales.  Easley and O’Hara (198) also posit that since most large block trades are 
executed by institutions, and institutions are more likely to be informed the equilibrium stock 
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price following a block purchase is expected to increase, and decrease following a block sale 
(permanent effect). 
 
In empirical literature on upstairs trading, Keim and Madhavan (1996) find evidence that 
upstairs (both seller- and buyer-initiated) trades have permanent price impact.  Their results 
also reveal that price changes occur prior to upstairs trades, which they interpret as a leakage 
of information about the upstairs trade during the facilitation process.  However, their sample 
only looks at the trades of one particular firm.  Booth et al. (2002) show that upstairs trades 
have lower permanent price impact than the downstairs trades.  In contrast, the temporary 
price effects of block trades are larger in the upstairs market.  The above discussion suggests 
that the price impact of large off-market options trades on the options market is an open 
question, which leads to the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis4,3: Large off-market option trades have no price impact on the underlying equity 
market. 
 
4.3 Institutional Details 
 
The Australian Options Market (AOM) provides a trading platform that uses a centralised 
limit order book with designated market makers. The Integrated Trading System (ITS), a 
screen-based trading system, facilitates trading options on the AOM.
23
  The AOM offers 
options on a range of underlying assets such as equities, fixed income instruments, and 
commodities. Of these instruments, equity options are the most actively traded. Equity 
options are American options, and are classified according to a set of exercise prices and 
                                                 
23
 The Australian Options Market (AOM) is one of the trading platforms provided by the Australian Securities 
Exchange (ASX). 
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expiry dates predetermined by the AOM.  There are two sub-trading platforms on the AOM; 
the centralised limit order book (CLOB) and the off-market facility. 
 
The Australian Options Market (AOM) centralised limit order book (CLOB) is an order-
driven market where market orders execute against standing limit orders based on price-time 
priority. Mandated market makers further supplement liquidity. The mandated market makers 
are each assigned two or more stocks in which they must meet ASX’s minimum volume and 
maximum spread requirements. The market makers are incentivised to meet certain 
benchmark quoting requirements under contractual arrangements with the ASX.  Market 
makers can choose to make a market on a continuous basis, in response to quote requests, or 
both. Market makers who choose to make a market on a continuous basis are obligated to 
provide orders continuously for a certain percentage of time, in a set of 18 options per 
underlying security.  The set of 18 options encompasses three calls and three puts in any three 
of the following 6 expiry cycles. Market makers who choose to make a market only in 
response to quote requests are monitored on their provision of quotes for a certain percentage 
of time for all options up to nine months to maturity.  A stock can have more than one market 
maker in competition with one another.  Although there may be multiple market makers in a 
class (representing each underlying security), there is no guarantee that all options series will 
have prices displayed as market makers are not required to provide quotes in all options, or at 
all times.  Normal trading hours for the AOM are from 10:00 a.m. to 4:20 p.m. 
 
Off-market trading allows more flexibility than the CLOB since the strict price/time priority 
rules do not apply to off-market transactions.  For a special size crossing (SPXT) or off-
market option trade to take place, the crossing must have a premium greater than the 
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threshold special size crossing for that category.
24
 During the sample period the contract size 
threshold for off-market trading was $500,000 for Category 1 option classes, and $250,000 
for Category 2 option classes.
25
 Note that option classes are classified into two groups 
(Category 1 and Category 2) based on the liquidity of the underlying stocks, at the discretion 
of the ASX; Category 1 option classes are more liquid than Category 2 option classes.  
Special crossings must be reported on the trading day on which they are transacted between 
9:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. 
 
4.4 Data and Sample 
 
The data are obtained from an internal database from the AOM. The sample consists of trade-
by-trade data for all equity options listed on the exchange. The data contain a record 
describing each transaction, including the option series, the underlying stock, date, time (to 
the nearest millisecond), price, volume, and a condition code specifying whether each trade 
was executed on the CLOB (Centralised Limit Order Book), or off-market as a special 
crossing (SPXT).  The focus of this study is off-market special crossings (SPXT) and only 
non-combination trades are considered, as the direction of combination trades cannot be 
determined using the quote rule.  The sample period extends from January 1, 2007 to August 
31, 2007.  The sample is restricted to normal trading hours for the AOM (10:00 a.m. - 4:20 
p.m.). 
 
                                                 
24
 The threshold special size crossings in Category 1 stocks underlying ETOs is $500,000 worth of premium. 
The threshold for special size crossings in Category 2 & Category 3 stocks underlying ETOs is $250,000 worth 
of premium. The threshold for special size LEPO crossings is $1,000,000 worth of premium. 
25 Off-market trading refers to Special Crossing (SP) defined in ASX Market Procedure 22.3. 
 145 
 
The internal AOM data are combined with order book data sourced from Reuters Data Scope 
Tick History provided by Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA).
26
  
The data provide the prices of the best bid and ask quotes time stamped to the nearest 
millisecond.  The quote rule is utilised to determine the direction of each trade.  In a study on 
the direction of option trades, Savickas and Wilson (2003) finds the quote rule, where trades 
are determined as buyer- or seller-initiated according to whether the trade price is above or 
below the midpoint, to be the most accurate in determining trade direction. 
 
Table 4-1 reports the mean price, contract size, strike price, the average value of contracts 
traded, average time to maturity, and moneyness. The sample consists of a total of 524 
transactions, of which 276 are call options, and 248 are put options.  The moneyness ratio is 
calculated as the stock price divided by the exercise price for call options and the exercise 
price divided by the stock price for put options, as performed in Chakravarty et al. (2004).  
Options are considered At-the-Money (ATM) if the ratio lies between 0.98 and 1.02.  If the 
ratio is below 0.98 it is considered Out-of-the-Money (OTM) and if above 1.02 it is 
considered to be In-the-Money (ITM), as defined in Engstrom (2002). Time to maturity is 
calculated as the difference between the trade date of the option and the expiry date. Each 
trade is further broken down into contract size categories. Small contract size trades are those 
in which only 1-4 contracts are traded, Medium contract size trades are those in which 5-99 
contracts are traded, and Large contract size trades are those in which 100+ contracts are 
traded. 
 
Summary statistics are partitioned by both Call and Put options and whether the off-market 
trades were buy or sell trades.  The results show that Call sell trades have an average contract 
                                                 
26 The Reuters intra-day data are cross-checked with the data internally sourced from the AOM. 
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size almost 3-times larger than the remaining categories. Similarly, the average traded value 
of Call sell trades is more than 5-times larger than the remaining categories.  As expected, the 
majority of the trades in our sample consist of large contract size trades. 
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Table 4-1 Descriptive Statistics 
This table provides descriptive statistics of the sample in the study.  Option Type specifies the type of option, whether a Call or Put option.  Trade direction specifies whether 
the trades were buyer (Buy) or seller (Sell) initiated.  Number of Trades is the size of that sub-category sample.  Average Price is the mean trade price of all trades in that sub-
category.  Average Contract Size species the mean amount of contracts transacted in each sub-category.  Average Strike Price is the mean Strike Price of all option contract 
trades in the sub-category.  Average Traded Value is the mean total value traded in each trade in the sub-category.  Average Time to Maturity specifies the mean number of 
days until expiry for each contract traded in the sub-category.  OTM (Out of the Money), ATM (At the Money), and ITM (In the Money), specifies the relationship between 
the current underlying price of the options contracts and their strike price.  Options are considered At-the-Money (ATM) if the ratio lies between 0.98 and 1.02.  If the ratio is 
below 0.98 it is considered Out-of-the-Money (OTM) and if above 1.02 it is considered to be In-the-Money (ITM).  Small Contract Size trades are those in which only 1-4 
contracts are traded, Medium Contract Size trades are those in which 5-99 contracts are traded, and Large Contract Size trades are those in which 100+ contracts are traded. 
 
Option 
Type 
Trade 
Direction 
Number 
of 
Trades 
Average 
Price 
Average 
Contract 
Size 
Average 
Strike 
Price 
Average 
Traded 
Value 
Average Time 
To Maturity 
(Days) OTM ATM ITM 
Small 
Contract 
Size 
Medium 
Contract 
Size 
Large 
Contract 
Size 
CALL 
BUY 151 $4.50 523 $40.94 $914,396 156 1 31 119 1 13 137 
SELL 125 $5.88 1,426 $39.21 $5,161,830 137 4 30 91 
 
15 110 
PUT 
BUY 158 $3.20 419 $56.66 $791,131 185 13 6 139 
 
7 151 
SELL 90 $3.70 465 $58.05 $757,128 165 6 5 79   3 87 
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4.5 Research Design 
 
4.5.1 Execution Costs and Liquidity available to off-market option trades 
 
This section determines immediate execution costs and the liquidity available to off-market 
option trades.  This analysis investigates whether off-market option trades are perceived to 
be informed and thereby experience higher execution costs as a by-product of their size.  
The analysis examines the ‘off-market premium’ and bid-ask spreads in 5-minute and 1-
hour intervals surrounding the trades both in the option market and the underlying stock 
market. 
 
The off-market premium is defined as the difference between the actual execution price and 
the market quote at the time of order entry.  In a study of exchange-traded equity options in 
the US, Wei and Zheng (2010) find the dollar bid-ask spread to be an increasing function of 
the option price.  Consequently, the proportional off-market premium is also calculated. 
 
                   {
[                        ]             
[                        ]              
 
(4-1) 
 
                              
  {
[                                          ⁄ ]             
[                                          ⁄ ]              
 
(4-2) 
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The proportional bid-ask spread is also calculated to examine the average round-trip 
transaction costs surrounding the time of the off-market option trades. The average 
transaction costs to the investor are usually considered as one-half of the proportional 
spread. 
 
                                                       ⁄  
(4-3) 
 
The proportional Ask (Bid) statistic calculated below for Buy (Sell) trades provide an idea 
of how much the Ask (Bid) moves from the time of the trade. 
 
                                                       ⁄               
(4-4) 
 
                                                       ⁄                
(4-5) 
 
4.5.2 Price and Information effects of off-market option trades 
 
This section examines the impact of off-market option trades on prices. The analysis 
specifically tests the role of any information leakage on the price, the permanent change in 
the price following the trade, and any temporary changes in the price as a result of the trade 
execution.  Studies in market microstructure such as Kraus and Stoll (1972) and Huang and 
Stoll (1996) have long defined permanent changes in price as either liquidity costs or price 
impact, and temporary changes in price as informational effects or realized spreads.  Figure 
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4-1 from Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004) illustrates the price effects of a block buy 
order. 
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Figure 4-1 Liquidity and Information Effects of a Block Buy 
 
Fig. 4-1 Liquidity and information effects of a block buy. The facilitation process is initiated at time=td in the upstairs market.  The leakage of information of the block size 
could move the security value in the downstairs market.  The security value just before the block trade (time=t0) is P0.  The block of size=Q is executed in the upstairs market 
at (time=tb) at price=Pb.  The liquidity effect of the block results in a price reversal and moves prices to P1.  Temporary component of price change  (Q): ln(Pb) –ln(P1).  Post-
trade impact  (Q): ln(P1) –ln(P0).  Leakage effect L(Q): ln(P0) –ln(Pd).  Permanent component of price change P(Q): ln(P1) –ln(Pd).  Total execution cost of the block trade 
T(Q): ln(Pb) –ln(Pd). 
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Following Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004), the temporary component,     , 
represents compensation to liquidity providers (i.e., counterparties) and can be measured by 
the price reversal after the block trade: 
                  , 
where    is the block trade price and    is a measure of post-trade value.
27
  The permanent 
component,     , can be divided into post-trade impact and pre-trade leakage.  The post-
trade impact,     , represents the change in the market’s perception of a security’s value 
after the announcement of the block trade: 
                  , 
where    is the pre-trade value of the security, proxied by the last quote midpoint before the 
announcement of the block trade. The leakage effect      represents price movements in 
the downstairs market while the block is being facilitated (or shopped) in the upstairs 
market: 
                  , 
where Pd is the security value when the upstairs broker initiates the search process.
28
  All 
measures are expected to be positive for a block buy and negative for a block sell. We adjust 
each measure for overall market movements by subtracting the Adjusted All Ordinaries 
Share Index’s market return from the stock’s return. 
 
4.5.3 Price Behaviour surrounding off-market option trades 
 
                                                 
27  Similar to Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004) we also examine the sensitivity of results to four 
different proxies for   : (1) the midpoint of the first quote reported 30 minutes after the trade, (2) the midpoint 
of the first quote reported after 12:00 noon the next trading day, (3) the midpoint of the closing quotes on the 
next trading day, and (4) the midpoint of the closing quote on the third trading day after the trade. The 
empirical results are similar across all four measures.  We only report results obtained while using the 
midpoint of the closing quotes on the next trading day. 
28 Again, similar to Bessembinder and Venkataraman (2004) we consider three proxies for   : (1) the midpoint 
of the quotes 30 minutes before the trade, (2) the midpoint of the closing quotes the day before the block trade 
(   ), and (3) the midpoint of the closing quotes three days before the block trade. We report results using (2).  
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This section provides a summary of the behaviour of share prices around the announcement 
of the large off-market option trades. This analysis assesses whether there are common share 
price traits leading up to the large off-market option trades, and whether there are similar 
share prices patterns following the large off-market option trades. 
 
Following Bozcuk and Lasfer (2005), the analysis utilizes the market model (Brown and 
Warner, 1985) with parameters (  and  ) calculated over the estimation period [-90, -31] to 
compute the abnormal returns over the event period -30 to +30 days, where day 0 is the date 
of the trade.  The company share prices adjusted for capital changes and dividends are used 
to calculate the log of security i's returns (  ), the Adjusted All Ordinaries Share Index, 
which covers over 2,000 quoted Australian companies to compute the market return (  ). 
 
4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Execution Costs and Liquidity available to off-market option trades 
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Figure 4-2 Off-market Option Premium Histogram - All Off-market Option Trades 
This figure shows a histogram of the dollar value of the off-market option premium for the entire sample of off-market option trades.  The Off-market Option Premium is 
equal to Price - Standing Ask Price for Buy Trades and Standing Bid Price - Price for Sell Trades. 
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Figure 4-3 Proportional Off-market Option Premium Histogram - All Off-market Option Trades 
This figure shows a histogram of the percentage value of the Proportional Off-market Option Premium for the entire sample of off-market option trades.  The Proportional 
Off-market Option Premium is equal to (Price - Standing Ask Price)/Standing Ask Price for Buy Trades and (Standing Bid Price - Price)/Standing Bid Price for Sell 
Trades. 
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Table 4-2 Mean Off-Market Option Premiums 
 
This table provides the mean of the off-market option premiums for all off-market option trades 
within the sample.  The sample includes 524 off-market option trades. 
 
  Mean p-value 
Off-market Option Premium  -0.0435 <.0001 
Proportional Off-market Option Premium -0.0159 <.0001 
 
 
Figure 4-2 reports the off-market premium for all trades within the sample in histogram 
format; 38% of all trades centre around an off-market premium of $0.00 with the majority of 
trades reporting a negative dollar off-market premium. Similarly, Figure 4-3 reports the 
proportional off-market premium. Again, the results find that the majority (64%) of trades 
centre on a proportional off-market premium of 0% with an equal amount of trades above 
and below. Table 4-2 presents the mean off-market option premiums. The findings support 
the fact that large off-market options trades receive price improvement in the order of 1.59% 
from the standing market quotes at the time of the trade.  Together, the results imply that the 
majority of off-market option trades do not pay an off-market premium and in contrast 
receive price improvement. 
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Figure 4-4 Off-market Option Premium Histogram - Call Option Trades 
This figure shows a histogram of the dollar value of the off-market option premium for all Call off-market option trades.  The Off-market Option Premium is equal to 
Price - Standing Ask Price for Buy Trades and Standing Bid Price - Price for Sell Trades. 
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Figure 4-5 Proportional Off-market Option Premium Histogram - Call Option Trades 
This figure shows a histogram of the percentage value of the Proportional Off-market Option Premium for all Call off-market option trades.  The Proportional Off-
market Option Premium is equal to (Price - Standing Ask Price)/Standing Ask Price for Buy Trades and (Standing Bid Price - Price)/Standing Bid Price for Sell Trades. 
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Figure 4-4 reports the off-market premium for only the call option trades. Similar to the 
findings on the entire sample, the results show that the majority (38%) of call option trades 
centre around an off-market option premium of $0.00 with 21% of trades at an off-market 
premium of -$0.03. Figure 4-5 further reinforces the same findings on proportional off-
market premium for call option trades as for the entire sample with over 64% of trades 
centred on 0%. 
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Figure 4-6 Off-market Option Premium Histogram - Put Option Trades 
This figure shows a histogram of the dollar value of the off-market option premium for all Put off-market option trades.  The Off-market Option Premium is equal to 
Price - Standing Ask Price for Buy Trades and Standing Bid Price - Price for Sell Trades. 
 
 
 
  
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
-$0.18 -$0.15 -$0.12 -$0.09 -$0.06 -$0.03 $0.00 $0.03 $0.06 $0.09 $0.12 $0.15 $0.18 $0.21 $0.24
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 
Off-market Option Premium 
 161 
 
Figure 4-7 Proportional Off-market Option Premium Histogram - Put Option Trades 
This figure shows a histogram of the percentage value of the Proportional Off-market Option Premium for all Put off-market option trades.  The Proportional Off-market 
Option Premium is equal to (Price - Standing Ask Price)/Standing Ask Price for Buy Trades and (Standing Bid Price - Price)/Standing Bid Price for Sell Trades. 
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Table 4-3 Mean Off-market Option Premiums – By Call/Put 
This table provides the mean of the off-market option premiums for off-market Call and Put option trades 
within the sample.  The sample includes 276 off-market Call option trades, and 248 off-market Put option 
trades. 
 
  Option Type Mean p-value 
Off-market Option Premium  
Call -0.0306 0.0078 
Put -0.0578 <.0001 
Proportional Off-market Option Premium 
Call -0.0132 <.0001 
Put -0.0189 <.0001 
 
Figure 4-6 reports the off-market premium findings for off-market put option trades.  The 
results find that almost an equal amount (21%) of trades centre around off-market premiums 
of either -$0.03 and $0.00. In Figure 4-7 the results show that similar to off-market call 
option trades, off-market put option trades also centre around 0% proportional off-market 
premium. Table 4-3 presents the mean off-market option premiums for both Call and Put 
options. The findings reveal that all off-market option premiums are significant and 
negative. 
 
The results surrounding off-market premiums are consistent across both the entire sample 
and when categorised into call or put option trades. The findings imply that, on average, off-
market option traders do not face higher execution costs and, in the contrary, find price 
improvement beyond what is available on the Centralised Limit Order Book (CLOB).  
These findings lend support to the Grossman (1992) model that predicts that upstairs 
brokers are able to reduce execution costs by tapping into unexpressed liquidity. 
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Figure 4-8 Options Market Proportional Spreads - 5 Minute Interval 
This figure shows a graph of the Proportional Spread on the Options market in the 5-minute intervals prior to and following the off-market option trades.  The 
Proportional Spread is equal to (Standing Ask - Standing Bid)/Midpoint. 
 
 
 
 
5.60%
5.65%
5.70%
5.75%
5.80%
5.85%
5.90%
5.95%
6.00%
6.05%
-0
5
:0
0
-0
4
:4
5
-0
4
:3
0
-0
4
:1
5
-0
4
:0
0
-0
3
:4
5
-0
3
:3
0
-0
3
:1
5
-0
3
:0
0
-0
2
:4
5
-0
2
:3
0
-0
2
:1
5
-0
2
:0
0
-0
1
:4
5
-0
1
:3
0
-0
1
:1
5
-0
1
:0
0
-0
0
:4
5
-0
0
:3
0
-0
0
:1
5
0
0
:0
0
0
0
:1
5
0
0
:3
0
0
0
:4
5
0
1
:0
0
0
1
:1
5
0
1
:3
0
0
1
:4
5
0
2
:0
0
0
2
:1
5
0
2
:3
0
0
2
:4
5
0
3
:0
0
0
3
:1
5
0
3
:3
0
0
3
:4
5
0
4
:0
0
0
4
:1
5
0
4
:3
0
0
4
:4
5
0
5
:0
0
Proportional Spread
 164 
 
 
Table 4-4 Options Market Proportional Spreads - 1 Minute Intervals 
This table presents the mean proportional spreads on 
the options market at 1-minute intervals in the 5 
minutes prior to and following the off-market trades.  
The sample includes 524 off-market option trades.  
Time 00:00 represents the time of trade. 
 
Time (mm:ss) Mean p-value 
-05:00 0.0584 <.0001 
-04:00 0.0581 <.0001 
-03:00 0.0582 <.0001 
-02:00 0.0585 <.0001 
-01:00 0.0575 <.0001 
00:00 0.0587 <.0001 
01:00 0.0594 <.0001 
02:00 0.0588 <.0001 
03:00 0.0582 <.0001 
04:00 0.0587 <.0001 
05:00 0.0591 <.0001 
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Figure 4-9 Options Market Proportional Spreads - 1 Hour Interval 
This figure shows a graph of the Proportional Spread on the Options market in the 1-hour intervals prior to and following the off-market option trades.  The Proportional 
Spread is equal to (Standing Ask - Standing Bid)/Midpoint. 
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Table 4-5 Options Market Proportional Spreads - 10 Minute Intervals 
This table presents the mean proportional spreads on 
the options market at 10-minute intervals in the 1-hour 
prior to and following the off-market trades.  The 
sample includes 524 off-market option trades.  Time 
00:00 represents the time of trade. 
 
Time (hh:mm:ss) Mean p-value 
-01:00:00 0.0607 <.0001 
-00:50:00 0.0604 <.0001 
-00:40:00 0.0601 <.0001 
-00:30:00 0.0592 <.0001 
-00:20:00 0.0588 <.0001 
-00:10:00 0.0572 <.0001 
00:00:00 0.0587 <.0001 
00:10:00 0.0575 <.0001 
00:20:00 0.0600 <.0001 
00:30:00 0.0598 <.0001 
00:40:00 0.0612 <.0001 
00:50:00 0.0618 <.0001 
01:00:00 0.0625 <.0001 
 
Figure 4-8 and Figure 4-9 report the changes in option proportional spreads in 5-minute and 
1-hour intervals, respectively, around the entire sample of off-market option trades.  
Although it seems that proportional spreads increase from the time of the trade to 1 minute 
after in Figure 4-8, Figure 4-9 renders this finding insignificant when viewing the changes 
in proportional spreads in 1 hour intervals around the trades. Further, the graphs highlight 
the transient volatility of the proportional spreads, and there is no evidence of significant 
patterns prior to or following the off-market trades. Table 4-4 and Table 4-5 present the 
proportional spread at 1-minute and 10-minute intervals, respectively, and reveal no 
significant spread patterns. 
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Figure 4-10 Underlying Equity Market Proportional Spreads - 5 Minute Interval 
This figure shows a graph of the Proportional Spread on the Underlying Equity market in the 5-minute intervals prior to and following the off-market option trades.  The 
Proportional Spread is equal to (Standing Ask - Standing Bid)/Midpoint. 
 
 
 
 
0.04%
0.04%
0.04%
0.04%
0.05%
0.05%
0.05%
0.05%
0.05%
0.05%
0.05%
-0
5
:0
0
-0
4
:4
5
-0
4
:3
0
-0
4
:1
5
-0
4
:0
0
-0
3
:4
5
-0
3
:3
0
-0
3
:1
5
-0
3
:0
0
-0
2
:4
5
-0
2
:3
0
-0
2
:1
5
-0
2
:0
0
-0
1
:4
5
-0
1
:3
0
-0
1
:1
5
-0
1
:0
0
-0
0
:4
5
-0
0
:3
0
-0
0
:1
5
0
0
:0
0
0
0
:1
5
0
0
:3
0
0
0
:4
5
0
1
:0
0
0
1
:1
5
0
1
:3
0
0
1
:4
5
0
2
:0
0
0
2
:1
5
0
2
:3
0
0
2
:4
5
0
3
:0
0
0
3
:1
5
0
3
:3
0
0
3
:4
5
0
4
:0
0
0
4
:1
5
0
4
:3
0
0
4
:4
5
0
5
:0
0
Proportional Spread
 168 
 
 
Table 4-6 Underlying Equity Market Proportional Spreads - 1 Minute Intervals 
This table presents the mean proportional spreads on 
the underlying equity market at 1-minute intervals in 
the 5 minutes prior to and following the off-market 
trades.   The sample includes 524 off-market option 
trades.  Time 00:00 represents the time of trade. 
 
Time (mm:ss) Mean p-value 
-05:00 0.00048 <.0001 
-04:00 0.00047 <.0001 
-03:00 0.00048 <.0001 
-02:00 0.00047 <.0001 
-01:00 0.00048 <.0001 
00:00 0.00047 <.0001 
01:00 0.00047 <.0001 
02:00 0.00046 <.0001 
03:00 0.00046 <.0001 
04:00 0.00046 <.0001 
05:00 0.00046 <.0001 
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Figure 4-11 Underlying Equity Market Proportional Spreads -1 Hour Interval 
This figure shows a graph of the Proportional Spread on the Underlying Equity market in the 1-hour intervals prior to and following the off-market option trades.  The 
Proportional Spread is equal to (Standing Ask - Standing Bid)/Midpoint. 
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Table 4-7 Underlying Equity Market Proportional Spreads - 10 Minute Intervals 
This table presents the mean proportional spreads on the 
options market at 10-minute intervals in the 1-hour prior to 
and following the off-market trades.  The sample includes 
524 off-market option trades.  Time 00:00 represents the 
time of trade. 
 
Time (hh:mm:ss) Mean p-value 
-01:00:00 0.00053 <.0001 
-00:50:00 0.00050 <.0001 
-00:40:00 0.00047 <.0001 
-00:30:00 0.00046 <.0001 
-00:20:00 0.00047 <.0001 
-00:10:00 0.00045 <.0001 
00:00:00 0.00047 <.0001 
00:10:00 0.00046 <.0001 
00:20:00 0.00046 <.0001 
00:30:00 0.00049 <.0001 
00:40:00 0.00049 <.0001 
00:50:00 0.00048 <.0001 
01:00:00 0.00048 <.0001 
 
Figure 4-10 and Figure 4-11 present the underlying equity market proportional spreads in 5-
minute and 1-hour intervals, respectively, around the entire sample of off-market option 
trades. Similar to the options market, the results find no significant patterns in proportional 
spreads in both 5-minute or 1-hour intervals prior to and following the off-market option 
trades.  Further, Table 4-6 and Table 4-7 reveal no significant spread patterns in the 1-
minute and 10-minute intervals, respectively, around the trades. These results imply that off-
market option trades have no significant impact on the underlying equities market. This 
finding is contrary to the Cho and Engle (1999) “derivative hedge theory” model whereby 
option market makers actively hedge their positions in the underlying stock. 
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Figure 4-12 Options Market Proportional Ask- Call Buys -1 Hour Interval 
This figure shows a graph of the Proportional Ask on the Options market in the 1-hour intervals prior to and following the off-market Call option Buy trades.  The 
Proportional Ask is equal to (Standing Ask - Midpointt=0)/Midpointt=0 for a Buy Trade. 
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Table 4-8 Options Market Proportional Ask- Call Buys -10 Minute Intervals 
This table presents the mean Proportional Ask on the Options market in the 
1-hour intervals prior to and following the off-market Call option Buy 
trades.  The Proportional Ask is equal to (Standing Ask - 
Midpointt=0)/Midpointt=0 for a Buy Trade.  The sample includes 151 off-
market Call option buy trades.  Time 00:00 represents the time of trade. 
 
Time (hh:mm:ss) Mean Proportional Ask p-value 
-01:00:00 0.04653 <.0001 
-00:50:00 0.04991 <.0001 
-00:40:00 0.05155 <.0001 
-00:30:00 0.04827 <.0001 
-00:20:00 0.04727 <.0001 
-00:10:00 0.04549 <.0001 
00:00:00 0.04394 <.0001 
00:10:00 0.04757 <.0001 
00:20:00 0.05130 <.0001 
00:30:00 0.05253 <.0001 
00:40:00 0.05340 <.0001 
00:50:00 0.05469 <.0001 
01:00:00 0.05550 <.0001 
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Figure 4-13 Options Market Proportional Bid - Call Sells -1 Hour Interval 
This figure shows a graph of the Proportional Bid on the Options market in the 1-hour intervals prior to and following the off-market Call option Sell trades.  The 
Proportional Bid is equal to (Midpointt=0 - Standing Bid)/Midpointt=0 for a Sell Trade. 
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Table 4-9 Options Market Proportional Bid- Call Sells -10 Minute Intervals 
This table presents the mean Proportional Bid on the Options market 
in the 1-hour intervals prior to and following the off-market Call 
option Sell trades.  The Proportional Bid is equal to (Midpointt=0 - 
Standing Bid)/Midpointt=0 for a Sell Trade. The sample includes 125 
off-market Call option sell trades.  Time 00:00 represents the time of 
trade. 
 
Time (hh:mm:ss) Mean Proportional Bid p-value 
-01:00:00 0.056 <.0001 
-00:50:00 0.055 <.0001 
-00:40:00 0.053 <.0001 
-00:30:00 0.051 <.0001 
-00:20:00 0.047 <.0001 
-00:10:00 0.041 <.0001 
00:00:00 0.035 <.0001 
00:10:00 0.036 <.0001 
00:20:00 0.043 <.0001 
00:30:00 0.035 <.0001 
00:40:00 0.051 <.0001 
00:50:00 0.049 <.0001 
01:00:00 0.051 <.0001 
 
The proportional bid/ask statistic measures how much the ask moves from the prevailing 
midpoint at the time of a call option buy trade, and how much the bid moves from the 
prevailing midpoint from the time of the call option sell trade. Figure 4-12 shows the 
changes in the proportional ask 1-hour before and after off-market call option buy trades, 
while Figure 4-13 shows the changes in the proportional bid 1-hour before and after the off-
market call option sell trades. In both cases there is no evidence of significant patterns 
regarding the relevant proportional ask or bid. Table 4-8 and 4-9 present the mean 
proportional ask/bid at 10-minute intervals for call option buy and sell trades, respectively.  
Similar to the graphs, they show no evidence of significant price patterns. 
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Figure 4-14 Options Market Proportional Ask - Put Buys - 1 Hour Interval 
This figure shows a graph of the Proportional Ask on the Options market in the 1-hour intervals prior to and following the off-market Put option Buy trades.  The 
Proportional Ask is equal to (Standing Ask - Midpointt=0)/Midpointt=0 for a Buy Trade. 
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Table 4-10 Options Market Proportional Ask- Put Buys -10 Minute Intervals 
This table presents the mean Proportional Ask on the Options 
market in the 1-hour intervals prior to and following the off-market 
Put option Buy trades.  The Proportional Ask is equal to (Standing 
Ask - Midpointt=0)/Midpointt=0 for a Buy Trade.  The sample 
includes 158 off-market Put option buy trades.  Time 00:00 
represents the time of trade. 
 
Time (hh:mm:ss) Mean Proportional Ask p-value 
-01:00:00 0.058 <.0001 
-00:50:00 0.056 <.0001 
-00:40:00 0.053 <.0001 
-00:30:00 0.055 <.0001 
-00:20:00 0.050 <.0001 
-00:10:00 0.050 <.0001 
00:00:00 0.053 <.0001 
00:10:00 0.051 <.0001 
00:20:00 0.053 <.0001 
00:30:00 0.055 <.0001 
00:40:00 0.055 <.0001 
00:50:00 0.053 <.0001 
01:00:00 0.054 <.0001 
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Figure 4-15 Options Market Proportional Bid - Put Sells - 1 Hour Interval 
This figure shows a graph of the Proportional Bid on the Options market in the 1-hour intervals prior to and following the off-market Put option Sell trades.  The 
Proportional Bid is equal to (Midpointt=0 - Standing Bid)/Midpointt=0 for a Sell Trade. 
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Table 4-11 Options Market Proportional Bid- Put Sells -10 Minute Intervals 
This table presents the mean Proportional Bid on the Options market 
in the 1-hour intervals prior to and following the off-market Put 
option Sell trades.  The Proportional Bid is equal to (Midpointt=0 - 
Standing Bid)/Midpointt=0 for a Sell Trade. The sample includes 90 
off-market Put option sell trades.  Time 00:00 represents the time of 
trade. 
 
Time (hh:mm:ss) Mean Proportional Bid p-value 
-01:00:00 0.064 <.0001 
-00:50:00 0.065 <.0001 
-00:40:00 0.063 <.0001 
-00:30:00 0.055 <.0001 
-00:20:00 0.055 <.0001 
-00:10:00 0.051 <.0001 
00:00:00 0.048 <.0001 
00:10:00 0.049 <.0001 
00:20:00 0.046 <.0001 
00:30:00 0.047 <.0001 
00:40:00 0.047 <.0001 
00:50:00 0.048 <.0001 
01:00:00 0.049 <.0001 
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Figure 4-14 shows the changes in the proportional ask 1-hour before and after off-market 
Put option buy trades. The results show a short spike in the proportional ask in the minutes 
following the off-market put purchases, however in the context of the 1-hour interval 
following the trade this spike is insignificant. Figure 4-15 shows the changes in the 
proportional bid 1-hour before and after off-market put option sell trades, again, in which 
there are no significant patterns.  Table 4-10 and Table 4-11 confirm these findings. 
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Figure 4-16 Options Market Proportional Ask - Call Buys - 1 Hour Interval 
This figure shows a graph of the Proportional Ask on the Underlying Equity market in the 1-hour intervals prior to and following the off-market Call option Buy trades.  
The Proportional Ask is equal to (Standing Ask - Midpointt=0)/Midpointt=0 for a Buy Trade.  The proportional ask is examined because it is posited (according to the 
derivative hedge theory) that in the case of an informed call option purchase, market makers would protect themselves against a rise in the underlying equity and 
therefore would hedge themselves against the exposure by buying at the ask price in the underlying. 
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Table 4-12 Underlying Equity Market Proportional Ask- Call Buys -10 Minute Intervals 
This table presents the mean Proportional Ask on the underlying 
Equity market in the 1-hour intervals prior to and following the off-
market Call option Buy trades.  The Proportional Ask is equal to 
(Standing Ask - Midpointt=0)/Midpointt=0 for a Buy Trade.  The 
sample includes 151 off-market Call option buy trades.  Time 00:00 
represents the time of trade.  The proportional ask is examined 
because it is posited (according to the derivative hedge theory) that 
in the case of an informed call option purchase, market makers 
would protect themselves against a rise in the underlying equity and 
therefore would hedge themselves against the exposure by buying at 
the ask price in the underlying. 
 
Time (hh:mm:ss) Mean Proportional Ask p-value 
-01:00:00 0.002 0.706 
-00:50:00 0.007 0.154 
-00:40:00 0.005 0.357 
-00:30:00 0.002 0.609 
-00:20:00 -0.004 0.223 
-00:10:00 0.002 0.681 
00:00:00 0.000 0.996 
00:10:00 0.001 0.807 
00:20:00 0.004 0.312 
00:30:00 0.005 0.324 
00:40:00 0.010 0.080 
00:50:00 -0.001 0.648 
01:00:00 0.004 0.216 
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Figure 4-17 Options Market Proportional Bid - Call Sells - 1 Hour Interval 
This figure shows a graph of the Proportional Bid on the Underlying Equity market in the 1-hour intervals prior to and following the off-market Call option Sell trades.  
The Proportional Bid is equal to (Midpointt=0 - Standing Bid)/Midpointt=0 for a Sell Trade.  The proportional bid is examined because it is posited (according to the 
derivative hedge theory) that in the case of an informed call option sale, market makers would protect themselves against a fall in the underlying equity and therefore 
would hedge themselves against the exposure by selling at the bid price in the underlying. 
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Table 4-13 Underlying Equity Market Proportional Bid- Call Sells -10 Minute Intervals 
This table presents the mean Proportional Bid on the underlying 
Equity market in the 1-hour intervals prior to and following the off-
market Call option Sell trades.  The Proportional Bid is equal to 
(Midpointt=0 - Standing Bid)/Midpointt=0 for a Sell Trade. The 
sample includes 125 off-market Call option sell trades.  Time 00:00 
represents the time of trade.  The proportional bid is examined 
because it is posited (according to the derivative hedge theory) that 
in the case of an informed call option sale, market makers would 
protect themselves against a fall in the underlying equity and 
therefore would hedge themselves against the exposure by selling at 
the bid price in the underlying. 
 
Time (hh:mm:ss) Mean Proportional Bid p-value 
-01:00:00 0.002 0.692 
-00:50:00 -0.003 0.503 
-00:40:00 -0.002 0.677 
-00:30:00 0.001 0.772 
-00:20:00 -0.003 0.514 
-00:10:00 0.001 0.893 
00:00:00 -0.003 0.489 
00:10:00 0.003 0.303 
00:20:00 -0.007 0.266 
00:30:00 -0.008 0.198 
00:40:00 -0.005 0.271 
00:50:00 -0.007 0.113 
01:00:00 -0.003 0.532 
 
The underlying equities market is examined because options and equity markets must move 
together in the absence of arbitrage.  Further, this analysis investigates the Cho and Engle 
(1999) “derivative hedge theory” by directly surveying the options and underlying equities 
markets around large off-market option trades. Figure 4-16 presents the results for the 
proportional ask in the underlying equities around call option purchases. The proportional 
ask is examined because it is posited (according to the derivative hedge theory) that in the 
case of an informed call option purchase, market makers would protect themselves against a 
rise in the underlying equity and therefore would hedge themselves against the exposure by 
buying at the ask price in the underlying, and vice versa for call option sells.  Figure 4-16 
shows no evidence of price patterns in the underlying equities prior to and following the off-
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market call option purchases.  Table 4-12 presents the results of the mean proportional ask 
at 10-minute intervals around the off-market call option buy trades and show no significant 
price changes. Similarly, Figure 4-17 presents the results for the proportional bid in the 
underlying equities around call option sales. Again, it reveals similar results and no apparent 
price patterns. Table 4-13 presents the results of the mean proportional bid at 10-minute 
intervals around the off-market call option sell trades, and show no significant price 
changes. Together these results suggest that there is no evidence of option market makers 
hedging their exposure to large off-market call option trades in the underlying equities in the 
1-hour prior to and following the trades. 
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Figure 4-18 Options Market Proportional Bid - Put Buys - 1 Hour Interval 
This figure shows a graph of the Proportional Bid on the Underlying Equity market in the 1-hour intervals prior to and following the off-market Put option Buy trades.  
The Proportional Bid is equal to (Midpointt=0 - Standing Bid)/Midpointt=0 for a Buy Trade.  The proportional bid is examined because it is posited (according to the 
derivative hedge theory) that in the case of an informed put option purchase, market makers would protect themselves against a fall in the underlying equity and 
therefore would hedge themselves against the exposure by selling at the bid price in the underlying. 
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Table 4-14 Underlying Equity Market Proportional Bid- Put Buys -10 Minute Intervals 
This table presents the mean Proportional Bid on the underlying 
Equity market in the 1-hour intervals prior to and following the off-
market Put option Buy trades.  The Proportional Bid is equal to 
(Midpointt=0 - Standing Bid)/Midpointt=0 for a Buy Trade. The 
sample includes 158 off-market Put option buy trades.  Time 00:00 
represents the time of trade.  The proportional bid is examined 
because it is posited (according to the derivative hedge theory) that 
in the case of an informed put option purchase, market makers 
would protect themselves against a fall in the underlying equity and 
therefore would hedge themselves against the exposure by selling at 
the bid price in the underlying. 
 
Time (hh:mm:ss) Mean Proportional Bid p-value 
-01:00:00 0.003 0.174 
-00:50:00 0.003 0.162 
-00:40:00 0.003 0.142 
-00:30:00 0.003 0.176 
-00:20:00 0.001 0.010 
-00:10:00 0.001 0.002 
00:00:00 0.002 0.260 
00:10:00 0.000 0.425 
00:20:00 0.002 0.366 
00:30:00 0.000 0.312 
00:40:00 0.002 0.378 
00:50:00 0.002 0.361 
01:00:00 0.002 0.415 
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Figure 4-19 Options Market Proportional Ask - Put Sells - 1 Hour Interval 
This figure shows a graph of the Proportional Ask on the Underlying Equity market in the 1-hour intervals prior to and following the off-market Put option Sell trades.  
The Proportional Ask is equal to (Standing Ask - Midpointt=0)/Midpointt=0 for a Sell Trade.  The proportional ask is examined because it is posited (according to the 
derivative hedge theory) that in the case of an informed put option sell, market makers would protect themselves against a rise in the underlying equity and therefore 
would hedge themselves against the exposure by buying at the ask price in the underlying. 
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Table 4-15 Underlying Equity Market Proportional Ask- Put Sells -10 Minute Intervals 
This table presents the mean Proportional Ask on the underlying 
Equity market in the 1-hour intervals prior to and following the off-
market Put option Sell trades.  The Proportional Ask is equal to 
(Standing Ask - Midpointt=0)/Midpointt=0 for a Sell Trade.  The 
sample includes 90 off-market Put option sell trades.  Time 00:00 
represents the time of trade.  The proportional ask is examined 
because it is posited (according to the derivative hedge theory) that 
in the case of an informed put option sell, market makers would 
protect themselves against a rise in the underlying equity and 
therefore would hedge themselves against the exposure by buying at 
the ask price in the underlying. 
 
Time (hh:mm:ss) Mean Proportional Ask p-value 
-01:00:00 0.003 0.646 
-00:50:00 0.003 0.681 
-00:40:00 0.012 0.144 
-00:30:00 0.012 0.137 
-00:20:00 -0.003 0.386 
-00:10:00 0.002 0.781 
00:00:00 0.005 0.314 
00:10:00 0.000 0.358 
00:20:00 0.000 0.880 
00:30:00 0.000 0.372 
00:40:00 0.006 0.301 
00:50:00 0.006 0.283 
01:00:00 0.012 0.132 
 
Figure 4-18 presents the results for the proportional bid in the underlying equities around 
put option purchases.  The proportional bid is examined because it is posited (according to 
the derivative hedge theory) that in the case of an informed put option purchase, market 
makers would protect themselves against a fall in the underlying equity and therefore would 
hedge themselves against the exposure by selling at the bid price in the underlying, and vice 
versa for put option sells. Figure 4-18 shows no evidence of price patterns in the underlying 
equities prior to and following the off-market put option purchases.  Similarly, Figure 4-19 
presents the results for the proportional ask in the underlying equities around put option 
sales.  Again, it reveals similar results and no apparent price patterns.  Table 4-14 and Table 
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4-15 present the proportional bid/ask at 10-minute intervals for off-market put option buys 
and sells, respectively.  The results show no evidence of significant price patterns around the 
trades. Together, the results suggest that there is no evidence of option market makers 
hedging their exposure to large off-market put option trades in the underlying equities in the 
1-hour prior to and following the trades.
29
 
 
4.6.2 Price and Information effects of off-market option trades 
 
Table 4-16 presents several execution cost measures for seller- and buyer- initiated off-
market option trades.  Across all categories there is no evidence of leakage effects or post-
trade effects.  The results, however, show that both Call buys and sells lead to a statistically 
significant positive temporary component of price change, which represents the 
compensation to liquidity providers. 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 We also examine proportional bid/ask in both the options and underlying equities markets for 5-minute 
intervals when the data is split into call/put sells and buys and find similar empirical results. 
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Table 4-16 Intraday Price and Information effects of off-market option trades 
This table reports the components of price effects in the Underlying Equity market for seller- and buyer-initiated off-market Call and Put option trades during the 
sample period.  All price effects are adjusted for market movements in the Adjusted All Ordinaries Share Index.  The adjustment is made by subtracting the 
relevant market index return from the stock's return.  The trades are classified into buy and sell trades using the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. 
 
Contract 
Trade 
Direction 
n Statistic 
Leakage Effect = ln(P0) 
- ln(Pd) 
Post-Trade Effect = ln(P1) 
- ln(P0) 
Temporary Effect = 
ln(Pb) - ln(P1) 
P(0) = md before trade P(0) = md before trade Pb = block trade price 
P(d) = md -1Day close P(1) = md +1Day close P(1) = md +1Day close 
CALL 
BUY 151 
Mean 0.0021 -0.0014 0.0146 
P-Value 0.73 0.77 0.02 
SELL 125 
Mean -0.0015 0.0025 0.0108 
P-Value 0.78 0.45 0.05 
PUT 
BUY 158 
Mean 0.0000 -0.0007 0.0007 
P-Value 0.98 0.79 0.78 
SELL 90 
Mean 0.0052 0.0071 0.0023 
P-Value 0.29 0.41 0.67 
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To summarize, off-market option trades present no evidence of a leakage effect which 
is the price movements that occur in the CLOB as a result of the large options trade 
being shopped around and negotiated among numerous counterparties off-market.  
This finding is in contrast to Keim and Madhavan (1996).  However, as previously 
noted, the findings of Keim and Madhavan (1996) cannot be generalised as their 
study was based on the trades of one particular firm. Further, the results also reveal 
that off-market option trades have no significant post trade impact, which represents 
the change in market value of a security following the trades.  These results suggests 
that off-market options trades are largely perceived to be uninformed by the market.  
The results also suggest that off-market call option trades require compensation to 
liquidity providers in the form of a higher price than the equilibrium price.  Put option 
trades experience no significant temporary price change following the trades. The 
results regarding off-market call option trades are consistent with Booth et al. (2002), 
Kraus and Stoll (1972), and Holthausen et al. (1987). 
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Table 4-17 Long Horizon Return Behaviour surrounding off-market option trades 
This table reports the cumulative abnormal returns in the Underlying Equity market in the 30 days 
surrounding the off-market option trades.  The sample includes all off-market option trades in our 
sample, categorized in to Puts and Calls and Buys and Sells.  The abnormal returns are grouped into 
Pre-event (CAR-2,-30), Post-event (CAR+2,+30), and Event (CAR-1,+1) periods.  Returns are 
calculated using the OLS market model.  Day 0 is the announcement day of the trade. N reports the 
sample size per category, Mean reports the average cumulative return during the period, and p-value 
reports the significance level. 
 
Contract Trade Direction Event Period N Mean p-value 
CALL 
BUY 
CAR-2,-30 151 0.0382 0.33 
CAR-1,+1 151 0.0129 0.03 
CAR+2,+30 151 0.0412 0.19 
SELL 
CAR-2,-30 125 0.0559 0.11 
CAR-1,+1 125 0.0099 0.06 
CAR+2,+30 125 0.0194 0.45 
PUT 
BUY 
CAR-2,-30 158 -0.0135 0.49 
CAR-1,+1 158 0.0009 0.74 
CAR+2,+30 158 -0.0069 0.73 
SELL 
CAR-2,-30 90 -0.0336 0.36 
CAR-1,+1 90 -0.0001 0.99 
CAR+2,+30 90 0.0075 0.86 
 
4.6.3 Price Behaviour surrounding off-market option trades 
 
Table 4-17 provides a summary of the behaviour of the underlying share prices 
around off-market option trades split into call and put option buy and sell trades.  The 
results indicate that on the event dates (CAR-1,+1) share prices of both buy and sell 
trades in call options increase significantly. Off-market call option purchases on 
average lead to a 1.29% increase in the underlying share price, while off-market call 
option sales on average lead to a 0.99% increase. There is no evidence of significant 
underlying share price changes on the event dates of both put option buys and sells.  
Further, the results show that the pre-event (CAR-2,-30) and post-event (CAR+2,+30) 
abnormal returns are not significant across all categories. Overall, these results 
suggest there are no particular price patterns that lead to large off-market option 
trades.  In addition, the findings do not provide support for the information hypothesis 
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that predicts that the abnormal returns should be positive (negative) on the trade dates 
and in the post event period following the call option buy and put option sell (call 
option sell and put options buy) trades. 
 
4.7 Summary 
 
Prior empirical studies examine the role of off-market trading in liquidity provision 
for larger traders in the equities market, also referred to as block trading.  The 
literature suggests that off-market trading lowers execution costs for large traders by 
reducing adverse selection costs as off-market broker-dealers can screen out informed 
traders and tap into unexpressed liquidity (Booth et al., 2002; and Bessembinder and 
Venkataraman, 2004).  In addition, it is posited that off-market trading improves 
market quality by supplementing liquidity when on-market liquidity is not sufficient.  
Although these findings are based on empirical studies examining the equities market, 
this study tests these findings for the Australian Options Market (AOM) and the 
underlying equities market. 
 
Results reveal that large off-market option trades on average receive price 
improvement. An analysis of bid and ask quotes indicates that large off-market option 
trades usually trade within the quoted best bid and ask quotes at the time of the trade 
across both put and call options, and across a number of characteristics including 
whether the trade was buyer or seller initiated.  Further, analysis of bid-ask quotes 
around the trades at different time intervals from 5-minutes to 1-hour reveals no 
significant change before, during, and after the trades take place, both in the options 
market and the underlying equities market. These results imply that the market, on 
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average, perceives large off-market option trades to be uninformed and therefore 
mostly utilitarian in nature. 
 
The price impact analysis reveals that all large off-market option trades across all 
categories have an insignificant impact on the permanent component of price changes.  
However, an analysis of the components of execution costs uncovers that both off-
market call buy and sell trades have a significantly positive impact on the temporary 
component of price change following the block trade. An examination of share price 
behaviour and abnormal returns in the days surrounding the off-market option trades 
finds no evidence of a price run-up leading up to the trades or a price continuation 
following the trades across all categories. It is noted that on the trade dates the share 
prices of both off-market call buy and sells increase significantly. 
 
Together, the findings suggest that off-market options are able to tap into unexpressed 
liquidity in the upstairs market as they usually trade within the best standing bid and 
ask prices, in support of Grossman (1992). Further, the results lend support to the 
Seppi (1990) prediction that upstairs trading is also able to reduce execution costs for 
large traders by reducing adverse selection costs. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
 
This dissertation investigates market integrity issues in financial markets. The 
importance of market integrity issues is underscored by the increasing pace of change 
in financial markets as result of evolving financial instruments, markets, and 
technological advances. As market integrity concerns fair and informed markets, 
understanding the impact of novel market structures, financial instruments, trading 
procedures, and information disclosure practices is relevant to exchanges, investors, 
regulators, and academics. The literature reviews in Chapter 2, 3, and 4 identify a 
number of gaps in the existing literature. 
 
First, the impact of information disclosure practices and the handling of confidential 
information are investigated in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS) market for European Union Allowances (EUA).  Prior literature only examines 
Phase I of the EU ETS.  Phase II of the EU ETS warrants examination as Phase I was 
initiated as a trial phase in which no real carbon emissions abatement occurred.  Phase 
II is the first Kyoto Protocol compliant phase of emissions trading and therefore likely 
to yield positive emissions abatement. This dissertation adds to the literature by 
investigating the impact of Phase II European Union emissions trading scheme (EU 
ETS) national allocation plan (NAP) announcements on carbon markets. 
 
Second, with the proliferation of new technologies such as broker execution engines 
and high frequency algorithmic trading, the growing trend of cancelling trades that 
have already executed and been reported have emerged as a developing concern.  
These trades can lead to distorted prices among other market wide statistics.  Further, 
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there is evidence to suggest that some of these trades are in violation of exchange 
trading rules and possibly manipulative in nature.  Thus, this dissertation initiates the 
first comprehensive investigation of trade cancellations to understand their magnitude 
and the impact on market integrity. This dissertation draws from theoretical and 
empirical research on market manipulation and applies it to the case of trade 
cancellations. Therefore, this dissertation also contributes to the literature on 
emerging forms of market manipulation. 
 
Finally, although a large amount of theoretical and empirical literature examines 
block trading or upstairs trading in equity markets, there is a lack of empirical 
evidence for derivatives markets. Therefore, this dissertation contributes to the 
literature by examining the impact of large off-market trading in the options market. 
 
Chapter 2 investigates the impact of Phase II EU ETS national allocation plan (NAP) 
announcements on carbon markets. The analysis is based on the notion that 
commodity markets are information driven mechanisms that determine equilibrium 
prices. If markets are active, the information is quickly disseminated among market 
participants who, upon trading, determine a fair price. Prices can also reflect 
information that is not publicly announced by a governmental agency but yet 
successfully forecasted by private agents or leaked by insiders. 
 
Results indicate that Phase II NAP announcements have an effect on both Phase I and 
II front futures and the sole Phase II futures contracts. That is, Phase II NAP 
announcements act as new information for the Phase I EU ETS. Phase I verifications 
announcements, however, only affect the Phase I & II front futures, which is 
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consistent with the information inherent in Phase I verifications, and the no banking 
of allowances between phases restriction. The results also find evidence of significant 
returns on the days leading up to both NAP and Verifications information becoming 
public. Further, there are no significant differences in the volatility of carbon returns 
before and after NAP and Verifications announcements. 
 
Consistent with the findings of Mansanet-Bataller and Pardo (2007) regarding Phase I 
NAP announcements, the results demonstrate that there is significant abnormal 
returns up to 3-days prior to several Phase II NAP-related events, and that there is an 
absence of volatility effects when the information becomes public. Together, these 
findings suggest a systematic leakage of information across all types of 
announcements. Hence, findings in this chapter lend further support to the request 
made by the European Federation of Energy Traders (EFET, 2006) to the European 
Commission for carbon price sensitive information that was “accurate, final and 
published in such a way as to be available to all market participants at the same 
time”. 
 
Chapter 3 initiates the first comprehensive investigation of trade cancellations to 
understand their magnitude and the impact on market integrity. Market manipulation 
is defined as a deliberate attempt to interfere with the free and fair operation of a 
market and create artificial, false or misleading appearances with respect to the price 
of, or market for, a security. The investigation finds that trade cancellations as a 
proportion of total traded value on the ASX almost doubled from 0.69% to 1.16% 
between 2006 and 2009.  The results suggest that a subset of cancelled trades can be 
defined as manipulative in nature. There is evidence that trade cancellations, on 
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average, distort market VWAP and exhibit return reversal, volume, and volatility 
patterns consistent with market manipulation. 
 
The findings also suggest that a substantial quantity of ‘crossed’ trades that are 
subsequently cancelled on the ASX may actually be illegal ‘wash trades’ intended to 
manipulate the market. The results on returns, volume, and volatility around the 
crossings are consistent with the intended effects of manipulative ‘wash trades’.  
Hence, these findings lend further support to the proposed changes recommended in 
the ASX REVIEW on Algorithmic Trading and Market Access Arrangements 
published on 8 February 2010.  They include the rule requirement that all brokers 
implement measures such as filters or algorithmic programming enhancements to 
prevent wash trades, and the proposed ASX review of fees for trades that are 
subsequently cancelled. 
 
Following the presentation of certain parts of this investigation to the ASX, the ASX 
has reviewed their trade cancellations policy (TCP) and implemented the following 
changes in 2011.  They have implemented a ‘qualifying’ cancellation price range in 
which trades can be can be cancelled without dispute by the ASX, a 10-minute 
window in which requests for cancellation must be made to the ASX, and the 
introduction of a cancellation fee schedule.  The ASX believes that these changes will 
provide market users with additional certainty as to when trades will and will not be 
cancelled, minimise the impact of cancellations on the market by tightening the time-
frame in which cancellation requests can be made, and streamline the cancellation 
process and provide quicker response times to cancellation requests by reducing, to 
the greatest extent practicable, ASX’s exercise of discretion. 
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Chapter 4 examines the impact of large off-market option trades on the AOM. 
Previous literature on block trading on equity markets finds that off-market trading 
lowers execution costs for large traders by reducing adverse selection costs and 
improves market quality by tapping into unexpressed liquidity in the upstairs market.  
Using a proprietary data set provided by the AOM, results show that off-market 
options are able to tap into unexpressed liquidity in the upstairs market as they usually 
trade within the best standing bid and ask prices, in support of Grossman (1992).  
Further, the results lend support to the Seppi (1990) prediction that upstairs trading is 
also able to reduce execution costs for large traders by reducing adverse selection 
costs. 
 
The evidence shows that there are no significant changes in bid-ask spreads prior to 
and following the off-market option trades. Focussing on price impact on the 
underlying equities market, the findings provide no support for the Cho and Engle 
(1999) ‘derivate hedge theory’. Leakage effects reveal that that there is no evidence of 
front running or a revision in the equilibrium price of the underlying stock prior to the 
large off-market option trade. However, following the off-market option trades there 
is evidence of positive temporary effects and compensation to liquidity providers in 
the case of call option trades. An examination of returns in the days surrounding the 
large off-market option trades also reveals no significant price patterns.  Overall, the 
results suggest that the market, on average, perceives off-market option trades to be 
uninformed and therefore mostly utilitarian in nature. 
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Appendix 
Table A-1 
This table lists all the announcements analysed in Chapter 2, and their corresponding dates. 
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